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ABSTRACT 
AMPLIFYING LGBTQIA+ PRESENCE THROUGH QUEER LEGAL WORLDMAKING: 
THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN RENEGOTIATING VALUE HIERARCHIES IN POLITICAL 
ARGUMENT 
 
by  
Hilary A. Rasmussen 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2017 
Under the Supervision of Professor Leslie Harris 
 
In this dissertation, I propose to better explain the argumentative processes by which 
communities are constituted in political crisis moments and how, within those moments, social 
movement and legal rhetorics co-create the rhetorical possibilities for queer legal worldmaking. 
Specifically, I argue that affect functions as an important tool within argumentative loci of 
presence (magnitude, proximity, and severity) and is intimately connected to value-warrants in 
political argument. When the affective resonance of polices exclusive of LGBTQIA+ persons is 
made present, deeply held values can be reappropriated in order to enact political change. Queer 
legal worldmaking is less about the creation of a single policy, but of a new rhetorical history 
and tradition that enables a worldview that honors the authenticity and legitimacy of queer lives. 
A queered legal rhetoric necessitates several argumentative processes ranging from redefinition, 
renegotiation of value hierarchies and community boundaries. 
Public and legal deliberation tends to be conservative and resist change, but my analysis 
proves that social movements can engage these seemingly stagnate sites of influence with 
arguments built around fulcrums of shared experiences. This dissertation includes three case 
studies that reveal how members of marginalized communities and their legal representatives can 
translate protest into policy-making. Through loci of presence, advocates in the case studies 
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rhetorically embodied the threat posed to LGBTQIA+ individuals and broader communities by 
heteronormative policy, thereby making that threat legally relevant. As only one piece of a much 
larger constellation of rhetorical practices, legal rhetorical theory alone inadequately 
encapsulates the process by which progressive advocates argue for the public recognition of 
queer partnerships and families. I develop the dialectical relationship between social movement 
and legal rhetorical theory in order to propose a prescriptive vision for queer legal worldmaking. 
The vehicles with which these discourses impact one another enlighten the process of 
community formation and public advocacy in the realm of political transformation. 
 Keywords: Queer legal worldmaking, loci of presence, affect, value hierarchies, political 
argument, social movements, constituting community  
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Queer Legal Worldmaking: 
Intersections between Legal and Social Movement Rhetorics 
Perhaps no court case regarding the expansion of LGBTQIA+ socio-political rights is 
more proximal in public memory than Obergefell v. Hodges (Obergefell).1 In June of 2015, the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a controversial decision to guarantee to same-sex couples the 
fundamental right to marry under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the U.S. 
Constitution.2 The culmination of six separate lawsuits in federal district courts in Kentucky, 
Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee, Obergefell constituted a turning point in the fight for marriage 
                                                          
1 The acronym LGBTQIA+ encompasses many queer and gender non-conforming sexual 
identifications. Standing for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, asexual, the 
acronym suits my argument, which contends that many of the legal debates regarding the 
expansion of rights for those in non-heterosexual relationships are instrumental in developing the 
rhetorical tools for broader legal debate concerning the expansion of rights for non-heterosexual 
identities, lifeways, and families. That said there will be times in this dissertation when I use the 
words gay and lesbian or queer instead. In such cases, I refer to particular legal contexts in which 
the scope of the debate extended only to gay and lesbian couples or the discourse engaged with 
queer theory, specifically.  
2 The case Loving vs. Virginia is one of the legal precursors to the Obergefell decision in 2015. 
U.S. Supreme Court heard Loving in on April 10, 1967. Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and 
Richard Loving, a white man, were married in 1957 in the District of Columbia. After returning 
to their state of residence, Virginia, the Lovings were charged with violating Virginia’s anti-
miscegenation statute, which banned inter-racial marriages. After being found guilty, the U.S. 
Supreme Court unanimously overruled. The Court held that anti-miscegenation laws violated the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court rejected 
Virginia’s argument that “the statute was legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and 
whites.” The Court’s decision marked a significant moment in legal argument by bestowing the 
power to choose a marriage partner with the individual, not with the state. For more information 
on Loving see Loving vs. Virginia, No. 395 (United States Supreme Court June 12, 1967). 
In addition, Zablocki vs. Redhail was useful legal precedent for those arguing for marriage 
equality in Obergefell. The U.S. Supreme Court heard the case on October 4, 1977. Milwaukee 
County Clerk Thomas E. Zablocki declined to issue the license to Roger C. Redhail under a state 
statute because Redhail owed more than $3,700 in child support. After a federal district court 
ruled against Zablocki, he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court who held that Wisconsin's statute 
violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court’s decision reaffirmed that marriage was a 
fundamental right, echoing the Loving decision that affirmed that the state does not have an 
interest in restricting the right to marriage. For more information on Zablocki vs. Redhail see 
Zablocki vs. Redhail, No. 76-879 (United States Supreme Court January 18, 1978). 
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equality. No longer would individual state legislatures, courts, and voters determine how and 
when same-sex unions would be publically recognized as legitimate marital relationships. In the 
majority opinion, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the High Court acknowledged, “states 
have contributed to the fundamental character of marriage by placing it at the center of many 
facets of the legal and social order,” yet “there is no difference between same- and opposite-sex 
couples with respect to this principle.”3 As such, the nation’s highest Court ordered the 
“constellation of benefits” denied to same-sex couples by states unwilling to recognize their 
marriages be extended to these families.  
The Obergefell decision was cumulative as it was monumental. Well known and highly 
publicized, Obergefell was the capstone on a collective push for marriage equality in the nation.4 
Each related court case and legislative action that led to Obergefell revitalized the question of 
marriage, partnership, and family in legal and public discourse and marked a moment wherein 
communities defined through marriage and family could be reconstituted to include LGBTQIA+ 
individuals. Within each state where the issue was legally debated, voters, legislators, and judges 
responded, deliberating who would be allowed to participate in state-sanctioned marriage and 
family, and what those choices meant for those already included in that community. Before 
Obergefell and beyond the scope of marriage alone, public deliberation and legal debate about 
same-sex partnership and public life had been vigorous, with several cases coming before the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Bowers v. Hardwick, Romer v. Evans, and Lawrence v. Texas, to name a 
few, all played key roles in establishing a legal discursive history on the topic of homosexuality 
                                                          
3 Anthony Kennedy, Opinion of the Court (US Supreme Court June 26, 2015). 
4 Prior to the ruling, thirty-six states had legalized same-sex marriage after heated legislative 
battles. 
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in private and public sectors of life.5 Yet, progress was dependent on legal and public discourse. 
A case must be brought to the Court for consideration and public advocates must renegotiate the 
boundaries of what relationships, identities, lifeways, and families “count” as recognizable by 
the State. In the cases that led up to the Obergefell decision, progressive advocates worked from 
the ground up, organizing grassroots movements geared toward swaying public opinion in favor 
of expanding rights to gay and lesbian couples. In the process, advocates in and out of the 
courtroom confronted and renegotiated discursive boundaries that separate partners from 
spouses, guardians from parents, houses from homes. Far from a top-down model of political 
action, progressive LGBTQIA+ advocacy and activism in the U.S. has continually seized the 
opportunity afforded by each successive deliberative moment.  
The efforts of progressive advocates illustrate the dialectical relationship between social 
movements and the law. Social movement discourses have historically influenced the formation 
of policy and policy has both hampered and enabled the rhetorical choices available to public 
advocates. The vehicles with which these discourses impact one another enlighten the process of 
community formation and dialectic negotiation in the realm of political transformation. I propose 
to better explain the argumentative processes by which communities are constituted in political 
crisis moments and how, within those moments, social movement and legal rhetorics co-create 
the rhetorical possibilities for queer legal worldmaking. More specifically, I argue that affect 
                                                          
5 Bowers was a case brought to the Supreme Court in 1986. The Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a Georgia law criminalized homosexual sodomy. Bowers was eventually 
overturned in a later case. I will discuss Bowers in detail in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Romer 
was a case brought to the Supreme Court in 1996. The Court invalidated an amendment to 
Colorado’s Constitution that prevent the State from protecting persons against discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. Lawrence was a case brought to the Supreme Court in 2003. In their 
decision, the Court overruled Bowers, contending that criminalizing homosexual relations 
violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. I will discuss 
Lawrence in detail in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
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functions as an important tool within argumentative loci of presence (magnitude, proximity, and 
severity) and is intimately connected value-warrants in political argument. When LGBTQIA+ 
persons and their allies are rhetorically embodied in arguments against exclusive policies, deeply 
held values can be reappropriated in order to enact political change. 
The interaction between legal and social movement rhetorics necessitates an assertion of 
similarity of particulars across contexts. Several scholars have proffered the concomitant 
processes of amplification and analogy as central to creating presence for premises in 
argumentation.6 Chaim Perelman discusses the basic purpose of rational legal discourse as a 
process wherein similar situations should meet with similar argumentative premises and 
conclusions.7 Ultimately, to achieve justice, which is the core motivator behind legal debate, 
similarities must be determined as a key facet of “equality of treatment.”8 Postulating further the 
notion of justice, Perelman contends that a fundamental aspect must be “to each the same thing,” 
that  
All people taken into account must be treated in the same way, without regard to any of 
their distinguishing particularities. Young or old, well or sick, rich or poor, virtuous or 
criminal, aristocrat or boor, white or black, guilty or innocent – it is just that all be treated 
in the same way, without any discrimination or differentiation.9  
Thus, as no one situation is identical in particulars to one that came before, analogous reasoning 
                                                          
6 Chaim Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric (University of Notre Dame Press, 1990); Chaim 
Perelman, Justice, Law, and Argument: Essays on Moral and Legal Reasoning, vol. 142 (Boston: 
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980); Chaim Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of 
Argument, First (Routledge, 1963); Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New 
Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, Translated by John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1969); John M. Murphy, “Presence, Analogy, and 
Earth in the Balance,” Argumentation & Advocacy 31 (1994): 1–16. 
7 Perelman, Justice, Law, and Argument: Essays on Moral and Legal Reasoning, 142:x. 
8 Ibid., 142:xi. 
9 Ibid., 142:2–3. 
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is a useful rhetorical tool with which to establish similarity as a pathway toward achieving justice 
in a legal context. Echoing Perelman’s assertions about the utility of analogy, John Murphy 
argues that analogic reasoning enabled Al Gore to create a more powerful text in his book, Earth 
in the Balance. Through three analogies in particular, Gore illustrated the connective tissue 
between environmental catastrophes and the man-made ravages of nuclear war and provides the 
necessary language with which to adequately encapsulate the magnitude of the problem.10 
Through analogy, Gore accomplished two rhetorical outcomes. First, he amplified the existence 
of the problem of environmental degradation while also establishing similarity to other 
catastrophic occurrences. This dissertation adds to these prior works by investigating the process 
of amplification and analogous reasoning within the legal context of LGBTQIA+ rights 
discourses, specifically. Amplifying the rhetorical existence of same-sex couples and their 
children, while also analogizing queer families and lifeways to those of their heterosexual 
counterparts, have been vital processes within progressive legal rhetoric.  
Notably, the constitution of community is a vital process by which social movement and 
legal discourses interact. A primary project of queer discourses has been to unseat the perceived 
naturalness of the heteronormative paradigm, and one of the primary vehicles for that project has 
been a transformation in language. Queer persons have worked to transform the ways in which 
bodies can be named, read, and behave in order to create more inclusive communities that 
embrace queer identities, lifeways, and families. Translating the project of queer worldmaking 
into a legal context has indeed been, according to James Boyd White, “something we do with our 
minds, with language, and with each other.”11 Queer legal worldmaking is less about the creation 
                                                          
10 Murphy, “Presence, Analogy, and Earth in the Balance.” 
11 James Boyd White, Heracles’ Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law (Madison 
WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), ix. 
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of a single policy, but of a new rhetorical history and tradition that enables a worldview that 
honors the authenticity and legitimacy of queer lives.12 A queered legal rhetoric necessitates 
several argumentative processes ranging from redefinition, renegotiation of value hierarchies and 
community boundaries, and the affective experiences that when rhetorically embodied, make 
those efforts persuasive. 
Through several case studies of LGBTQIA+ advocacy, this dissertation contributes to an 
investigation of how members of marginalized communities and their legal representatives 
translate protest into policy-making. More foundationally, I investigate how these parties claim 
the authority to reframe public deliberation around privacy, marriage, and family to suit a 
queered reality. As a step toward deeper understanding, I develop the linkage between social 
movement and legal rhetorical theory in order to propose a prescriptive vision for queer legal 
worldmaking. In the pages that follow, I illustrate the rhetorical problem for LGBTQIA+ 
advocates by providing a brief overview of how activists in the homophile era sought political 
agency through legal and extra-legal channels and set the stage for the rhetorical options 
available to advocates in the courtroom. As only one piece of a much larger constellation of 
                                                          
12 John M. Sloop and Charles E. Morris III, “‘What Lips These Lips Have Kissed’: Refiguring 
the Politics of Queer Public Kissing,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 3, no. 1 
(2006): 1–26; Charles E. Morris III, “Sunder the Children: Abraham Lincoln’s Queer Rhetorical 
Pedagogy.,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 99, no. 4 (2013): 1–28; Charles E. Morris III, 
“Context’s Critic, Invisible Traditions, and Queering Rhetorical History,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 101, no. 1 (2015): 225–43; Sarah Mann, “‘You’re Just a Stripper That Came Out of a 
Time Machine’: Operation Snatch’s Queer World-Making and Sex-Working Class Politics,” 
Canadian Theatre Review 158, no. 1 (2014): 50–53; Isaac West, “Queer Generosities,” Western 
Journal of Communication 77, no. 5 (2013): 538–41; Dustin Bradley Goltz and Jason Zingsheim, 
eds., Queer Praxis : Questions for LGBTQ Worldmaking (New York, NY: Peter Lang 
Publishing, Inc., 2015); Peter Odell Campbell, “The Procedural Queer: Substantive Due Process, 
Lawrence v. Texas , and Queer Rhetorical Futures,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 98, no. 2 
(2012): 203–29; Kyra Pearson and Nina Maria Lozano-Reich, “Cultivating Queer Publics with 
an Uncivil Tongue: Queer Eye ’S Critical Performances of Desire.,” Text and Performance 
Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2009): 383–402. 
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rhetorical practices, legal rhetorical theory alone inadequately encapsulates the process by which 
progressive advocates argue for the public recognition of queer partnerships and families. 
Leaning heavily on value warrants in legal argumentation, progressive queer advocacy in legal 
contexts also challenges the hierarchical relationship between value clusters associated with 
“privacy,” “marriage and family,” and “the home.” The final part of this chapter previews three 
case studies that illustrate the ways in which the process of renegotiating these value clusters 
contribute to the formation of communities within the context of progressive LGBTQIA+ 
advocacy in a post-Homophile era.13 As exemplars of queer legal worldmaking, the case studies 
included in this dissertation demonstrate the dialectic relationship between social movements and 
the law as advocates attempt to make queer partnerships and families more present in political 
discourse. 
Homophile Era Activism and the Law 
The pursuit of socio-political equality for LGBTQIA+ individuals and communities can 
be traced to the early 20th Century in the United States, when gay and lesbian individuals worked 
to gain public visibility. It was dangerous to be “out and proud” as many gay and lesbian people 
who did reveal their sexual orientation experienced discrimination and violence. Thus, queer 
communication networks necessitated a level of informal organization. As early as the 1930s 
informal communication networks, with the help of subaltern activist media, contributed to the 
formulation of medical, legal, and educational discourses pertaining to gay and lesbian rights.14  
These disparate discourses began to counter dominant cultural narratives and the pervading 
                                                          
13 The term homophile, which in many ways is a precursor to the terms homosexual, gay, 
lesbian, etc., can be defined as a love of (or positive affinity toward) those with same-sex 
attractions. The Homophile movement gained prominence in the U.S. in the early twentieth 
century. 
14 Martin Meeker, Contacts Desired: Gay and Lesbian Communications and Community, 1940s-
1970s (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 3. 
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psychiatric wisdom of the time that characterized homosexuality as a mental disorder.  
In the 1950s, the homophile movement emerged in the U.S. as a coalition of 
organizations who sought equal rights for gays and lesbians. The movement flourished into the 
1960s. LGBTQIA+ individuals created communities wherein they could live their lives more 
openly and create families. Armed with isolated political successes in subsequent decades, 
homophile advocacy groups gained momentum through the 1960s and 70s and brought 
awareness to the burgeoning gay liberation movement in order to craft a collective mission 
aimed toward social justice. The 1960s and 70s were marked by pervasive social and political 
transformation, coupled with painful setbacks. Even though the medical community de-
pathologized homosexuality in 1973, pervasive cultural narratives that staunchly defended the 
privilege of hegemonic communities often stymied queer activists in these decades.15 Fraught 
with identitarian political conflict that travelled from the streets of Compton and the Tenderloin, 
to the Stonewall Inn in Greenwich Village, LGBTQIA+ and allied advocates in these decades 
worked arduously to legitimate queer sex/gender identities and protect rights for gays, lesbians 
and to a certain extent, trans persons who were subjected to endemic socio-economic and legal 
inequality.16 
The subaltern ideologies of the homophile and gay liberation movements made gender, 
sex and sexuality of argumentative relevance in legal discourses, yet formal modes of legal 
advocacy would be slower to form. As far back as the Civil War era, the law sought to preserve 
                                                          
15 The Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics of the American Psychiatric Association, 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Second (Washington D.C.: American 
Psychiatric Association, 1974). Homosexuality was removed from the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders in 1974. The second edition (DSM-II) was reprinted for the sixth 
time in 1974.  
16 Alexander Galloway, “Networks,” in Critical Terms for Media Studies, ed. W.J.T. Mitchell 
and Mark Hansen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 283. 
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heteronormative sex and gender norms, the perceived natural order, and punished any deviance 
from that model as malignant and damaging. Despite the hegemonic roots of the law, progressive 
models of gender roles and sexual preferences have begun to supplant this “natural law” model 
for the legal system.17 Joining the burgeoning progressive social movement predicated upon the 
independence of gender, sexuality, and sex from the body,  
feminists, lesbian and gay activists, and trans advocates and their allies, maintained that 
variation in gender, sexuality, and even sex is typically benign. That is, significant and 
increasing sexual, gender, and sex variation is not necessarily a matter for normalizing state 
interventions.18  
To a certain degree the American system of law followed this concept of benign sexuality and 
gender, operating in alliance with the presumption that “the state has no business coercing or 
perhaps even encouraging people to adhere to a collectively determined ideal of standardized 
gender roles and sexualities.”19 The presumption that sexual variance was benign has extended to 
such legal debates as marriage and adoption, both contentious discourses that will be further 
discussed in later chapters. Nevertheless, such discourses have served to slowly transform the 
law such that the State should secure equal freedom and opportunity to LGBTQIA+ individuals 
rather than work to preserve archaic notions of “natural law.”  
Decades of slow struggle have wrought a philosophy of law typically referred to as 
Sexual Orientation and the Law, which is founded on the premise that “legal rules and standards 
pervasively reflect, regulate, and are undermined by the diversity gender roles, sexual practices, 
                                                          
17 William N. Eskridge Jr., “Sexual and Gender Variation in American Public Law: From 
Malignant to Benign to Productive,” UCLA Law Review 57, no. 5 (June 2010): 1334. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 1334–1335. 
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and gender or sexual identities in a society.”20 Some scholars have traced the development of the 
LGBTQIA+-friendly legal philosophy to the groundbreaking law review symposium, published 
in the Hastings Law Journal in 1979.21 This symposium, which stood in stark contrast to the 
academy’s silence on these issues, contained comprehensive overviews of how statutory and 
common law unfairly discriminated against LGBTQIA+ individuals. Though this endemic 
discrimination impacted the lives of many people, some of whom belonged to the legal academy, 
sex, sexuality and the law was a subject few were brave enough to write or speak about until the 
symposium.22 Several legal academics, including Jeffrey Sherman, David Richards, and Rhonda 
Rivera “were academic trailblazers who risked their careers so that the upcoming generation of 
law students, lawyers, and law professors would have a framework for understanding the legal 
oppression of gay men and lesbians and advocating for necessary change.”23 The 1979 
symposium and the work that followed brought constitutional privacy rights to the fore, 
connecting the notion of equal protection to social justice and making sex relevant in 
conversations related to the First Amendment.24 Yet the progressive victories related to 
                                                          
20 William N. Eskridge Jr., “Sexual and Gender Variation in American Public Law: From 
Malignant to Benign to Productive,” UCLA Law Review 57, no. 5 (June 2010): 1333–1334; See 
also William N. Eskridge Jr. and Nan D. Hunter, Sexuality, Gender, and the Law, 3rd ed., 
University Casebook Series (Foundation Press, 2011); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sex Equality, 
2nd ed., University Casebook Series (Foundation Press, 2007); Mary Becker, Cases and 
Materials on Feminist Jurisprudence: Taking Women Seriously, 3rd ed., American Casebook 
Series (Thompson West, 2007); William B. Rubenstein, Carlos Ball, and Jane S. Schacter, Cases 
and Materials on Sexual Orientation and the Law, 4th ed., American Casebook Series (West, 
n.d.). 
21 The N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Social Change published conference proceedings at around 
the same time and the articles published complemented the mission and purpose of the Hastings 
Law Journal publication in 1979. 
22 Christopher R. Leslie, “The Evolution of Academic Discourse on Sexual Orientation and the 
Law: An Introduction to a Festschrift in Honor of Jeffrey Sherman,” Chicago-Kent Law Review 
84, no. 2 (n.d.): 367. 
23 Ibid., 369. 
24 Eskridge Jr., “Sexual and Gender Variation in American Public Law: From Malignant to 
Benign to Productive,” 1335. 
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LGBTQIA+ rights also spawned a “traditional family values countermovement” that has since 
worked to undermine the frame of “gay equality” as a threat to “the privacy and free speech 
rights of religious persons, many of whom now see themselves as an embattled minority 
oppressed by the state.”25 It is on these fertile grounds that the contemporary controversies 
surrounding the expansion of gay rights, like those covered in this dissertation, have sprouted. 
Political gains made in the homophile era have influenced the trajectory of legal 
discourse and created opportunity for deliberation by publicizing queer identities and lifeways 
into the present-day. LGBTQIA+ legal scholars, academics and professionals tended to keep 
private their sexual identities, and desires, which hampered inclusive political philosophies out of 
the courtrooms and, in turn, out of public policy. Despite this, “liberal and progressive discourses 
flowing from [homophile] social movements have […] profoundly affected constitutional law 
doctrine.”26 In the 1950s, 60s, and 70s there was no body of literature in the academy to support 
gay litigants, which foreclosed the available “persuasive authority” upon which to base a “pro-
gay opinion.”27 However, the move by progressive legal scholars and activists to publicly 
disclose their experiences led to instrumental changes in municipal, state, and federal statutes.28 
As the movements associated with LGBTQIA+ activism have grown and evolved, so too has the 
legal discourse pertaining to privacy, equal protection, free speech, and access to resources and 
spaces. Because of the ground that was gained by legal and grassroots advocates in the 
homophile era, the realm of law is currently much more inclusive to LGBTQIA+ individuals. 
Changes to policy have granted these marginalized communities a greater degree of agency 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 
26 Leslie, “The Evolution of Academic Discourse on Sexual Orientation and the Law: An 
Introduction to a Festschrift in Honor of Jeffrey Sherman,” 364. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Leslie, “The Evolution of Academic Discourse on Sexual Orientation and the Law: An 
Introduction to a Festschrift in Honor of Jeffrey Sherman.” 
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when arguing on their own behalf on numerous levels of public and political participation, from 
the streets of the Tenderloin to the U.S. Supreme Court, and everywhere in between.  
What remains unclear however is how LGBTQIA+ individuals and their allies have made 
their positions persuasive relative to status quo arguments about “traditional” partnership, 
marriage, and family. Increasing friction in and among some allied progressive activist coalitions 
has complicated the quest to expand rights for LGBTQIA+ individuals, obfuscated the mission 
and strategy of queer politics in an era of diversification, and increased political agency within 
marginalized groups.29 As queer communities have been created, rejuvenated, splintered, and 
reconfigured, the movements to which they claim allegiance do not and cannot encapsulate the 
universal interests of its entire membership. For this reason, the constitution and renegotiation of 
queer and allied communities, and communities hostile to progressive politics, is integral to 
understanding queer legal worldmaking. Homophile activists made these arguments relevant, but 
this dissertation will explain, in part, by what means these arguments can become authoritative, 
legitimate positions in legal discourse and compelling sources of evidence with regard to 
establishing and challenging legal precedent. 
Intersections with Related Social Movement Discourses 
Along with homophile-era advocacy, related Civil Rights activism complicated the 
intersections and divergences among progressive social justice advocates. In order to better 
account for the non-traditional methods of protest that had emerged during the 1950s, 60s, and 
70s, as well as the changes to formal channels of political advantage, social movement scholars 
                                                          
29 Within the context of marriage, specifically, some queer and allied activists see marriage as a 
heteronormative institution that further disciplines queer sex/gender identity and desire and thus, 
do not support the legal expansion of marriage rights for queer persons. 
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in this time sought to redefine social movements and the characterizations of their function.30 
The trends of social movement scholarship in the 1960s and early 70s highlight the ways in 
which diffuse leadership can be cultivated to facilitate a more fluid dispersal of power rather than 
strictly top-down. In the 60s, social movement scholars expanded their purview to include modes 
of protest beyond the verbal.31 Embodied forms of protest such as sit-ins, picketing, and mass 
marches came to the fore during this time of increased radicalization, and some of these 
strategies were taken up by LGBTQIA+ activists.32 Notably, these forms of protest were 
significant for the places they were carried out. Picketing was no longer limited to outside the 
courthouse, but occurred at individual homes, and mass marches took place through hostile 
territory. The forms of protest were also significant because of the particular bodies that carried 
                                                          
30 Franklyn S. Haiman, “The Rhetoric of the Streets: Some Legal and Ethical Considerations,” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 53, no. 2 (1967): 99–114; Robert L. Scott and Donald K. Smith, 
“The Rhetoric of Confrontation,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 55, no. 1 (February 1969): 1–8. 
See also Herbert W. Simons, “Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion 
for Social Movements,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 56, no. 1 (February 1970): 1–11.  
In 1970, Herbert W. Simons defined social movements as un-institutionalized collectivities that 
mobilize in order to implement systematic changes for the reconstitution of social norms or 
values. Simons carefully distinguishes social movements from other more nebulous or erratic 
instances of conflict (such as panics, fads or hostile outbursts), and characterizes social 
movements by their coherence of purpose. Simons also distinguishes the form and function of 
social movements from the actions of institutionalized bodies such as labor unions, government 
agencies or corporations, which are generally codified by formal policies and procedures.  
31 Haiman, “The Rhetoric of the Streets: Some Legal and Ethical Considerations.” See also Scott 
and Smith, “The Rhetoric of Confrontation.” 
This analytical move was largely predicated on shifting conversation about social privilege and 
the agency with which “have nots” could alter their positionality in relation to the “haves.” The 
language of “haves” and “have nots” in this context refers to a multitude of things, from wealth 
and goods to social privilege and opportunity. Nevertheless, the old language of “haves” and 
“have nots” is problematic as it underemphasizes the depth and complexity of the division 
between the two parties. Throughout the 60s, trust waned that the “haves” would altruistically 
care for the “have nots.” As the tide shifted, “have nots” who found themselves in the margins no 
longer accepted their designation as an inert mass waiting and hoping to receive what they 
lacked from the “haves.” Rather the “have nots” began to formulate a more active and radical 
collective identity which not only divided them from status quo society, but also enabled them to 
question the limitations and fundamental purpose of public benevolence. 
32 Haiman, “The Rhetoric of the Streets: Some Legal and Ethical Considerations.” 
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them out.33  
A social movement is made up of several disparate bits of communication that coalesce 
into a persuasive, constitutive force that binds communities together based on specific fulcrums 
of agreement. As Herbert A. Simons notes, “It is frequently impossible to separate detractors 
from supporters of a social movement, let alone discern rhetorical intentions, to distinguish 
between rhetorical acts and coercive acts, or to estimate the effects of messages on the many 
audiences to which they must inevitably be addressed.”34 Moreover, the temporal span of social 
movements, often encompassing several stages and potentially transitioning leaders further 
complicates the endeavor to account for the multiple and at times conflicting needs of those who 
claim allegiance to a movement.  
Certainly, movements advocating for the expansion of rights and privileges for 
LGBTQIA+ communities fit Simons’ description.35 For example, the premises from which 
activists fight for the right to privacy or marriage for same-sex couples are somewhat different 
from the premises from which activists argue for trans persons’ right to access public bathroom 
and changing facilities that align with their gender self-identification. In the case for marriage, 
progressive advocates argue that committed same-sex couples are largely the same as 
heterosexual married couples, deserving of equal recognition and equal privileges. On the other 
                                                          
33 This dissertation build from the theoretical perspectives mentioned above toward a discussion 
of rhetorical embodiment. Though the material presence and performance of bodies aren’t 
relevant to a discussion of rhetorical embodiment, the case studies in this dissertation do 
elaborate on the affective impact of the discursively represented presence of particular persons 
(i.e., LGBTQIA+ folks) within legal argument. 
34 Simons, “Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social 
Movements,” 1. 
35 The marriage case study included in this dissertation illustrates this tension. In Hawaii, 
LGBTQIA+ individuals rallied behind the campaign to strike down the amendment that would 
have enabled the state to outlaw same-sex marriage regardless of whether or not they themselves 
saw the value in marriage. The amendment was read as a threat to all LGBTQIA+ people and so 
became a rallying point for queer communities. 
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hand, advocates fight for trans persons’ rights on the basis of the authenticity of trans identity – 
on the very assumption of difference from a heteronormative standard. As such, attempts to 
change policy in favor of LGBTQIA+ rights have necessarily entailed targeted, specialized 
arguments designed for and by particular stakeholders in response to particular injustices and 
have been predicated on unique argumentative premises.  
The specificity of queer argumentation makes it well suited for the courtroom, a 
rhetorical context in which arguments are often made inductively. Edward H. Levi distinguishes 
between case law and the application of statues in legal reasoning, the former typically carried 
out through inductive arguments, the latter carried out through deductive reasoning.36 Initially, 
concepts and premises “can be created out of particular instances,” the reasoning process moving 
from particular toward the general.37 Once codified, the application of the statute depends on the 
interpretive process of establishing commonality between general principles to the particular, 
new instances are weighed with the old “and the remaking of the concept word itself is 
apparent.”38 The inevitable partnership between inductive and deductive reasoning process also 
enables transformation in concepts and premises. As the statute is formulated from one particular 
and likened with others in future contexts, related connotative and contextual features alter the 
concepts and premises that undergirded the statute to begin with. In this way, legal reasoning 
enables the destabilization and malleability of concepts that queer rhetorics demand. In line with 
queer theoretical frameworks that resist static codification, trending instead toward the process of 
(de)construction of possibilities, queer legal reasoning “(re)constructs ethics, and the criminal 
                                                          
36 Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, Second (Chicago, IL: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2013), 27. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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law, through the prism of queer lived experience(s).”39 Inductive queer legal reasoning creates 
arguments imbued with a presence that “exert[s] a pressure in our lives and thinking” and 
enables the creation of statutes that can be applied in future contexts.40  
Preview of Case Studies 
This dissertation will analyze the ways in which advocates and coalition advocacy groups 
engaged argument in legal and public contexts to expand socio-political rights for LGBTQIA+ 
persons in specific policy deliberations. To do so, I will analyze three case studies wherein 
progressives tapped into the affective features that characterize privacy, marriage and family, and 
the home as representative of communities predicated on these shared values (and value 
hierarchies). For the first case study, I have chosen to examine arguments presented by Lambda 
Legal during Lawrence and Garner v. Texas (Lawrence), which urged the U.S. Supreme Court to 
overturn Texas’ Homosexual Conduct law in 1998. Prior to Lawrence, thirteen states still had 
anti-sodomy laws on the books, some of which criminalized conduct between partners of the 
same sex. Lambda Legal is a national legal organization that has worked to gain “full recognition 
of the civil rights of lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, transgender people and those with HIV 
through impact litigation, education and public policy work.”41 After years of fierce litigation 
during which Lambda Legal attempted to exonerate Lawrence and Garner, the state of Texas 
                                                          
39 Chris Ashford, “Barebacking and the ‘Cult of Violence’: Queering the Criminal Law,” The 
Journal of Criminal Law 74 (2010): 342, doi:10.1350/jcla.2010.74.4.647; See also Judith Butler, 
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, Second (New York: Routledge, 
2007); Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: 
Routledge, 1993); Judith (Jack) Halberstam, Female Masculinity (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1998). 
40 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Melanie Klein and the Difference Affect Makes,” South Atlantic 
Quarterly 106, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 625, doi:10.1215/00382876-2007-020. 
41 Lambda Legal: Making the Case for Equality, “About Us,” 2016, 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/about-us. Para 1. 
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refused to overturn the conviction.42 Unsatisfied with Texas’ ruling, Lambda Legal took their 
case to the U.S. Supreme Court where they attempted not only to secure the same fundamental 
right to privacy and sexual intimacy for gay and lesbian individuals that is granted to 
heterosexual persons, but also to overturn the precedent set by Bowers v. Hardwick (Bowers).43  
The legal documents and oral arguments presented to the U.S. Supreme Court by Lambda 
Legal are an apt text through which to examine progressive argument strategies used to secure 
privacy rights for LGBTQIA+ persons for three main reasons. First, the outcome of Lawrence 
was a landmark victory for progressive queer advocacy. Lawrence established that queer persons 
were deserving of the same rights and liberties in their private lives as heterosexual persons, and 
representatives of Lambda Legal were the primary progressive advocates involved with that 
case. The brief represents the argumentative premises by which the case for privacy was made 
present by an advocacy group that had been involved with the case on both state and federal 
levels. In addition, the outcome of Lawrence was representative of a larger shift in legal 
discourse, which put “a human face on the clinical and foreign label ‘homosexual’.”44 Combined 
with the increasing visibility of gay persons in the public eye that concurrently impacted legal 
discourse as early as the 1970s, the outcome of Lawrence made it difficult for “heterosexual 
society to view gay people as ‘sexual psychopaths’ worthy of contempt and legal 
condemnation.”45 Third, and on a related note, the outcome of Lawrence reset the legal precedent 
previously established through the Bowers case for the treatment of LGBTQIA+ individuals with 
                                                          
42 Ibid. Para 1. 
43 Lambda Legal: Making the Case for Equality, “Lawrence v. Texas,” 2016, 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/lawrence-v-texas. The U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Bowers in 1986. The decision that determined that sodomy laws were constitutional. 
44 Leslie, “The Evolution of Academic Discourse on Sexual Orientation and the Law: An 
Introduction to a Festschrift in Honor of Jeffrey Sherman,” 372. 
45 Ibid. 
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regard to privacy. Reversing Bowers was instrumental for progressive advocates because “a large 
body of federal cases relied on Bowers to deny the legal claims of gay men and lesbians, 
especially those based on equal protection arguments – despite the fact that Bowers was not an 
equal protection case.”46 Bowers was “infectious” in judicial thinking, therefore striking it down 
also called into question the outcomes of a series of related cases that had been based on the 
Bowers decision.47  
Examining the progressive arguments that were deployed during the Lawrence case is a 
solid foundation from which to assess the ways in which anti-sodomy laws were framed as a 
threat against all intimate relationships, not just same-sex couples, thereby making the magnitude 
of that threat more present. Lambda’s arguments were cited as effective in the majority opinion, 
authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy. In his opinion, Kennedy emphasized the arguments 
specifically related to privacy that were made by Lambda in their initial writ and during oral 
arguments:  
We conclude the case should be resolved by determining whether the petitioners were 
free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. For this inquiry 
we deem it necessary to reconsider the Court’s holdings in Bowers.48 
As the Court echoed similar arguments to due process and personal liberty, Kennedy cited the 
same court cases that were used by Lambda to circumvent the precedential connection between 
Bowers and Lawrence.   
                                                          
46 Ibid., 376. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Anthony Kennedy, “Opinion of the Court, Lawrence and Garner v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003),” June 26, 2003, 564. 
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For the second case study, I will examine legal discourse outside of the courtroom in the 
progressive Vote NO campaign’s televised media spots in their effort to secure same-sex 
marriage rights for residents of Minnesota. In 2012, Minnesota legislators voted to include on the 
ballot an amendment to the state’s constitution that would have defined marriage as a union 
between one man and one woman. Since the 90s, marriage amendments have been proposed in 
thirty-one states, and as of 2012 when Minnesota proposed Amendment One, similar 
amendments passed in each of the thirty-one states in which they were considered. These 
amendments, though not identical to one another, accomplished at least one of the following: 
preempted the legalization of same-sex marriage in those states or prevented the recognition of 
all other legally recognized same-sex unions, like civil unions or domestic partnerships. In the 
effort to avoid becoming “state number thirty-two,” grassroots coalitions, headed by 
Minnesotans United for All Families, waged the Vote NO campaign. Through a series of 
television spots, print ads, and billboards, Vote NO was a unified platform from which 
progressive advocates banded together in the effort to stop passage of Amendment One.  
The Vote NO campaign in Minnesota is an apt text for study for three main reasons. First, 
the vote in 2012 marks the first time wherein a state-proposed amendment to prevent the legal 
recognition of same-sex partnerships did not pass. While Obergefell49 ultimately rendered 
unenforceable state laws and constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage, the victory 
of progressive advocates in Minnesota was a significant milestone in the fight for public opinion, 
which remains a key resource for advocates arguing for the overturning of legal precedent in 
                                                          
49 On June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the Obergefell case, which was a case 
comprised of several state-level Supreme Court cases brought by same-sex couples petitioning 
for their right to legally recognized unions. The outcome of Obergefell guaranteed the right to 
marry for same-sex couples under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
14th Amendment. 
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courtrooms. Second, advocates in the Vote NO campaign deployed the power of affect to make 
the threat of Amendment One more proximal to voters. This argumentative strategy was unique 
to their compatriot campaigns in other states. For example, progressive advocates in Wisconsin, 
largely headed by Fair Wisconsin fought against the passage of Referendum One in 2006 by 
arguing that marriage equality was simply “common sense.”50 In addition, Fair Wisconsin’s 
campaign focused on the economic and legal impacts of marriage equality such as “sharing 
health insurance, having visitation rights in hospitals, raising children together, accessing family 
medical leave benefits and even filing joint tax returns.”51 These arguments, while valid, did 
little to motivate Wisconsin’s electorate to accept a progressive vision for marriage, and the 
referendum ultimately passed. The Vote NO campaign, on the other hand, tapped into the 
affective resonance of marriage and family as American values shared by conservatives and 
progressives alike. In terms of reestablishing a community united around the dignity of marriage, 
Vote NO disarmed their political opposition and won hearts and minds in Minnesota.  
Third, as mentioned previously, there has been debate within gay communities between 
“those who [favor] same-sex marriage and those who [fear] the perceived assimilation into an 
institution created by a dominant culture that had been hostile to both gay people and the equal 
treatment of women.”52 Yet the upsurge of statewide constitutional marriage amendments pushed 
to the background many of the nuanced arguments within the LGBTQIA+ community against 
the merits of marriage. Because “opponents of equal rights for gay Americans made same-sex 
                                                          
50 Megin McDonell and Jenni Dye, “Anniversary of Marriage Equality Decision a Powerful 
Example of Why Courts Matter,” Fair Wisconsin, June 28, 2016, para 1. 
http://fairwisconsin.com/anniversary-of-marriage-equality-decision-a-powerful-example-of-why-
courts-matter/. 
51 Ibid., para 4. 
52 Leslie, “The Evolution of Academic Discourse on Sexual Orientation and the Law: An 
Introduction to a Festschrift in Honor of Jeffrey Sherman,” 374. 
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marriage the primary battleground over gay rights more broadly,” the public face of the gay 
liberation movement was unified in support of same-sex marriage.53 As such, the voters’ 
rejection of Amendment One, which made Minnesota the first state to vote down a constitutional 
measure prohibiting the legal recognition of same-sex marital unions, is a rich case study of 
presence in grassroots, coalition advocacy.  
The third case study examines the lawsuit filed in August of 2015 by the Campaign for 
Southern Equality, the Family Equality Council, and four same-sex couples in Mississippi to 
expand adoption rights to same-sex couples in that state.54 At the time of the lawsuit, Mississippi 
was the only state in the union to uphold its prohibition of legal joint adoption rights for GLBT 
couples. Though Mississippi was hardly the only state to have had statutes restricting the 
adoption of children by same-sex couples on their books, Obergefell eliminated a roadblock that 
had hindered same-sex couples in many states from adopting. Despite the ruling however, 
Mississippi did not reverse a law that was passed in 2000 that prohibited same-sex couples from 
adopting jointly in the state, regardless of marital status. As a targeted argument against a very 
specific claim (i.e., that same-sex couples, married or unmarried, were unfit to be parents), the 
documents filed by the plaintiffs in the 2015 lawsuit mirrors the prior two case studies in the 
sense that values associated with “the home” necessarily needed to be renegotiated to 
accommodate same-sex couples. Similar to the previous two case studies, Campaign for 
Southern Equality constitutes a culmination of prior legal arguments made to overturn prior 
policies that restrict freedoms for LGBTQIA+ individuals. Each case study makes present the 
threat against queer couples and families through loci of magnitude, proximity, and severity, 
                                                          
53 Ibid., 374–375. 
54 The plaintiffs will be subsumed under the Campaign for Southern Equality, who led the suit. 
The abbreviation CSE will signify the collective. 
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respectively. Taken together, the case studies I have selected provide a focused analysis on both 
legal and public deliberation wherein vested parties negotiated the terms and stakes of policy 
formation. This dissertation enables a deeper understanding of the ways in which progressives at 
all levels of policy-making have established a model for American values that suits an 
increasingly queered socio-legalscape.  
Though similar in topical and theoretical focus, key differences between each case study 
highlight the unique challenges that progressive advocates have necessarily encountered in 
creating LGBTQIA+-inclusive policy. Namely, outmoded legal precedent, hegemonic cultural 
narratives that sway public opinion, and the negation of the plasticity of values in legal 
argument. When arguing on behalf of Lawrence and Garner, Lambda Legal was tasked not only 
with arguing for the merits of their suit, but also in overturning prior legal precedent in Bowers. 
With history not on their side, Lambda’s argument strategy amplified the magnitude of the harms 
brought about by Bowers’ outmoded logic and widened the scope of who was harmed by the 
supposed precedent. Minnesotans United faced other difficulties, fighting against a tide of hostile 
public opinion in their efforts to convince Minnesotans to “vote no.” Battling against established 
religious tropes centered on freedom and moral rightness, Vote NO worked to circumvent 
abstracted appeals to morality by making the key issues at stake more proximal to voters. 
Minnesotans United made concrete the rhetorical embodiment of personal experience in order to 
sway public opinion. Finally, Campaign amplified the severity of the problem of child 
displacement by contending that displaced children were particularly vulnerable and in need of 
stability, dignity, and suitable homes. Doing so shifted the field of argument away from the 
moral fitness of same-sex couples as parents and toward a discussion of what constitutes a safe 
and loving home. Advocates working on behalf of Campaign for Southern Equality (CSE) 
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emphasized stability, love, nurturance, and physical, mental and emotional health as abstract 
values reflected in the concrete value of the home.  
Each of the three case studies speak to the legacy of LGBTQIA+ advocacy and illustrate 
the ways in which arguments have been made in response to perceived attacks on the queer 
community. Demonstrating the dialectic between grassroots and judicial contexts, all three case 
studies show the breadth and depth of advocacy in this context while also examining the 
influence of affect through loci of presence on the process of renegotiating value hierarchies and 
the communities built around them. Through this robust analysis to follow, I will extrapolate 
several practical takeaways for progressive advocates and advocacy coalitions seeking to impact 
policy and the expansion of queer rights. In addition, this project will advance theoretical 
conclusions about the role of rhetorical embodiment within loci of presence in bringing about 
legal and cultural change. The following section will treat each of these theoretical foundations 
in the context of the three case studies mentioned above and more broadly, with regard to 
progressive queer legal worldmaking.   
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Affect, Presence, Social Movements, and Values:  
A Look Beyond Legal Reasoning to the Full Scope of Policy Making 
Laws that defend a heteronormative status quo are inadequate and work against the 
interest of LGBTQIA+ communities. Advocates who want to change laws must also redraw 
communities to include queer members and families. In the co-creative process of queer legal 
worldmaking, justices, lawyers and voters alike are audiences that may be swayed. Values (and 
relative hierarchical position of those values) shared by vested audiences are influential factors in 
establishing community ties and creating policy inclusive to queer folks. Specifically, 
progressive value arguments in these case studies move between abstract and concrete 
representations of privacy, marriage and family in order to shift what those values mean. As the 
meaning of those values shift, queer partnerships and families create authentic, legitimate 
resources for legal argument. Changing the law requires a shift in community boundaries and the 
affective ties that define them. Taken together, the following brings into view the ways in which 
audience and advocate, values and argument intersect to create policy inclusive of LGBTQIA+ 
partnerships and families.  
As was detailed in the previous chapter, this dissertation will analyze how rhetorical 
embodiment through loci of presence enabled the process of renegotiating values in legal 
decision-making. The three case studies included in this project examine the role of value 
warrants and hierarchies, and the process of renegotiating communities within the context of 
queer legal worldmaking. As such, it is first necessary to explore the theoretical components that 
contextualize the argumentative process of redefining key terms and establishing the field of 
argument. As legal reasoning does not alone encapsulate this process, the following will first 
provide a brief discussion of legal reasoning and how legal precedent is established before 
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discussing in greater depth the relevant literature related to the various channels through which 
legal discourse and social movements impact public policy.55 This review highlights the 
importance of capturing how this process occurs. A primary goal of this dissertation is to fill that 
gap in knowledge by extending the notion of presence. As embodied rhetorics were key in 
constituting cohesive queer social movements during the homophile era and into contemporary 
queer activism, I will explore the influence of rhetorical embodiment within verbal 
argumentation in making more present the harms of policies exclusive of queer partnerships and 
families. Affect, as a tool of presence, is a productive strategy by which to establish a 
progressive field of argument in legal discourse and rework value hierarchies in order to alter 
status quo politics toward a more inclusive model of public policy. 
Resisting Conservatism in Legal Discourse 
Advocates in the LGBTQIA+ community and their allies have achieved political and 
socio-economic progress in the last several decades. Much of this progress can be credited to the 
ways in which social movement discourses have been integrated within the law and legal 
discourse. Legal discourses tend to be conservative and resist change. The law is often thought of 
as a business of “clarity, objectivity, rigor, and toughmindedness,” a static institution of statutes 
wherein there is a right answer and a claim that can be proven. This is in large part due to the 
“plain English” approach to legal language.56 Frances J. Ranney explains that in its heyday, the 
“plain English” was much more concerned with preserving what might have been interpreted as 
                                                          
55 Each case study chapter will include a discussion of the relevant historical context specific to 
each case. In this chapter, I will limit my discussion to the homophile movement, the primary 
social movement that called forth the particular instances of LGBTQIA+ legal activism in the 
present day. 
56 Gerald B. Wetlaufer, “Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse,” Virginia Law Review 76, 
no. 1 (1990): 1545. 
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the overly esoteric features of legal language.57 Yet, scholars such as Wayne C. Booth, Kenneth 
Burke, Chaim Perelman, Stephen Toulmin, and James Boyd White have demonstrated that the 
law is primarily rhetorical; it is malleable, intangible, and embodies the possibilities and is 
subject to the constraints of rhetorical action.58 During the Civil Rights era, the “law and 
literature” movement developed in contrast to “plain English,” with the influence of scholars like 
White, to “bring the humanities into the study of law.”59 By focusing more intently on making 
legal language accessible to non-practitioners, the “law and literature” movement in legal 
discourse and scholarship is “therefore concerned not so much with legal writing as it is with 
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legal reading, and focuses not on consumer documents but on arguably ‘literary’ judicial 
opinions.”60 By integrating the “humanities” into the law, thereby blending the technical and 
public spheres of discourse, the law was placed in context, crafted to be easily consumable in 
both legal and extralegal contexts.  
The law as fundamentally rhetorical is not a new invention. Realist, critical, postmodern 
and semiotic approaches to the law have long rejected the received legal view of cases.61 
Situating law as discourse, Chris Heffer notes that what is commonly thought of as “language in 
action” is more accurately a form of ritualized practices that are “historically constituted, locally 
situated, and are laden with social and political value.”62 As such, the pragmatic, social, 
historical, political and rhetorical aspects of the law must be taken into account when attempting 
to uncover a full understanding of how the law intersects with the individuals who uphold, 
defend and even violate it.63 Furthermore, it is necessary to consider the ethical stakes of 
multiple potential outcomes and what members of a community “can say to one another … about 
our own desires and those of others, about who we are and who we want to be, who [we become 
and who we risk becoming], when one tack or another is taken.”64 The interaction between 
dynamic ethical, socio-political and historical features embedded within the law has thereby 
                                                          
60 Ibid. Italics mine. 
61 Peter Goodrich, Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis 
(Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1987); Peter Goodrich, Languages of Law: From Logics of Memory to 
Nomadic Masks (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990); White, Heracles’ Bow: Essays on 
the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law. 
62 Heffer, “Revelation and Rhetoric: A Critical Model of Forensic Discourse,” 462, citing 
Stephen Levinson, “Activity Types and Language,” in Talk at Work: Interaction in Institutional 
Settings, ed. Paul Drew and John Heritage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 66–
100.; See also V.N. Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1986); Richard Bauman and Charles L. Briggs, “Poetics and Performance as 
Critical Perspectives on Language and Social Life,” Annual Review of Anthropology 19 (1990): 
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complicated the notion of objective truth with regard to how laws are written and interpreted 
across multiple contexts. 
Perhaps another way of considering the ethical and contextual lenses through which the 
law can be filtered is through a more detailed dissection of the notion of truth. Heffer notes that 
nowadays, the law is “an account based on verisimilitude (the quality of seeming true) rather 
than veracity (the unadorned truth),” which can co-create the reality that it would appear to 
merely reflect.65 The notion that those who practice the law may reveal the truth, or tell the 
whole story is a powerful rhetorical strategy designed to persuade decision-makers in court.66 
When verisimilitude is the Rosetta Stone for interpreting the veracity of a legal ruling or 
interpretation, the practices of framing, argumentation, and developing narrative appeal within a 
body of data become key rhetorical functions that preempt the production of objective truth. 
Indeed, such rhetorical practices call into question the relevance and utility of seeking objective 
truth at all. Those who practice law inevitably deploy communication strategies that present facts 
that are quite adorned. Ultimately, legal practitioners have the responsibility to make facts 
sensible for those who are tasked with handing down a decision; “the rhetor, like a magician, lifts 
the veils of time and space that obscure the jury’s view of events so that they can see clearly 
what really happened.”67 As such, the law can be constitutive as it is persuasive, and speaks more 
to the ways in which we co-create our language and cultural capital than the simple “dos” and 
“don’ts” of a society.  
Legal rhetoric impacts how communities are created and transformed. Not merely a 
“system of rules (or rules and principles), nor reducible to policy choices or class interests,” the 
                                                          
65 Heffer, “Revelation and Rhetoric: A Critical Model of Forensic Discourse,” 460. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
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law is a cultural context within which one party seeks to persuade another toward a particular 
position.68 The greatest and most basic power of the law is not in particular judiciary rulings and 
decisions, but “in the coercive aspect of its rhetoric – in the way it structures sensibility and 
vision.”69 In other words, the law shapes knowledge and brings together the reader, writer and 
the text, all of which co-create a cultural language.70 Understanding the collaborative process of 
legal discourse is key to understanding how the law is created and through the integral function 
of narrative, is interpreted through various legal and extralegal contexts. As Karen Griggs notes, 
the law is not only a product of the technical sphere, but of the public sphere. Before the “law 
and literature” movement, much study of the law in both academic and nonacademic writing 
pursued either the language of attorneys or the rhetorical techniques used by other parties, 
namely in the realm of business and technical communication, as exclusive to one another. Yet 
contemporary rhetoric and composition scholarship has called for a refocusing of our scholarly 
attention on the social pressures that impact “how laws are produced, how writers and audiences 
interact in socially constructing laws, and how writing occurs in the public sector.”71 In other 
words, contemporary approaches to studying legal discourse position the law as a dynamic text, 
reliant on social norms, expectations, and interactions. As scholars in the fields of rhetoric and 
the law developed overlapping theories, the language of the law has been continually 
(re)translated such that lay readers can participate actively both in the creation and consumption 
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Text and Context,” 157; See also Anthony R. Petrosky, “From Story to Essay: Reading and 
Writing,” College Composition and Communication 33, no. 1 (1982): 19–36; David Bartholomae 
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of legal rhetoric. 
Methodological Considerations of Reading Law and Legal Discourse 
As has been discussed at length in the paragraphs above, the process of creating and 
reading law and participating in legal discourse is not as cut and dry as words on the page. The 
“law and literature” movement brought about an era of legal discourse as open to interpretation, 
housed within social and historical contexts and the paradigm of literary-critical thought. The 
eventuality of legal rhetoric as rhetoric, as prophesized by Peter Brooks and to a certain extent, 
Richard Posner, signaled the inherent textuality of American law.72 In other words, the 
implications of law reach beyond the measure of legal precedent and into the fabric of culture in 
the U.S. and the socio-economic systems that define Americans. What can be read within the law 
is much richer than the policy it codifies.  
The courtroom then is a productive arena within which to study legal worldmaking. The 
process of inductive and deductive thought, along with the interaction of rhetorical tropes and 
subjectivities, demands a concession of dialectical space between legal and extralegal discourses. 
Common tropes overlap between legal and extralegal rhetoric. Extralegal tropes like tragedy and 
justice, which are associated with social justice and human compassion, may be applied when 
legal scholars, practitioners and judges adjust their interpretations and rulings in order to 
“become more sensitive to the human consequences of legal actions.”73 It is in this spirit that this 
dissertation approaches the law, legal discourse, and public reaction to and co-formation of 
                                                          
72 Peter Brooks, “Literature as Law’s Other,” Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 22, no. 2 
(2010): 349–67; Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation, First 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988). Posner warned against the blending of humanistic 
and legal philosophies. Brooks did not take such a firm stand against law and literature, but 
conceded that the stakes of textual law were high, the autonomy of law being uncertain.  
73 Brooks, “Literature as Law’s Other,” 350. 
In his discussion of legal tropes as seen in law, Peter Brooks includes citations to Aeschylus's 
The Oresteia, Dickens's Bleak House, Melville's Billy Budd, or Kafka's The Trial as examples. 
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policy specifically within the context of queer worldmaking.  
Within this context, legal and social texts are linked in their contribution to the ways in 
which the American socio-political landscape is formed and reformed. Progressive activism in 
the 80s, 90s and early 2000s in the U.S., brought about isolated policy changes designed to 
increase the quality of life available to LGBTQIA+ persons, some of which included the barring 
of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) in 2011 and the nationwide expansion of marriage equality by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2015 Obergefell decision. Despite these isolated successes, 
ideological opposition to the expansion of queer rights remains evident in certain contexts, and it 
is for this reason that scholars must more adeptly develop the rhetorical linkages between legal 
and extralegal channels.74 As the Human Rights Campaign confirms, there are still thirty-two 
states in the U.S. that  
lack clear, fully-inclusive non-discrimination protections for LGBTQ people, meaning 
that despite the [Supreme Court’s] ruling, LGBTQ Americans can get legally married but 
still be at risk of being denied services for who they are or risk being fired simply for 
getting married and wearing their wedding ring to the office the next day.75 
Since the initial passage of the Equality Act in 1974, changes in public opinion and discourse 
have played a role in bringing about substantive policy changes that have positively impacted 
members of the LGBTQIA+ community.76 Thus, any reading of law and legal rhetoric must 
                                                          
74 Marriage and trans sex/gender self-identification, among other things, remain controversial in 
the current political landscape. 
75 “Why the Equality Act?,” Human Rights Campaign, 2016, http://www.hrc.org/resources/why-
the-equality-act., para 1. 
76 Ibid., para 3.  
To combat discrimination against LGBTQIA+ folks, U.S. Senators Jeff Merkley, Tammy 
Baldwin, and Cory Booker, and Representatives David Cicilline and John Lewis, introduced the 
Equality Act which was meant to establish “explicit, permanent protections against 
discrimination based on an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity in matters of 
employment, housing, access to public places, federal funding, credit, education and jury 
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attend to the cultural values that create and constrain rhetorical options for progressive 
advocates. 
Values and Value Hierarchies in Legal and Public Argument 
Methods of reading law are rhetorical. As such, it is important to account for the ways in 
which values can be argued in legal and public contexts. A product of legal and extra-legal 
rhetorics in the law, value warrants and hierarchies aid in developing the rhetorical options 
necessary for queer legal worldmaking. Scholars have discussed at length the utility and function 
of values as argumentative warrants, and the negotiation of values in argument.77 As Chaim 
Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca argue, values are suasory devices that not only represent a 
point of identification, but can also prescribe one as superior to others. 
Agreement with regard to a value means an admission that an object, a being, or an ideal 
must have a specific influence on action and on disposition toward action and that one 
can make use of this influence in an argument, although the point of view represented is 
not regarded as binding on everybody.78 
In other words, asserting a value judgment as superior to others enables a person to argue not 
                                                          
service.” The Equality Act also had provisions to prohibit discrimination against individuals 
based on sex with regard to access to public spaces, a provision that I will return to in my later 
discussion about trans men and women’s access to public restrooms that align with their gender 
self-identification. 
77 Greg B. Walker and Malcolm O. Sillars, “Where Is Argument? Perelman’s Theory of Values,” 
in Perspectives on Argumentation, ed. R Trapp and J. Schuetz (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland 
Press, 1990); Perelman, Justice, Law, and Argument: Essays on Moral and Legal Reasoning; 
Perelman, The New Rhetoric and the Humanities: Essays on Rhetoric and Its Applications; 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation; Malcolm O. 
Sillars and Patricia Ganer, “Values and Beliefs: A Systematic Basis for Argumentation,” in 
Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, ed. J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard 
(Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982); E. Steele, “Social Values in Public 
Address,” Western Speech 22 (1958): 38–42; Milton Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values 
(New York: Free Press, 1973). 
78 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, 74. 
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only for a particular action, as a reflection of a certain point of view, but also to assert the 
superiority of arguing from that point of view. Through this process, point of view is an element 
of the argumentative warrant. The valuation itself assigns importance to the object, person, or 
ideal in dispute and invites the audience to assume a similar point of view. Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca also note that “values enter, at some stage or other, into every argument” and 
that the utility of appealing to values is in their capacity “to induce the hearer to make certain 
choices rather than others and, most of all, to justify those choices so that they may be accepted 
and approved by others.”79 Not a substitute for argument itself, values and appeals based on 
values remain powerful supplements that create an invitation to assume a particular worldview 
and through that assumption, justify its relevance and advantageousness. 
Distinctions between types of values are by no means mutually exclusive, but there are 
productive ways to delineate the function of values within arguments. In the scholarly tradition 
set forth by Milton Rokeach in the 1970’s, there are instrumental values and terminal values.80 
Instrumental values consist of positive or negative assessments of behavior, such as honesty and 
dishonesty. When a person lies, there is a negative value judgment assigned to that behavior 
whereas telling the truth is generally viewed positively. Terminal values refer to desirable states 
of being. The notion of terminal values is reflected in Aristotle’s theorization that happiness is 
the end all, be all (telos) of human existence.81 Other scholars align with Donald Walhout who 
distinguished between personal values, such as health and friendship, and social and political 
values, which are those that refer to those shared values within communities, such as freedom 
                                                          
79 Ibid., 75. 
80 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values. 
81 Ibid. 
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and liberty.82 These distinctions are theoretically useful in parsing out the ways in which values 
function argumentatively. However, each of the scholarly traditions mentioned above distinguish 
values and value types in a topical fashion, referring to the subject matter being valued rather 
than the relationship between value types. As such, they are less productive in discussions 
pertaining to how one can argumentatively resolve a conflict among values that are deeply held. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca propose abstract and concrete values as a satisfying 
means of resolving value-driven arguments. A concrete value is “one attaching to a living being, 
a specific group, or a particular object, considered as a unique entity.”83 Abstract values, on the 
other hand, are general and transcend specific circumstances, which make them particularly 
useful as they “provide criteria for one wishing to change the established order.”84 Because 
abstract values are not inherently connected to any one instance or experience, one can argue for 
their connection to concrete values in order to reframe the meaning of either. Once the 
connection is made, a particular value may be reframed to suit more universal contexts, and 
universal values can be made more specific.85 Deploying abstract values in arguments “manifest 
a revolutionary spirit,” and are particularly useful in criticism because they are irrespective of 
individual persons; rather, abstract values more closely reflect systems of power than they do 
individuals who enjoy power.86 Individuals may claim allegiance to any number of concrete 
values, which can exist as harmonious co-habitators of their psyche. One can easily value both 
                                                          
82 Donald Walhout, The Good and the Realm of Values (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1978). For more detailed explanation of the distinctions between values, see also 
James Jasinski, Sourcebook on Rhetoric: Key Concepts in Contemporary Rhetorical Study, ed. 
Herbert W. Simons, vol. 4, Rhetoric and Society Series (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
Inc., 2001). 
83 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, 77. 
84 Ibid., 79. 
85 Ibid., 76. 
86 Ibid., 79. 
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family and professional integrity, and negotiating those values is something that many people 
manage to do on a daily basis. Yet it is difficult to reconcile abstract values without the 
argumentative process of establishing similarities through particulars. When carried to extremes, 
abstract values are irreconcilable.87 As such, arguing from the abstract to the particular, and vice 
versa, is a useful method for reconciling abstract values that may run counter to one another.  
Arguing in this fashion is inherent to legal discourse, and subsequently, queer legal 
worldmaking.88 Myriad values inevitably find their way into legal argument, and the abstracted 
values are often translated into concrete terms. Once the connection is made between abstract 
and concrete values, particulars may be reframed to suit more universal contexts, and the 
universal can be made more specific.89 When used in argument, abstract values can be tools for 
revolution and concrete values, tools for community building. Abstract values such as privacy, 
love and commitment, and the ethic of care can make concrete values like family and the home 
more inclusive. Similarly, the affective resonance of concrete values when paired with the 
abstract, impacts the relative importance of abstract values. What the cases in this dissertation 
ultimately illustrate is that progressive argumentation in a legal context necessitates both a 
hierarchical reordering of values and an assertion of concrete values as reflective of their more 
universally accepted, abstract counterparts. Shifting both the relative value hierarchies and the 
associations between abstract and concrete values can reconcile contradicting value arguments 
and redrawing community lines around shared values. The role of values in legal argument ought 
not be reduced to that of particular types of claims, but rather as warrant for an argument.90  
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The process of engaging values through argument, the process of negotiating one’s 
“value orientation,” reveals values as warrants that can reframe abstract values.91 Edward S. Inch 
and Barbara Warnick point to what they call stock topics of policy discourse that enable the 
process of value renegotiation in argumentation. The stock topics include: definition, field, 
criteria, application and hierarchies.92 Of particular relevance to this dissertation is the stock 
topic of the argument field, which refers to the “perspective within which the value object will be 
evaluated.”93 Consider the following example: An individual who recently moved to a new city 
asks a friend which is the best deli in town. Before the friend could adequately respond, both 
parties must agree upon how best to weigh the options. Looking from a purely financial field, the 
friend may suggest the least expensive deli as the best one in town. If, however, the friend is 
speaking from an ethnic field, the friend may opt to recommend the deli that serves the most 
ethnically authentic food in town, regardless of price. Both parties must proceed from the same 
argumentative field before there can be an understanding between them. Even in those cases, 
wherein both parties agree on what argumentative field to use, they can still disagree on any of 
the many field-dependent criteria that ultimately set the terms of the argument and determine 
how the valuation will proceed. The interpretive process of applying criteria is every bit as 
important as the definitional and field choices that are made prior to the discussion. In other 
words, what one values more dearly will draw the field of argument away from that which is 
valued less dearly.  
Often arguments premised on value judgments may run counter to one another. In such 
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cases, when value conflicts are at the center of a discourse, those conflicts can be resolved by 
negotiating value hierarchies, or the importance assigned to given values, relative to one another. 
As explained by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, “when a value is in question, a person may 
disqualify it, subordinate it to others, or interpret it but may not reject all values as a whole.”94 
Many people can create and sustain value hierarchies with respect to their own ideological 
formations, but if a person  
wants to justify this primacy to others or even to [themself], [they] must acknowledge the 
other values marshaled against it in order to be able to fight them. In this respect, values 
are comparable to facts: for, when one of the interlocutors puts forward a value, one must 
argue to get rid of it, under pain of refusing the discussion; and in general, the argument 
will imply that other values are accepted.95  
In this way, value hierarchies enable the negotiation of values across social contexts and are 
integral to the process of creating and interpreting legal precedent. For example, in cases wherein 
decisions were made that reflect social and political values those values can be interpreted and 
reframed in later decisions in ways that either affirm or challenge the value assessment that was 
made. The following section continues this line of thinking, considering the ways in which 
values work to establish community bonds, as well as the constitutive role of affect in drawing 
individuals together through common allegiance to specific value clusters. 
The Constitutive Role of Affect and Community Values 
Though values and value hierarchies are useful constructs in argument, particularly when 
challenging the status quo, the success of these arguments depends largely on the “stickiness” or 
perceived relevance for vested audiences. As such, deliberative moments wherein values are 
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renegotiated, or reasserted as hierarchically superior or inferior relative to one another, constitute 
a kairotic moment for communities bound by shared affiliation to those values. Speaking 
specifically to the role of emotion in public deliberation, Daniel J. Kapust and Michelle A. 
Schwarze argue that there exists a “mutually constitutive relationship between reason and 
affect.”96 Though debate remains as to whether or not reason functions in deliberation apart from 
emotion or affective content, many scholars argue that emotions perform a vital role in 
deliberation and that “certain features of speakers’ characters might play a critical role in 
creating epistemic trust between them and audiences.”97 In this dissertation, I extend that 
paradigm and embrace the tandem function of reason and affect in legal argument that relies on 
value-driven warrants.  
There are two primary precursors to the “affective turn” in rhetorical studies: an 
increased focus on the rhetorical function of the body and an exploration of emotions as 
constitutive forces.98 The former relates closely to the ways in which the material body through 
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its presence, behavior, and adornment can be rhetorical. The latter leads to a discussion of 
rhetorical embodiment, or the ways in which rhetors use bodies as a means for creating presence 
in verbal argument. This dissertation builds from that latter discussion to consider rhetorical 
embodiment within verbal argument. Any discussion of affect must begin with the concession 
that emotions and the bodies that interpolate them impact our power as human beings to “affect 
the world around us and our power to be affected by it, along with the relationship between these 
two powers.”99 Rhetorical embodiment draws from the resonance of the body’s ability to affect 
and be affected.  
The mind's power to think corresponds to its receptivity to external ideas; and the body's 
power to act corresponds to its sensitivity to other bodies. The greater our power to be 
affected […] the greater our power to act.100  
Each time a critic pauses to consider the mind's power to think and create meaning, they must 
also consider the body's power to act and be affected. 
Rhetorical embodiment is a powerful constitutive force in the formation of communities, 
particularly communities of protest. Emotions can constitute alternative materializations of 
identity that may be politically useful, and the rhetorical embodiment translates material 
experiences into discursive symbols.101 Coalition queer activism in the present-day illustrates the 
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integral relationship between the material and the rhetorical.102  Rhetoric is rooted in the body; it 
is experienced through the body, and may gain coherence insofar as bodies, message, movement, 
and affect align. However, in contexts such as legal argument wherein rhetors do not have access 
to embodied protest as an argumentative appeal, they may rely on symbolic representation of 
bodies. Robert Hariman and John Lucaites support this conclusion through their analysis of the 
power of visual rhetorical artifacts. The authors note that encountering, observing and/or 
participating in others' emotions has a greater affective impact than the interior experience of 
emotion.103 Emotions can work to establish a “commonness” that is felt when individuals work 
together against a common threat or toward a common goal. In other words, emotions mediate 
the relationship between individuals and the collective they constitute and formulate the 
“stickiness” that binds individuals together.104 It is through affect that individual subjects come 
into being as agents of the collective.  
Creating Affective Presence through Magnitude, Proximity and Severity 
The previous section detailed the process by which rhetorical embodiment can function 
as a constitutive force for LGBTQIA+ communities. Armed with the resources made available 
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through shared ideologies and the embodied experience of inhabiting a queer body, post-
homophile era activist communities have deployed affect to bring about the expansion of socio-
political rights for queer persons through verbal argument. There is a gap however between the 
rhetorical opportunities made available by social movements and the channels that facilitate legal 
change. This rhetorical problem, mirroring the constraints faced by activists during the 
homophile era, has been exacerbated by the necessity to create space for rhetorical embodiment 
within legal reasoning. Each of the three case studies in this dissertation, Lawrence and Garner 
v. Texas, Vote NO, and Campaign for Southern Equality aligns with the trends in social 
movements identified by scholars in the 60s, while offering critical insight into how rhetorical 
embodiment can be translated to a mode suitable for the courtroom or legal debate. Yet, this 
discussion is incomplete without a consideration of how arguments for the legitimacy of queer 
partnerships and families gain traction in the legal sphere, as well as how the reassertion of 
values and value clusters associated with privacy, marriage, family, and the home achieve their 
“stickiness” across both legal and social movement discourses.  
Within the realm of verbal argumentation, marginalized identities, experiences and 
lifeways are deployed through affective channels not dependent on bodily presence, but rather 
“words, phrases, figurative images, and other discursive strategies” that can accomplish two 
interrelated things: 1) make something present that had previously been absent and 2) “increase 
the presence of something that already has been brought to the audience’s attention.”105 In 
selecting certain elements over others to present as evidence in an argument, the relative 
importance and pertinence of those elements is elevated as well.106 Scholars have discussed 
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presence as a “discursive effect,” a way of making a “phenomenon, idea, concept, process, or 
person [more] vivid, tangible, and /or proximate to an audience.”107 Louise A. Karon explains 
presence as a quality first felt in the auditor’s consciousness. 
This quality, created by the rhetor’s ‘verbal magic,’ enables [them] to impress upon the 
consciousness of [their] audience whatever [they deem] important. Second, presence 
fixes the audience’s attention while altering its perceptions and perspectives. Third, its 
strongest agent is the imagination. Fourth, its purpose is to initiate action or to dispose the 
audience toward an action or judgment.108 
As an instrumental technique of argumentation, which often elicits emotional responses geared 
toward initiating a change in an audience’s attitudes or behavior, presence is persuasive and 
speaks to experiential existence.109 Argumentation, particularly in a legal context, is necessarily 
incomplete, and relies on the process of selection when determining legal precedent. As 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note, “except where a formalized field which can be completely 
isolated is involved, the aggregate of things admitted is fluid and remains open. […] In any case, 
it provides each audience with a frame of reference by means of which arguments can be 
tested.”110 In choosing certain elements above others, one makes those elements present, which 
changes the field of argument such that “it cannot avoid being open to accusations of 
incompleteness and hence of partiality and tendentiousness.”111 An important step then in legal 
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argumentation is identifying a method or technique with which to make the argument 
compelling. 
According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, flexibility and extension are two common 
techniques for arguing for the plasticity of ideas that are useful in this context. Flexibility, which 
enables concepts to be removed from their original usage, lends itself to arguments asserting that 
the status quo has been “outmoded.” With this strategy, concepts appear to be “living” and 
“adaptable” and therefore “up to date.”112 Extension, on the other hand, consists of “enlarging or 
restricting the sphere of a notion so that it does or does not embrace certain beings, things, ideas, 
or situations.”113 Both of these strategies are instrumental when challenging the fixedness of 
arguments. Plasticity of concepts is vital within the context of queer legal worldmaking. In such 
contexts, progressive advocates are tasked with reordering the hierarchical relationship in and 
amongst values, as well as the abstract and concrete associations that define the value itself. 
Because the assumption of fixedness is easier to refute, progressives can establish flexibility 
and/or extension of the value clusters associated with privacy, marriage and family, and the 
home in order to argue that current policies regarding same-sex partnerships and families are 
outmoded and therefore inadequate. Nevertheless, such arguments are likely to be interpreted by 
hostile audiences as “a sign of misunderstanding or insincerity,” as was evident in the each of the 
three case studies included in this dissertation.114 For the flexibility and/or extension of values in 
legal argument to be more widely acceptable, there must also be a shift in what counts as shared 
or common experience. 
Symbolic connection is precarious as it is emotionally evocative; “symbols have an 
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indisputable effect on those who recognize the symbolic connection, but none at all on others.”115 
As such, the process of making values more present is not simply an emotional process, but 
affective. Presence “acts directly on our sensibility.”116 Illustrations that amplify or analogize 
experiences and values contribute to the affective impact of presence. Making vivid and specific 
that which is abstract, amplification leads to the transposition of the material into the discursive 
sphere.117 Acting first upon the psyche and the body via emotional resonance, amplification and 
analogy facilitate the presence of values and hierarchies, which are essential elements in 
argumentation.118 Thus, figurative tropes facilitate affect in order to supplement verbal argument 
in similar fashion to a concrete, physical object. In the same way as “Caesar’s bloody tunic 
which Antony waves in front of the Roman populace, or the children of the accused brought 
before his judges in order to arouse their pity,” physical things may be transubstantiated and 
made rhetorically present by their descriptor.119 Presence is a means of preserving the affective 
resonance of embodied protest strategies used by queer activists in the 80s and 90s because “the 
effort to make something present to the consciousness can relate not only to real objects, but also 
to a judgment or an entire argumentative development.”120 The act of making something present 
through verbal argument fills the hearers’ consciousness, which imbues it with added 
importance. Not only do such arguments make certain premises of superior relevance, but should 
those premises be primarily affective, they also work to establish affective arguments as superior 
in and of themselves. 
 Presence is the vehicle through which progressive advocates in each of the three case 
                                                          
115 Ibid., 335. 
116 Ibid., 116. 
117 Ibid., 360. 
118 Ibid., 117. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid., 118. 
49 
 
studies to follow renegotiate the field of argument and the values associated with privacy, 
marriage and family, and the home. Though arguments in each of the case studies feature 
affective qualities, they also rely on loci that are useful for creating presence, which include: 
magnitude, proximity, and severity.121 These three loci stem from Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s prior work, in which they proffered time, place, relation, and personal interest as 
relevant loci to presence.122 Loci of magnitude, proximity, and severity are most relevant to the 
case studies included in this dissertation as they relate closely to arguments grounded in the 
assertion of common experience between rhetor and audience. By amplifying the shared 
experiences of same-sex couples to those of heterosexual couples, progressive advocates in each 
of the case studies made discursively present the negative effects of the exigencies of policies not 
inclusive of LGBTQIA+ partnerships and families. Furthermore, each of the case studies 
exemplifies the power of amplification, of illustrations that increase the presence of abstracted 
concepts and values through a particular case, in transpositioning what families can look and feel 
like. Such arguments seize the rhetorical opportunities made available by the kairotic moment, 
thereby redrawing community lines around whose partnerships and families “count” as 
recognizable under the law to include same-sex couples and their families. 
 Queer legal worldmaking necessarily involves the co-creation of laws by people 
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operating through legal and extralegal channels. When creating laws about intimate partnership, 
marriage, and family, policy-makers find their interests analogous to those of the communities 
they seek to govern. Policy change occurs when the status quo no longer represents the interests 
and lifeways of those within the community. As such, a more inclusive model of partnership, 
marriage, or family must begin with a renegotiation of community boundaries around common 
values. If value-driven arguments are a process through which communities can be constituted, 
then rhetorical embodiment is the gatekeeper and conduit through which extra-legal discourse 
influences the law. In the chapters to follow, I dissect the function of loci of presence as vehicles 
for rhetorical embodiment as they facilitate the negotiation of values and value hierarchies 
associated with privacy, marriage and family, and the home. Through presence, affect can shift 
the field of argument in legal and extra-legal contexts to reflect the increasingly queered cultural 
landscape in the United States. 
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Lawrence and Garner v. Texas and “The Right to be Left Alone”:  
Making Privacy Affectively Resonant Through Loci of Magnitude  
Just outside of Houston, Texas, on September 17, 1998, Tyron Garner and Robert 
Eubanks visited the home of John Lawrence. Eubanks, who had a somewhat tempestuous 
romantic relationship with Garner, was reportedly angry that Lawrence and Garner had been 
flirting. He left Lawrence’s apartment and called the police to report that a “black man with a 
gun was going crazy” at Lawrence’s apartment.123 Although false, Garner’s report gave the 
police due cause to enter Lawrence’s apartment, after which, Joseph Quinn, one of the 
responding officers, claimed that he found Lawrence and Garner engaged in sexual intercourse in 
the bedroom. The other responding officers disputed Quinn’s claim, some claiming to have 
witnessed oral sex but not sexual intercourse and others reporting that they witnessed no sex at 
all. However, Quinn’s testimony provided enough justification to jail the two men overnight, 
after which they were charged with and eventually convicted of “homosexual conduct,” a Class 
C misdemeanor under the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law.124  
Lawrence and Garner’s arrest provided the opportunity to revisit what had become a 
stagnant conversation with presumed agreement across the U.S. In 1998, several states, Texas 
included, had anti-sodomy statutes on the books.125 The wording of the Texas Homosexual 
Conduct Law defined sex between same-sex partners as a “deviate sexual act,” and effectively 
                                                          
123 Counsel for Petitioners, John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner v. State of Texas, Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari (n.d.). 
124 For more information about the chain of events that led to Lawrence and Garner’s arrest and 
the subsequent trial, see Dale Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct: The Story of Lawrence v. Texas 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2012). 
125 States with anti-sodomy legislation in place were Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, 
Utah and Virginia. 
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classified “homosexual conduct” as a criminal action.126 For this reason, Lawrence and Garner’s 
arrest attracted the interest of lawyers from Lambda Legal, who encouraged Lawrence and 
Garner to plead no contest in their initial trial in order to petition for appeal in the higher courts. 
The men would provide the opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of anti-sodomy 
legislation, which had been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick (Bowers) 
in 1986.127 After Lawrence and Garner’s initial conviction, Lambda Legal appealed to the Harris 
County Criminal Court, where Lawrence and Garner again pled no contest and their conviction 
was upheld. The case then moved to the Texas Fourteenth Court of Appeals, where, as had 
happened in the lower Courts, Lawrence and Garner’s conviction was upheld, and the 
constitutionality of the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law was affirmed. Finally, upon being 
denied a hearing by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the highest appellate Court in the state, 
Lambda Legal petitioned for a hearing with the U.S. Supreme Court in 2002. The High Court 
agreed to hear the case. Sixteen years since the Court had upheld the constitutionality of sodomy 
legislation in Bowers, a discourse that had lain dormant since 1986 was brought back to the fore.  
The conviction of Lawrence and Garner served as a kairotic moment in which to 
reenergize a cultural conversation about homosexuality in the U.S. and make that conversation 
legally relevant. Similar to other moments in our nation’s history wherein the State unjustly 
discriminated against marginalized communities, Lawrence was seen by progressive advocates 
as an opportunity to correct a prior wrong. By using equal protection arguments, Lambda 
lawyers drew connections between outmoded and overturned court decisions that upheld state-
sanctioned discrimination, specifically with respect to race. Lambda lawyers’ comparisons to 
                                                          
126 “Homosexual Conduct Law,” Texas Penal Code § 21.06. Homosexual Conduct § (1973). 
127 The Bowers v. Hardwick decision upheld the constitutionality of sodomy legislation. There 
will be more detailed information about Bowers in later pages. 
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racial injustice, which had been previously sanctioned and subsequently overturned by the Court, 
extended the reach of equal protection arguments beyond the gay community and elevated the 
relative importance of values related to privacy above moral arguments about sexuality. Indeed, 
the case shifted the meaning of morality altogether, rerouting conversation away from the moral 
imperative of sexual expression and toward the moral imperative to honor the freedoms codified 
in the Constitution. In their defense of Lawrence and Garner, Lambda Legal lawyers used 
argumentative loci of magnitude to make present 1) the depth of impact of anti-sodomy 
legislation and 2) the full scope of those affected by such laws. While anti-sodomy laws like the 
Texas Homosexual Conduct Law inevitably target queer communities, particularly gay men, 
Lambda lawyers argued that such laws also set a legal precedent that would limit privacy for all 
U.S. citizens.  
Moreover, through figurative allusions to government’s “prying eyes,” Lambda lawyers 
created the possibility for affective resonance with respect to government intrusion. Privacy as an 
abstract value was argumentatively linked with the lived experience of intimacy, which created a 
concrete value association directly tied to the relationships and experiences that characterize 
private life. As this analysis illustrates, loci of magnitude can facilitate a shift in value 
hierarchies in legal argument. Making prominent the threat of privacy infringement in this case, 
Lambda established the full scope of the harm brought about by the Texas Homosexual Conduct 
Law and disrupted the assumed connection between immorality and homosexual sodomy, which 
enabled a reshuffling of values associated with private, intimate relationships to embrace a non-
heteronormative paradigm. Rather than argue for or against the morality of homosexuality, 
which constituted many of the arguments in favor of anti-sodomy legislation, Lambda shifted the 
field of argument toward arguments pertaining to how American liberties are constructed and 
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embodied. Relating the injustices experienced by Black Americans to those experienced by 
Lawrence and Garner through rhetorical embodiment, these arguments created the rhetorical 
space necessary to challenge the constitutionality of anti-sodomy legislation. 
In this chapter, I first discuss the relevant aspects of Bowers v. Hardwick echoed by the 
State of Texas during the Lawrence hearing as contextual elements that both enabled and 
restricted Lambda’s rhetorical options in arguing on behalf of Lawrence and Garner. I then 
elaborate on the prior court cases in which race-based discrimination was debated. Arguing 
specifically against state-sanctioned discrimination, Lambda’s lawyers analogized legal 
arguments about sexual desire with those about race, hearkening to the nation’s shameful past 
with racial discrimination. By establishing the full depth of harm through loci of magnitude, they 
made present the problems associated with anti-sodomy legislation.  
The second portion of the analysis illustrates how arguments related to privacy (by way 
of equal protection) extended the sphere of vested individuals beyond targeted and marginalized 
communities. Lambda’s argument demonstrated that a legal conversation about private intimacy 
extended beyond homosexual couples to all Americans with a vested interest in protection from 
government intrusion. By demonstrating the impact of the issue beyond those who had been 
deemed “immoral” by their engagement in homosexual sodomy, vested stakeholders in the case 
were constituted much more broadly to include those who value privacy and the right to due 
process. As has been illustrated in previous chapters, arguments that “ring true” are often those 
that justify the status quo; audiences have a tendency to gravitate emotionally toward that which 
is familiar. However, as this case study demonstrates, the affective resonance of liberty and 
intrusion (both related to privacy) as antithetical value warrants are powerful forces that 
ultimately empowered the High Court to overturn Bowers. 
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The Influence of Bowers as Legal Precedent in Lawrence and Garner v. Texas 
 As with many legal rulings, arguments made during the Lawrence case were in 
opposition to prior legal precedent. In this case, Bowers was the primary legal ruling that set the 
precedent against which litigators representing the state of Texas argued. The Bowers case was 
brought in 1982 after a police officer, who had been fulfilling a warrant for Michael Hardwick’s 
arrest for failing to appear in court on the charge of public drinking, witnessed him engaging in 
sex with another man in his home. Both men were charged for violating the Georgia statute that 
criminalized sodomy, even in a private dwelling. The case was first brought against the Atlanta 
police commissioner and Georgia’s attorney general in the Federal District Court in order to 
challenge the constitutionality of Georgia’s anti-sodomy statute. After the District Court initially 
refused to hear the case, the Court of Appeals overruled, contending that the statute violated 
Hardwick’s right to privacy under the Ninth Amendment and under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.128 The Court further held that in light of other prior precedent, the 
constitutionality of the statute would have required Bowers to demonstrate that the law served a 
“compelling state interest” and that it was the “most narrowly tailored means of achieving what 
ever that state interest might be.”129 Ultimately however the case was brought to the U.S. 
Supreme Court where justices ruled against Hardwick and upheld the constitutionality of anti-
sodomy laws.  
 Values and value hierarchies played an integral role in the interpretation of relevant legal 
precedent as the Court deliberated Bowers. For example, values associated with privacy and due 
                                                          
128 The Ninth Amendment protects fundamental rights not specifically enumerated in the prior 
eight amendments. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from 
depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law.  
129 Bowers vs. Hardwick, No. 760 F.2d 1202. (United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit May 21, 1985). 
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process, which served to substantiate the Hardwick’s claim, were subordinated to values 
associated with both Christian morality and Constitutional purity in this case. The Bowers 
decision had uncoupled sodomy and homosexual sodomy as inherently different behaviors and 
assigned a moral judgment that was intimately tied to the identity of those who engaged the 
behavior. In 1986, discourses that challenged power and privilege with regard to gender and 
sexuality were still gaining public recognition. As such, it was assumed that the moral 
justification that undergirded Bowers was generally supported by mainstream cultural discourses 
at the time. Sixteen years later in 2002, representatives for the State of Texas in Lawrence leaned 
heavily on Bowers when asserting the distinction between morality, homosexuality, and intimate 
partnership, and used these assumptions to substantiate their claim to have pursued legitimate 
state interest. The hierarchical relationship between privacy and morality as values would need to 
be renegotiated before Bowers could be overturned and the assumed constitutionality of anti-
sodomy legislation challenged.  
As Lawrence made its way through the lower courts, the State of Texas repeatedly argued 
that its only aim was to advance “legitimate state interest” and the “enforcement of principles of 
morality and the promotion of family values,” albeit strategic versions of morality and family 
values.130 Representatives for the State of Texas built their argument around the assumption that 
homosexuality and, thus, homosexual sodomy was aberrant and immoral. These arguments were 
somewhat narrowly drawn and relied on the Liberty Counsel131 and representatives from other 
southern states, who advised the Court that homosexuals were self-destructive, disease-prone, 
and promiscuous and that homosexual sodomy had “severe physical, emotional, psychological 
                                                          
130 Counsel for Petitioners, John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner v. State of Texas, Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari at 7. 
131 Founded in 1989, the Liberty Counsel is a coalition that promotes litigation and policy 
formation in line with evangelical Christian values on the local, state, and national levels.  
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and spiritual consequences.”132 As such, Texas’ primary justification for upholding the 
Homosexual Conduct Law was the assumption that the statute stood for moral righteousness, and 
this decision would symbolize the moral compass of the nation.  
The majority opinion in the 1986 Bowers case was invoked in several ways by the State 
of Texas to justify the constitutionality of anti-sodomy laws. The first argument lifted from 
Bowers and reappropriated in Lawrence was that the Constitution does not grant a fundamental 
right upon homosexual citizens to engage in sodomy as prior cases dealt with family 
relationships, marriage, and/or procreation, which was argued bore no resemblance to Bowers or 
Lawrence. As it was portrayed by Texas, the image of the American family was still firmly 
heteronormative. On a related note, the majority opinion in Bowers, authored by Justice Byron 
White, argued that it was unsupportable to assume that any form of private sexual conduct 
between consenting adults would be constitutionally insulated from state scrutiny.133 White’s 
argument is notable for the way in which it narrowly defined the central issue of the case as a 
question of whether or not the Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexual 
citizens to engage in sodomy, not whether or not citizens had a fundamental right to privacy. 
White’s opinion was predicated on the assumption that the mode of sexual intercourse made 
homosexual and heterosexual relationships fundamentally different. White contended that 
homosexuality and the American family were not compatible.  
Moreover, White’s opinion argued against the assertion that the due process clause of the 
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment protected the right to engage in sodomy because such conduct is 
not “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” nor is it “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
                                                          
132 Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct: The Story of Lawrence v. Texas, 203–06. 
133 J. White, Bowers v. Hardwick, No. 85-140 (Eleventh Circuit Supreme Court June 30, 1986). 
65 
 
and tradition.” To claim otherwise, he argued would be “facetious.”134 White resisted the 
argument to extend the reach of Due Process to include homosexual sodomy, which was not 
represented in the language of the Constitution. He warned that it could potentially grant the 
Court authority to govern the country without direct constitutional authority.135 White’s 
argument explicitly argued that any interpretation of “liberty” must be represented specifically in 
the language of our nation’s founding documents. However, as has been noted in prior chapters, 
the process of interpretation is integral to constitutional law, and many constitutional scholars 
envision the Constitution as a living document, one that requires constant revitalization.136 As 
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such, White’s argument that linguistic integrity should be the touchstone for preventing an 
overreaching by the Court to secure certain liberties was vulnerable to reinterpretation. 
Moreover, White argued that anti-sodomy laws should not be invalidated on the grounds that the 
“presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral 
and unacceptable.”137 Because the statute did not infringe on a fundamental right and because the 
majority of the electorate supposedly viewed sodomy as unacceptable, White argued that the law 
served a legitimate government purpose and was thus, constitutional. White’s opinion was 
echoed by Chief Justice Warren Burger who stated in his concurring opinion that recognizing a 
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy would “cast aside millennia of moral 
teaching.”138  
In emphasizing the importance of “history and tradition” and “moral teaching,” the 
majority opinion in Bowers created the opportunity for petitioners in the Lawrence case to 
reframe the applicability of the Court’s decision in Bowers. Justices White and Burger deployed 
history and tradition as concrete values, with specific ties to the Constitution. As an abstract 
value, morality was tied to “history” and “tradition” in 1986 and served particular argumentative 
ends that enabled White and Burger to substantiate their claims. However, as petitioners in 
Lawrence demonstrated, when linked to other concrete values or when history and tradition are 
effectively reframed, abstract values can be deployed to support a persuasive counter argument 
with which to challenge the applicability and soundness of legal precedent, like Bowers.  
As was seen in this case, a shift in value orientation and the hierarchical relationships 
among values can facilitate a shift in the field of argument itself. Justice Harry Blackmun, in 
                                                          
137 White, Bowers v. Hardwick at 196. 
138 Warren Burger, Concurring opinion, Bowers v. Hardwick, No. 478 U.S. 186 (United States 
Supreme Court June 30, 1986). 
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writing a dissenting opinion on Bowers, left important breadcrumbs to be followed by lawyers at 
Lambda Legal in 2002. In his opinion, Blackmun accused the majority of the Court of distorting 
the central issue of the case (along with those of prior relevant precedent) by focusing on 
behavior (i.e., sodomy and “homosexual activity”) instead of underlying principle of privacy. 
Citing from two precedential court rulings, Blackmun argued that Bowers was no more about  
a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy” than Stanley v. Georgia [1969] 
protected the “fundamental right to watch obscene movies,” or Katz v. United States 
[1967] protected the “fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone 
booth.”139  
Rather, he argued, Bowers was at its core about “the most comprehensive of rights and the right 
most valued by civilized men,” which was “the right to be let alone.”140 Blackmun contended 
that the majority’s opinion in Bowers was not singularly related to the refusal to recognize the 
right to engage in homosexual sodomy, as they had claimed, but that the ruling also refused to 
recognize the fundamental right and interest of all individuals to control the nature of their 
intimate relationships. In the Lawrence case, Lambda lawyers reappropriated Blackmun’s 
argument that sodomy, as a behavior, was not on trial; rather the act of homosexual sodomy, 
which was defined not by action itself but by the identity of the individuals carrying it out. 
Building from Blackmun’s opinion, lawyers at Lambda re-envisioned liberty itself, 
revisited relevant value hierarchies to challenge Bowers-era assumptions about morality, and 
renegotiated the field of argument. Lambda leaned heavily on the assumption that culture had 
evolved and that American morality and family as values could accommodate an alternative 
                                                          
139 Harry Blackmun, Dissenting opinion, Bowers v. Hardwick, No. 478 U.S. 186 (United States 
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140 Ibid. 
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frame of reference; homosexuality was simply a reality of American life rather than a threat to it. 
The argument was multi-faceted, and was accompanied by briefs submitted not just by Lambda 
Legal, but also the American Bar Association, the American Psychological Association, the 
American Public Health Association, the Cato Institute, and the Log Cabin Republicans, among 
others, who incorporated extralegal evidence to substantiate their position.141 Diversifying the 
issue at hand beyond a discussion of homosexual sodomy, Lambda developed troubling imagery 
of government intrusion, which minimized the perceived relevance of moral arguments with 
regard to homosexuality alone. To challenge Bowers, which contended that anti-sodomy laws 
were, in fact, constitutional because prior cases had concerned privacy within the contexts of 
child rearing, family relationships, procreation, marriage, contraception, and abortion, lawyers 
for Lambda built an argument that the unique qualities of the Lawrence case aligned favorably 
with the unique qualities of legal decision(s) apart from Bowers; that privacy was a relevant 
premise on which to assert the unconstitutionality of anti-sodomy laws. 
 For the remainder of this chapter, I draw from a transcript of the oral arguments 
presented during the hearing of Lawrence and Garner v. Texas, along with supporting passages 
of the writ of certiorari submitted by Lambda Legal that urged the High Court to hear the case. 
Both documents illustrate the progressive arguments that justified the hearing to exonerate 
Lawrence and Garner, effectively overturning Bowers. The transcript of oral arguments also 
provides an adequate encapsulation of the arguments made on behalf of the state of Texas, which 
lawyers at Lambda Legal sought to undermine and reframe. The first portion of the analysis 
                                                          
141 Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct: The Story of Lawrence v. Texas. The Cato Institute is a 
libertarian think tank that promotes policy based on individual liberty and limited government, 
the importance of free markets to national interest and peaceful international relations. The Log 
Cabin Republicans is an organization that works with the Republican Party to advance rights for 
LGBTQIA+ communities. 
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discusses the ways in which Lambda lawyers took advantage of the rhetorical options made 
available by the accumulation of three primary tenets. First, Lambda argued that Bowers 
represented state-sanctioned discrimination. Second, they argued that the kind of discrimination 
in Bowers and in Lawrence reflected other shameful moments in U.S. history wherein the state 
discriminated on the basis of race. Finally, the depth of the harm that anti-sodomy statutes bring 
to targeted groups is grounds for their dismissal. Loci of magnitude that emphasize the depth of 
harm done unto a particular party create the possibility for affective arguments, which in this 
case amplified the threat of privacy infringement.  
“Gay” is a Four-Letter Word 
Historically, cases that have dealt with issues of discrimination have been argued on the 
basis of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to the 14th Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. Section One of Amendment XIV reads: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.142 
Contrary to what had been upheld in the Bowers decision, lawyers at Lambda interpreted the law 
to argue that an infringement on a homosexual person’s right to private intimate relations while 
sparing non-homosexual persons who engaged in the same behavior was a direct violation of 
equal protection. The frame of view asserted by Lambda rested on one primary assumption: that 
                                                          
142 National Archives, “The Constitution: Amendments 11-27, A Transcription,” October 6, 
2016, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/amendments-11-27. Italics mine. 
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criminality in this case was determined by identity, not by action, and violated the fundamental 
right for all adult couples, same-sex or otherwise, to “be free from unwarranted State intrusion 
into their personal decisions about their preferred forms of sexual expression.”143  
In terms of freedom of expression, there were direct and indirect harms imposed by the 
Texas Homosexual Conduct Law, which made the law a “glaring affront to the Constitution’s 
guarantee of equal protection.144  
As a matter of equal protection, bare condemnation of one group of people – whether 
termed a moral judgment, a value judgment, or simple dislike – cannot sustain a 
classification like the Homosexual Conduct Law under any level of scrutiny. This equal 
protection question is separate and independent from the privacy claim also urged here, 
and confusion in equal protection law independently warrants the Court’s 
intervention.”145   
Lambda attempted to call into question the ways in which the Equal Protection Clause was 
appropriated in Bowers in order to make the case that making a similar decision, which was a 
mistake then, would constitute a similar mistake now.  
 Contrary to the majority opinion in Bowers that asserted that homosexual sodomy was 
not inherently connected to the development and maintenance of intimate relationships, Lambda 
argued that decoupling sodomy from homosexual sodomy gave legal grounding to the rhetorical 
practice of “othering” gay and lesbian individuals from the norm. Whereas on paper, the 
definition of sodomy and homosexual sodomy is virtually the same with regard to the practice 
                                                          
143 Paul M. Smith and Charles A. Rosenthal, “In the Supreme Court of the United States John 
Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner, Petitioners v. Texas. Oral Arguments,” Pub. L. No. 02-102, 
52 (2003), 4. 
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itself, Lambda lawyers argued that “today, ‘sodomy’ has become a ‘code word’ for 
homosexuality, regardless of statutory definition.”146 This unusual quality of Texas’ law singled 
out same-sex couples rather than sodomy as an act. The redefinition of homosexual sodomy and 
sodomy, and its relevance to the American family, was a vital rhetorical process that enabled 
petitioners for Lawrence and Garner to call into question Bowers’ relevance as primary legal 
precedent. Key terms like “infectious” and “criminal” were important touchstones that facilitated 
a renegotiation of the field of argument and subsequently the value hierarchies that made each 
argument (progressive and conservative) affectively powerful. 
In challenging the appropriateness of Bowers as legal precedent for Lawrence, Lambda 
developed stronger interpretive ties to other cases that highlighted values that had been 
subordinated in Bowers. Lambda intimated that there are necessarily layers of cultural history 
that blend with the function of legal precedent, that “history is a starting point, not the end point 
of this analysis.”147 Rather than isolate Bowers as the touchstone in determining the outcome of 
Lawrence, Lambda urged for a more holistic view of legal history to avoid one of the errors 
made in the Bowers decision, which was negating “the right of everyone to decide for themselves 
about consensual private sexual intimacy.”148 History painted a much more complicated picture. 
In each of the cases cited by Lambda, the identity of those who had broken the law was 
paramount to the actions that were carried out. In their arguments during Lawrence, Lambda 
lawyers amplified comparable affective qualities between Bowers and other case decisions that, 
in their view, got it wrong with respect to the Equal Protection Clause.149 In other words, in 
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declining to address equal protection issues in favor of upholding the State’s “morality 
justification,” Bowers was comparable to the cluster of prior cases that discriminated against 
marginalized communities, which made them unfavorable sources of legal precedent.150  
Illustrated by the U.S.’ legal history with upholding state-sanctioned racial 
discrimination, the word of the Supreme Court is far from infallible and the history of 
overturning wrongful decisions was well established before Bowers and the litany of cases cited 
directly by Lambda Legal in the Lawrence case. A prime example is Dred Scott v. Sandford. 
Considered one of the worst decisions to be handed down by the High Court in American legal 
history, Dred Scott upheld that a “negro” enslaved or free was not and could not be an American 
citizen and therefor had no right to sue in federal court.151 Chief Justice Roger B. Taney authored 
the majority opinion and cited the founders as having never intended to consider those of Negro 
decent as members of the American people.  
In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and the language 
used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of persons who had 
been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, 
were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the 
general words used in that memorable instrument.152  
While the Constitution clearly guaranteed that “all men are created equal,” it was argued that the 
accommodation of the practice of slavery by the founders indicated their views that slaves and 
their descendants were not then nor are they now considered people. Rather, “the unhappy black 
race” was marked as separate from the white race, “and were never thought of or spoken of 
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except as property, and when the claims of the owner or the profit of the trader were supposed to 
need protection.”153 The decision was not unanimous, however. Justices John McLean and 
Benjamin Robbins Curtis dissented. McLean objected to the Court’s decision citing that Black 
men were eligible to vote in five of the thirteen states when the Constitution was ratified. For that 
reason, he argued they were citizens not only of their respective state but of the nation.  Justice 
Curtis objected to the Court’s decision on the merits of the majority decision itself, which 
nullified Scott’s ability to file his lawsuit. Since the Court had decided that Scott’s right to 
citizenship was void, so too was the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case. The appropriate action, 
he argued, would have been to dismiss the case entirely.  
Since the decision in 1857, Dred Scott has been broadly denounced as “the Court’s 
greatest self-inflicted wound.”154 Beyond signifying an abuse of judicial power, the Dred Scott 
decision contributed to the further polarization of the nation.155 The decision had specific 
implications for advocates belonging to the abolition movement, who had long striven to secure 
slaves’ freedom. Rather than answer the question of slavery once and for all, Dred Scott 
contributed to the eventual bloody conflict between the pro- and anti-slavery factions of the 
country. As a battle for Constitutionally guaranteed individual autonomy and over the role of 
government in determining and protecting personhood, Dred Scott represents a touchstone 
moment wherein social movement rhetorics were implicated as legally relevant. Hearkening also 
to the eventual argument made by litigants in Bowers and Lawrence that the privacy of gay men 
was less protected by the Constitution, Dred Scott also represents a touchstone moment in legal 
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history in which identity and citizenship were inextricably linked. 
A few decades after the Dred Scott decision and after the conclusion of the Civil War in 
the U.S., the Supreme Court once again issued a controversial ruling regarding racial 
discrimination. Plessey v. Ferguson was decided in 1896 and upheld the “separate but equal” 
doctrine that effectively sanctioned racial segregation in public facilities.156 The result of a pre-
arranged incident wherein Homer Plessey, a free man of mixed decent, boarded the “whites 
only” train car in Louisiana. After being convicted and sentenced by Judge John Howard 
Ferguson in Louisiana, Plessey appealed, eventually bringing his case (then against the State of 
Louisiana, now against Ferguson himself) before the High Court. In a 7-1 decision, the Court 
upheld Ferguson’s initial ruling and contended that separation of the races did not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment, as it did not imply the inferiority of African Americans.157 Ultimately, 
the Court argued that the principle being debated in the case (i.e., that separation of the races 
invariably contributed to a denigration of a people on the basis of race) did not implicate the 
Fourteenth Amendment. However, as was documented across the nation, segregated facilities 
were rarely of equal quality, and those reserved for African Americans were routinely of far 
lesser quality.158 Justice John Marshall Harlan, the only Justice to dissent in the case, warned that 
the Court’s decision in Plessey clearly violated not just the Fourteenth Amendment, but the 
Thirteenth as well. Harlan foreshadowed that Plessey would come to be as disreputable as Dred 
Scott had become should the Court operate beyond the bounds of the Bill of Rights. As a set of 
“notable additions” to “fundamental law,” Harlan contended the Bill of Rights as an effort by 
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“friends of liberty” to purge the United States’ government of racial discrimination that had 
poisoned the Court’s prior decisions to do with race.159 Though the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments had not been ratified at the time of Dred Scott, Harlan felt the precedent set by 
Dred Scott did not apply within a legal context that granted to “a race recently emancipated, a 
race that through many generations have been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior 
race enjoy.”160 Equality, he argued, was not merely something written into law. The extra-legal 
factors that contribute to quality of life, while not directly secured through legal means, become 
of legal relevance when one considers the spirit of the Constitution. Harlan argued that without 
properly taking into account various extralegal prestige, achievements, education, or wealth, the 
relative power enjoyed by the “dominant race” would mirror a caste system, which would limit 
liberties for those Americans not belonging to the “dominant race.”  
In view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, 
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, 
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. […] It is therefore to be regretted 
that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached 
the conclusion that it is competent for a state to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of 
their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.161 
Speaking directly to what he perceived as an overreach and a direct attack on a particular group 
of citizens on the basis of race, Harlan foreshadowed the legal arguments that would be heard in 
Lawrence. Namely, that extra-legal consequences resulting from being marked as a criminal on 
the basis of identity are legally relevant and valid resources for argumentation. Even as the 
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majority decision in Plessey justified “separate but equal” policy as useful means of preserving 
freedom for privately owned businesses from governmental interference, Harlan’s voice of 
dissent challenged the assumption that separation on the basis of identity, particularly aspects of 
identity like race that have been historically used to marginalize communities, would always 
limit liberty and equality. 
 Dred Scott and Plessey, both decisions from the High Court that have since been 
overturned, brought identity and the extra-legal consequences of government overreach under the 
purview of legal argument. These themes became of greater relevance in legal proceedings 
during the Civil Rights era, particularly in Loving v. Virginia. After being jailed for entering an 
interracial marriage, which violated the State of Virginia’s anti-miscegenation laws, Mildred 
Loving (born Jeter) and Richard Loving filed a lawsuit that was eventually heard by the High 
Court. Contrary to the outcomes in Dred Scott and Plessey, the Court ruled in favor of the 
Lovings and overturned a prior decision, Pace v. Alabama, which had previously upheld the 
constitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws.162 In addition to overturning Pace, the Loving 
decision also upheld the Court’s decision in McLaughlin, which maintained that statutes that 
prevent interracial couples from cohabitating were unconstitutional.163 Since 1967, the Loving 
decision has become a touchstone case for progressive legal argument, particularly for marriage 
equality advocates, even serving as a primary resource for argument in Obergefell v. Hodges. 
Loving challenged prior decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court that had authorized state-
sanctioned discrimination on the basis of race. More importantly, however, Loving served as a 
precedent for the overturning of such decisions that had subsequently been deemed 
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unconstitutional and which public opinion had come to reject over time.  
As was the case with Dred Scott, Plessey and Loving, Lawrence was, at its root, about 
identity. And so, Lambda lawyers drew connections between Lawrence and those prior legal 
arguments that came to bear on rulings that upheld legislation that discriminated on the basis of 
race. Specifically referring to McLaughlin,164 Lambda referenced the injustice of assigning a 
“specially heightened penalty to cohabitation, but only when it involves a white person with a 
black person.”165 Similar to Lawrence, wherein the State of Texas was drawing a comparison to 
Bowers’ assumption that sodomy was different from homosexual sodomy, McLaughlin 
contended that interracial cohabitation was somehow different from the practice of cohabitation 
between two partners of the same race. Petitioners in McLaughlin argued that they were merely 
regulating “a particular form of conduct,” yet the Court ultimately decided that cohabitation, 
interracial or otherwise was fundamentally the same and that any decision to the contrary would 
classify people, not practice. In decisions since, the Court has maintained that “a mere 
disapproval of one group of people, whether it is the hippie communes in Moreno or the 
mentally retarded in Cleburne, or indeed gay people” cannot be sustained without rational 
justification.166  
Leaning on the assumption that these prior decisions had since been deemed antiquated 
by the Court and running counter to pubic interest, Lambda urged the Court to understand the 
ways in which rejecting the rational basis standard would be “insensitive to the reality of what 
the world is like, and to the fact that some groups of – some classifications tend to be involving 
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minorities that have had histories of discrimination against them and that the overall effect of 
some line-drawing can be very harmful.”167 Though the cases mentioned by Lambda were based 
on the disapproval of some people or some conduct, the Equal Protection Clause positions the 
role of the Court as a bulwark against arbitrary government intrusion when there is no rational 
justification for whatever line being drawn.168 In reframing which cases Lawrence aligned with, 
Lambda developed connective tissue between Bowers and the several prior cases that were 
overturned on the basis that they couldn’t survive rational basis scrutiny. Cases that had done 
undo harm to communities made vulnerable for myriad identity characteristics created unjust 
consequences that when deployed as legal precedent, spawned further injustice, and therefore 
could not stand.  
The depth of harm brought about by statutes like Texas’ Homosexual Conduct Law onto 
historically marginalized communities justified their removal. Alluding to previous decisions, 
Lambda argued that the potential magnitude of injustice was simply a risk the Court could not 
afford.169 According to Lambda’s case brief, the State of Texas had not justified the Homosexual 
Conduct Law beyond “we want these people to be excluded. We’d had a distaste for them. We 
disapprove of them. It’s mere disapproval, or hostility, however historically based, is not 
sufficient.”170 Lambda’s argument alluded to what Levi describes as the infectious quality of 
legal decisions and precedent.171 As Levi explains, “Laws come to express the ideas of the 
community and even when written for general terms, in statute or constitution, are molded for 
the specific case.”172 Within the context of Lambda’s argument, the “ideas of the community,” 
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namely that homosexual sodomy was criminal and supposedly immoral, which was represented 
in Texas’ Homosexual Conduct Law, had broader consequences that would diminish quality of 
life for gay and lesbian citizens. This foundation provided Lambda with the rhetorical options to 
establish the affective resonance of the case for individuals beyond homosexual couples. If one 
statute could create implications that leaked into other aspects of life in this case, then other 
cases would inevitably follow. Lambda carried forth this argument, noting that the Texas 
Homosexuality Conduct Law imposed a “discriminatory prohibition on all gay and lesbian 
couples, requiring them to limit their expressions of affection in ways that heterosexual couples, 
whether married or unmarried, need not.”173 This prohibition would potentially have detrimental 
consequences for gay and lesbian individuals that extended beyond their relationships by 
stigmatizing “loving behavior that others can engage in without the brand of ‘lawbreaker.’”174  
Important for Lambda’s case was the stipulation that only homosexual sodomy should be 
criminalized in Texas. By way of committing homosexual sodomy, homosexual individuals were 
constituted as criminals and thus, discriminatorily sanctioned “in a variety of ways unrelated to 
the criminal law.”175 Outlawing homosexual sodomy, it was argued, sends a powerful message to 
the public that being homosexual was condemned by the State and that perceived condemnation 
could then be used to “justify discrimination against gay men and lesbians in parenting, 
employment, access to civil rights laws, and many other aspects of everyday life.”176 Lambda 
referred to this problem as “legislative line drawing” and argued that in this case, the line that 
legislators had drawn was irrational and arbitrary.177  
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Speaking specifically to the threat against liberty during oral arguments, Lambda asserted 
that American families had evolved since Bowers was decided in 1986, and that the reality of 
gay parents, or parents with gay children, were a pervasive actuality in American society. 
And certainly while it may not have been shown in that case or even apparent to the 
Court in 1986, I submit that it has to be apparent to the Court now that there are gay 
families that family relationships are established, that there are hundreds of thousands of 
people registered in the Census in the 2000 census who have formed gay families, gay 
partnerships, many of them raising children.178 
Resultant inequities for gay and lesbian Americans would be “collateral effects” that forecasted a 
bleak vision of what it would be like to live in states that regulate sodomy. In such states, gay 
and lesbian individuals could be shackled with the label of criminal and denied visitation and 
custody of their own children, denied public employment, denied private employment, all 
because they’ve been identified as homosexuals.179 Putting a finer point on it, Lambda argued 
that the behavior of sodomy itself was not considered criminal under the law.  
The practice of deviate sexual intercourse violates traditional morality. But so does the 
same act between heterosexuals, which activity is decriminalized… The issue here is not 
whether sexual activity traditionally viewed as immoral can be punished by society, but 
whether it can be punished solely on the basis of sexual preference.”180 
Rather than serving as an apt legal precedent by which to judge subsequent cases dealing with 
sodomy charged fairly and justly, Lambda’s argument repositioned Bowers as infectious, as a 
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poison that had infused public discourse with harmful assumptions about gays and lesbians.  
On trial in this case was the notion of morality itself. Having shifted the field of argument 
away from questions of sexual deviance, Lambda devoted much of their argument to overtly 
undermining Texas’ law and the appropriateness of Bowers as legal precedent, on the grounds 
that they were antiquated and ill suited to bring about identitarian justice. Lambda drew 
connections between Lawrence and other cases wherein the Court voted to uphold fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of identity classifications.181 In so 
doing, Lambda reframed the ways in which American morality was interpreted, debated, and 
ultimately defined in this case, which circumvented antiquated social principles that designated 
homosexuality as deviant and immoral, and which made such principles legally relevant in this 
case. 
Protecting Americans’ Privacy from the “Prying Eyes” of the Government 
One of the primary constraints working in Lambda’s favor was that Lawrence and Garner 
were arrested for consensual sexual conduct that took place in a private dwelling. As such, prior 
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cases that dealt with public exposure or disorderly conduct were not legally relevant. Only those 
cases that dealt with the question of equal protection and due process with regard to privacy 
could fall within the purview of legal precedent. Lawyers at Lambda affirmed repeatedly that the 
“charges rested solely on consensual, adult sexual relations with a partner of the same sex in the 
privacy of Lawrence’s home.”182 In addition, Lambda often referenced the various decisions that 
had been handed down since 1986 that “employed substantive due process analyses that are less 
rigidly determined by history and … articulated strong spatial privacy values, particularly in the 
home.”183 In other words, the home was the figurative bulwark against government overreach. 
Contrary to the majority decision in Bowers, the Court’s primary duty is to serve as a bulwark 
against arbitrary governmental intrusion, and the home was a physical marker that defined the 
extent to which government intrusion could be considered arbitrary. 
As had been the trend in legal decisions since Bowers, Lambda’s argument in Lawrence 
emphasized the importance of protecting privacy in the home. Lambda evoked the imagery of 
intrusion with a metonymic description to government’s “prying eyes” noting, “Since Bowers, 
the Court has more forcefully recognized the constitutional dimension of privacy in the home 
and comparable settings [wherein] all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held 
safe from prying government eyes.”184 As has been the case in multiple case outcomes, privacy 
and private spaces have been jealously guarded American treasures. In its effort to outlaw 
homosexual sodomy on the basis of moral arguments, Texas had trampled on the “entrenched 
expectations of privacy that are central to personal dignity and are deeply valued and broadly 
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shared – even by those who disapprove of the conduct outlawed by the statute.”185 The 
Fourteenth Amendment provided Lambda with the rhetorical tools to renegotiate the relative 
importance of moral arguments against homosexual sodomy. Tied intimately to the freedoms 
guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment, privacy was presented as a foundational American 
value.  
Though Christianity predated the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights 
temporally, Lambda argued that the right to privacy guaranteed to U.S. citizens should be 
paramount. More to the point, Lambda averred that the Court had been convened to uphold the 
law of the land as it is codified in the Constitution, not to make moral commentary. When forced 
to hierarchically rank the values, Lambda asserted that privacy would trump morality; in fact the 
only moral decision the Court could make would be to ensure that the right to privacy would not 
be infringed upon through arbitrary governmental intrusion. 
 This line of argument, which engaged the hierarchical relationship between privacy and 
morality as abstract values in the United States, operated through loci of magnitude by 
illustrating the full scope of implicated audiences. Not only was the depth of harm to 
marginalized communities justification for the removal of anti-sodomy legislation, but so too 
was the full scope of harm for all U.S. citizens. The Equal Protection and Due Process clauses 
enabled Lambda to extend the implications of the outcome of this case to all those who value 
privacy and who fear government intrusion. The magnitude of the problem posed to the Court 
was both deep and wide. 
To illustrate the full magnitude of the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law as a problem, 
Lambda entwined the extra-legal aspects (i.e., the “prying eyes” of government and arbitrary 
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intrusion) with the legal justification for overturning precedent (i.e., the justification for 
overturning Bowers as the Court had for other prior decisions). Levi explains that the 
applicability of the law/legal precedent is determined through the interpretive process of 
controlling what comparable qualities are salient between a prior case and the current one.186 
Illustrating this case through loci of magnitude was dependent on the extent to which Lambda 
could accomplish two things. First, Lambda needed to draw connections between prior decisions 
later deemed wrongful, which they did through direct references to McLaughlin and other cases 
to do with state-sanctioned racial discrimination. Second, Lambda needed to account for and 
adequately refute Texas’ claim that Bowers served as adequate and just legal precedent for the 
present case. During oral arguments, Lambda asserted that the Bowers decision itself was wrong 
for three major reasons, which allowed them to question the case as authoritative precedent: 1) 
the question it posed was too narrowly drawn because it only focused on homosexual sodomy, 
“which is just one of the moral choices that couples ought to have;” 2) its analysis of history was 
inadequate, taking little account for the cultural developments that have taken place between 19th 
century laws regarding marriage, family and fornication; and 3) the assumptions made by the 
Court in 1986 did not fully represent the “realities of gay lives and gay relationships.”187 For 
these reasons, Lambda argued, implicated audiences were actually much broader than Bowers 
and other cases would allow for.  
Through loci of magnitude Texas’ Homosexuality Conduct Law represented an exigence 
that would be “felt by a large number of people,” or other quantifiable aspects of the exigence’s 
impact.188 To make such arguments, Lambda redefined important terms within the case through a 
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negotiation of abstract and concrete values and move the field of argument away from questions 
of morality and sexual identity. Importantly, Lambda asserted the imperative for the Court to 
recognize, not only the existence and dignity of gay families, but also that  
for those people, the opportunity to engage in sexual expression as they will in the 
privacy of their own homes performs much the same function that it does in the marital 
context, that you can’t protect one without the other, that it doesn’t make sense to draw a 
line there and that you should protect it for everyone. That this is a fundamental matter of 
American values.189 
In the process, Lambda redefined the nature of the problem (or question) before the Court and 
asserted the prominence of privacy and self-determination as integral to rights that were under 
threat. The disease of Bowers, institutionalized in the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law and its 
tangible collateral effects, reflected a negative cultural influence that would adversely affect 
people beyond same-sex couples.  
The Bowers decision created a legal precedent that was dangerous for everyone, as it 
inherently discriminated against particular people for an indiscriminate behavior. The Bowers 
ruling and Texas’ case in Lawrence threatened sexual intimacy as a “basic component of stable, 
healthy relationships” for all couples, gay or straight.190 Lambda reiterated that the Constitution 
explicitly protected the following: 
those relationships, including family relationships, that presuppose deep attachments and 
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a 
special community of thoughts, experiences and beliefs, but also distinctively personal 
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aspects of one’s life.191 
Tapping directly into the personal relationships and experiences that define one’s personal life, 
Lambda elevated affective appeals to a point of legal relevance. This lent authority to the 
assertion that the implications of Texas’ Homosexual Conduct Law on the day-to-day lives of 
gay and lesbian persons as U.S. citizens would be justification to strike it down. By criminalizing 
“private consensual adult sexual conduct when engaged in by same-sex couples, but not identical 
conduct by different-sex couples,” same-sex-only sodomy prohibitions attached “a badge of 
criminality” to the intimate sexual relations of one group of people.192 Texas’ attempt to govern 
in the best interest of the State, or to govern in keeping with American morality, perhaps 
inadvertently and even unintentionally targeted a specific group of people (gays and lesbians). 
As an answer to this problem, Lambda proffered that the moral decision with respect to 
Lawrence and Garner would be to correct the wrong that had been brought about through Bowers 
and to honor the dignity of their citizenship and the covenant extended to them by the 
Constitution to privacy and due process. 
By asserting the existence and dignity of gay and lesbian couples and their families as 
vital representations of liberty, Lambda concomitantly coupled the notion of privacy with the 
affective resonance of hearth and home. Rather than take on the question of whether or not the 
Constitution guaranteed the fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy, which would 
have been in line with the first primary argument put forth by Bowers and reiterated by Texas, 
Lambda exalted privacy as a more prominent American value, which when threatened and would 
impact a greater number of people. Lambda illustrated the full magnitude of how Texas’ 
Homosexual Conduct Law impacted Americans, gay or straight. As a statute that restricted the 
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formation of intimate partnership, Texas’ law implicated a larger community of individuals 
irrespective of their sexual activity and orientation. Relying on the plasticity of liberty as an 
abstract value that must be revitalized through particulars, Lambda reframed what was at stake in 
Lawrence.  
Elucidating the “infectiousness” of the logic reflected in Bowers, Lambda likened the 
practice of line drawing as a disease on our American legal landscape that must be cured: “In 
Texas and other states with a same-sex-only crime, a federal remedy is especially 
necessary….”193 The word “remedy” analogizes the Homosexual Conduct Law as a disease, a 
disease that was allowed to propagate since the Bowers decision and which could “spread” to 
legal reasoning beyond the bounds of anti-sodomy legislation. Though culturally much had 
changed since the Bowers decision, “same-sex and broader sodomy laws persist – and have 
resisted full eradication.”194 Within this narrative depiction, the decision to overturn Bowers 
would be the cure that could eradicate a dangerous cultural disease that impacts straight and gay 
people alike. 
In likening the Homosexual Conduct Law as an infectious and harmful disease on the 
cultural-legal landscape in the U.S., Lambda emphasized the multiple impacts such policies had 
within the communities subjected to them. By amplifying magnitude, both in terms of the 
number of people who would be negatively impacted by the upholding of Texas' Homosexual 
Conduct Law and the multiple levels on which those harms would be experienced, Lambda 
shifted the relative hierarchical position of morality and privacy as value warrants, and also 
argued for the superiority of arguments predicated on the protection of privacy as a question of 
morality. To accomplish this, Lambda positioned the Bowers decision as an “infectious disease,” 
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challenged the assumption of homosexual-as-criminal, and asserted the relevance of 
(homosexual) sodomy to the integrity of the American family. By way of redefinition, Lambda 
challenged the relative hierarchical position of privacy, moral rightness and the right to Due 
Process in order to undermine and ultimately argue to overturn Bowers. 
The figurative imagery of hearth and home, the bedroom, and intimate relationships was 
infused with affective timbre. Without legitimate and rational justification under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, Lambda argued that the Homosexual Conduct Law 
“regulates forms of sexual intimacy that are permitted in the State only for same-sex couples, 
thereby creating a kind of second class citizenship to that group of people.”195 As was the case in 
Dred Scott, Plessey, Loving, and McLaughlin, this argument warns against  
the idea that a State may enter into American bedrooms and closely inspect the most 
intimate and private physical interactions, or give its police officers unbridled discretion 
to arrest disfavored minorities for engaging in consensual sexual activity, is a stark 
affront to fundamental liberty that the Court should end.196 
Turning to the imagery evoked by the State entering American bedrooms to “closely inspect” 
private, intimate relations, Lambda developed a negative affective association with the Texas 
Homosexual Conduct Law. Moreover, as the statute had been previously linked with American 
morality, Lambda’s defamation of such policy necessitated that morality be redefined if it is to 
be valued. Thus privacy, which would protect against the intrusion of the State into U.S. 
bedrooms, became a more concrete version of the abstract value of morality. In other words, 
privacy would and should be valued more highly in the public sphere than “old world” 
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assumptions about sexual deviance, assumptions that undergirded Bowers and represented an 
“intrusion” and an “invasion” into citizens’ personal dignity. 
Co-creating a Queered Legalscape, a Cure for the Disease 
 Lambda’s argument was inundated with references to intrusion as humiliation and 
negation of individual dignity on multiple levels, which functioned through loci of magnitude 
and were imbued with affective resonance. As a statute that outlawed the practice of homosexual 
sodomy “based on nothing more than the identity of their chosen partners in private sexual 
relations,” the arrest of Lawrence and Garner and the subsequent day they were held in custody 
represented a “a humiliating invasion of personal dignity.”197 Lambda further argued that this 
humiliation could easily extend beyond the bounds of homosexual sodomy, as prior case history 
has shown. Americans had become complacent, moving on to the point that the right to “engage 
in consensual sexual intimacy in the privacy of their home” is taken for granted.198 Most 
Americans “would be shocked to find out that their decision to engage in sexual intimacy with 
another person in their own home might lead to a knock on the door [and] a criminal 
prosecution.”199 As the Court’s decision in Bowers does not well account for the reality that most 
Americans expect that their private sexual exploits will be left alone, Lambda asserted that the 
time had come for the Court to settle what had been left “unanswered” for nearly thirty years, 
that question being whether anyone has the right to privacy in their own home. 
 In exalting privacy above outmoded tropes of Christian morality that were no longer 
reflective of American lifeways, Lambda made arguments for due process and equal protection 
concrete and legally relevant. As Lambda argued, “consensus expectations about the limits of 
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government intrusion into private, adult sexual intimacies, especially in the home, provide the 
kind of ‘objective considerations’ […] that undergird a principled approach to the Due Process 
Clause.”200 And so, on the basis of both primary arguments, 1) that criminality in this case was 
determined by identity, not by action, and 2) that privacy was a fundamental American right to 
be valued above irrational justifications for a law that regulates forms of sexual intimacy for 
same-sex couples, Lawrence challenged Bowers. In so doing, morality came to be associated 
more so with privacy and the right of all citizens to Due Process under the law rather than 
sexuality and sexual deviance, thereby diminishing the relative hierarchical position of such 
arguments altogether. 
Loci of magnitude enabled Lambda Legal to amplify the ways in which the Texas 
Homosexual Conduct Law constituted an exigence that would be “felt by a large number of 
people” and on a multitude of levels.201 Bowers was dangerous when deployed as legal 
precedent. The assumptions that undergirded Bowers no longer adequately reflected intimate 
partnership in America; they arguably never did. As was noted by Lambda:  
Bowers does not have any of the unique qualities of cases like Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966), that have become imbedded in our ‘national culture.’ […] To the 
contrary, Bowers is out of step with the vast majority of the States. […] The 
unmistakable trend … nationally … is to curb government intrusions at the threshold of 
one’s door and most definitely at the threshold of one’s bedroom.202 
In turning to the imagery of government invasion, Lambda cast the Texas Homosexual Conduct 
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Law and Bowers as “humiliating invasions” that diminished the fundamentally American value 
of privacy.  
Though Bowers leaned on a version of morality that was supposedly reflected in the 
majority of Americans, that paradigm was shaken by the renegotiation of key terms and concepts 
in this case, namely “infectious criminality.” In a pre-Lawrence legalscape, the infectious 
criminal was still the homosexual, capable of spreading the disease of sexual deviance. A post-
Lawrence legalscape however, more adequately reflected intimate partnership in America by 
embracing queer partnerships and lifeways as deserving of equal protection. Justice for 
Lawrence and Garner also exonerated gay couples from their criminal status and co-created a 
cultural narrative that cast Bowers-era legal logic as an infectious disease in desperate need of a 
remedy. Having dispensed with Bowers, Lambda created rhetorical space wherein privacy was 
upheld as a fundamental right for all Americans, superior to outdated models of American 
morality.  
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“It’s OK to take a second look”: 
Reframing the Family through Loci of Proximity in the Fight against Minnesota’s  
Amendment One 
On May 11, 2011, the Minnesota state legislature proposed an amendment, then called 
Amendment One, to the state constitution that if passed would define marriage as the union 
between one man and one woman in the state of Minnesota. This constitutional marriage 
amendment, similar to amendments that had previously passed in Arizona, California, Florida, 
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin, instigated a socio-political firestorm in Minnesota from which 
two major political activist campaigns emerged: the progressive “Vote NO” campaign (seeking 
to strike down the amendment) and the conservative “Vote Yes” campaign (advocating for the 
passage of the amendment). Before 2011, every state-proposed amendment defining marriage as 
between one man and one woman had passed. Given this history, the passage of Minnesota's 
amendment was an assumed outcome, but on November 6, 2012 Minnesota residents voted to 
reject the amendment.   
 Public opinion pertaining to Amendment One oscillated precariously in the months 
leading up to the November 2012 election. Three separate opinion polls in late May and early 
June of 2011 reported contradicting figures.203 As the election grew nearer, public opinion 
remained largely divided, with polls in October 2012 reporting gaps no wider than seven points 
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between those opposing and supporting the amendment.204 Given the tight race and the staunch 
ideological underpinnings of the amendment, both campaigns (Vote NO and Vote Yes) battled 
fiercely over the “persuadable middle,” those voters still on the fence about Amendment One. 
This was no easy task since the persuadable middle only constituted roughly seven to eight 
percent of voters in Minnesota. Despite the narrow demographic, each campaign rose to the 
deliberative challenge of attempting to persuade these undecided voters who ultimately made the 
difference in deciding the outcome of the election. 
 The deliberative public discourse surrounding Minnesota's marriage amendment and the 
surprising defeat of Amendment One, demands our attention as a site of making law. In this 
chapter, I argue that loci of proximity enabled Vote NO to make present the threat posed by 
Amendment One to families in Minnesota. Affectively resonant arguments that promoted a 
vision of the family as a unit defined by commitment and love rather than the 
sex/gender/orientation of the married partners won the day. These arguments built associations 
between family values and LGBTQIA+ households. Vote NO amplified the concrete experiences 
of familial relationships, shared by same- and opposite-sex couples, and thereby renegotiated 
abstract values like love, commitment, and compassion as they relate to concrete values like 
family and the Golden Rule. In this shuffling of value orientations, affect 1) constituted 
persuadable voters as a community loyal to universal, abstract values and 2) decoupled family 
values from “natural marriage.” In essence, Vote NO created rhetorical space for gay and lesbian 
heads of households within the family.  
 The outcome in Minnesota marked a turning point in the struggle for marriage equality 
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and illustrates that affect, particularly as it was used in the Vote NO campaign, may be a largely 
untapped resource for progressive activism in similar discourses. The following critically 
evaluates how affect enabled the renegotiation of value hierarchies as they functioned in primary 
texts from the Vote NO campaign. Specifically, I focus on video campaign messages aired on 
television and subsequently posted online. These TV spots were the most pervasive and 
consistently broadcast messages released by both campaigns, with multi-million dollars spent 
between them.205 As such, these ads comprised the most cogent rhetorical platform from which 
the campaign advocated. This analysis reveals that loci of proximity facilitate affective 
arguments by which advocates can renegotiate the relationship between abstract and concrete 
values in public argument in order to shape public opinion and policy.  
In the following pages, I first discuss the argumentative pillars of the Vote Yes campaign, 
which were largely predicated on the defense of “natural marriage” and religious freedom, before 
turning to a close reading of Vote NO campaign TV spots. The dialectic between Vote No’s 
campaign spots and undecided voters invited active participation from the public in re-visioning 
the family as a concrete value reflective of a community hampered by the law of the land and in 
need of revitalization. 
Vote Yes and the Movement to “Protect Marriage” 
As early as the 1990s, several countries in Europe legalized civil unions and made the 
expansion of marriage and other legal unions for same-sex couples became politically relevant. 
In 1993 the Supreme Court of Hawaii became the first state in the union to take on the issue in 
Baehr v. Lewin (Baehr), a decision that maintained that prohibiting marriage licenses to same-
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sex couples was sex-discrimination specifically under Hawaii’s state constitution.206 
Conservative factions in Hawaii responded by introducing Constitutional Amendment Two in 
1998, which upon its passage granted the state legislature power to prohibit the recognition of 
same-sex marriage in the state. Though Hawaii’s Amendment Two was different from 
subsequent marriage amendments in that it did not explicitly ban same-sex marriage, Hawaii’s 
amendment did allow the state to enact such a ban, which Hawaii ultimately did. Amendment 
Two in Hawaii was the first amendment that was proposed and adopted in the U.S. that led to the 
explicit nullification of same-sex partnerships under the law. Over the years, other states across 
the nation proposed constitutional amendments to codify the definition of marriage as a union 
between one man and one woman.  
In support of Minnesota’s marriage amendment, Minnesota for Marriage headed the 
Vote Yes campaign to defend the amendment and the assumptions and values pertaining to 
marriage and family that the amendment represented.207 In this section, I briefly contextualize 
the values deployed by Minnesota for Marriage and the ways in which the coalition used value-
based argumentative warrants to assert the primary importance of “God’s will” and “natural 
marriage,” as well as a broader appeal to the preservation of freedom (freedom of religion, in this 
case).  
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“God’s will” and Natural Marriage 
The values deployed by Minnesota for Marriage were that of Christian tradition, 
institutional history, and a particular version of family. Importantly, the Vote Yes campaign 
linked tradition, institution, and family with heteronormative sex and gender norms. From this 
perspective marriage was a tradition and an institution reliant on man and woman joining to 
create a family. Using the longevity of heterosexual marriage as a strategy to naturalize marriage 
as an inherently sexed institution, some Vote Yes video campaign ads relied heavily on appeals 
that positioned same-sex marriage as threatening to a “natural” way of life. Matt Birk (a 
Minnesota native and former NFL player of the year) offered his testimony in a Vote Yes 
television ad. In the ad, Birk asserted the “natural” definition of marriage as non-threatening and 
that defining marriage in this way does not infringe upon the rights of people with same-sex 
attraction. 
 Outside, and unfortunately even inside our own parishes, we have people telling U.S.  
 to stop talking about marriage, an institution that the church has been talking about for  
 thousands of years. They say that if we stand up and talk about the natural definition  
 of marriage, that we are somehow being mean or bullies.208 
Speaking as a Christian, Birk conveyed a deep association between marriage, as a union between 
one man and one woman, and the mission to promote God’s will. In the video, Birk relied on the 
longevity of Christian tradition and the assumed naturalness of heterosexual marriage, which 
implicated Vote NO as radical, subversive and threatening to a Christian way of life. Other 
videos echoed Birk’s appeal by asserting, “throughout history and all societies, marriage has 
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been between a man and a woman.”209 For the sake of preserving tradition, Vote Yes called for 
voters to support the amendment:  
The law should step up and support this institution and preserve it to be what it should be, 
what it was meant to be which is a union, a life-long commitment between one man and 
one woman.210  
The ads mentioned above positioned tradition as a superior value to inclusivity. Vote Yes 
reappropriated the abstract notion of “natural” marriage in a way that negated many Christian 
principles predicated on an “open doors, open hearts” paradigm. However, in doing so, 
Christianity and heterosexual marriage were framed as inextricably linked. This enabled Vote 
Yes to assert the passage of the amendment as a defense not only of marriage, but also of 
Christian tradition. 
To create a sense of heightened authority many campaign messages cited the Bible and 
positioned marriage as part of a God-given covenant. Another ad described the position, “We 
believe that the Bible is our authority and that God has ordained marriage to be between one man 
and one woman and that's actually best for society.”211 Evoking a biblical ethos reified Christian 
dominance in American society. On this basis, Vote Yes affirmed marriage as a “pillar of our 
society,” asserting that it “has been for thousands of years and needs to be for years to come.”212 
Importantly, Minnesota for Marriage implied that “voting yes” would represent one's 
commitment not only to the institution of marriage, but to God's will and the broader interests of 
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society: “Since the beginning of time, God has established that marriage is between a man and a 
woman and I believe it is important for us to do the will of God.”213 Vote Yes messages relied 
heavily on the call to promote God’s will and frame one's support of the amendment as a 
commitment to such work. 
As human beings, I think most of us just search for the truth, you know, what is the truth? 
As Catholics, we try to find, you know, what is God's will and I believe that this is his 
will, to stand up and fight for it and protect one of the gifts that he blessed us with.214  
Certainly, no argument is without ideological underpinnings and it is not uncommon in public 
argument to appeal to religious tradition. However, in privileging loyalty to Christian tradition 
and carrying out the will of God over a more inclusive vision of marriage and the family, 
Minnesota for Marriage negated a lived, embodied reality that many Minnesotans experienced 
firsthand or had encountered in their lives; namely, the existence of LGBTQIA+ families.  
Christians under Siege: The Call to Protect Religious Freedom 
 The Vote Yes campaign was also foundationally about protecting freedom of religion 
from what was viewed as an assault against Christianity. From the perspective of Vote Yes, the 
Vote NO campaign sought to redefine marriage, to write into law “that marriage is 
fundamentally about people's emotional unions rather than the procreation and raising of 
children.”215 Vote NO posed a danger to the ideology that naturalized marriage as a sexed 
institution by promoting marriage as a loving commitment between two individuals who may 
subsequently build a family. This danger, as was argued, was presented as insidious as it was 
unchristian and threatened to undermine the freedom for Christians to join in a marital institution 
                                                          
213 “Minnesotans Vote Yes for the Marriage Protection Amendment Video 5,” 5. 
214 “Matt Birk Speaks on the Minnesota Marriage Protection Amendment.” 
215 “Minnesotans Vote Yes for the Marriage Protection Amendment Video 6” (Minnesota, 
August 1, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WQXY8Jr2xAY. 
102 
 
that reflected their religious beliefs. The underlying values that Vote NO and Vote Yes argued 
for were shared between the campaigns, as Christian marriage is also linked with love and 
commitment; the schism that divided NO and Yes from one another issued from a foundational 
disagreement about which of those value clusters defined marriage. In other words, the 
campaigns disagreed about where love and commitment would sit in hierarchical relation to 
other values associated with marital partnership. Given the push to link heterosexual marriage 
with God’s will and the fundamental importance of relative sex/gender between the marital 
partners, any perceived redefinition of marriage was understood as a threat to the practice of 
religious freedom as Vote Yes had defined it. 
Vote Yes also warned that failure to adopt the amendment would make way for systemic 
violations of religious freedom beyond the state. Namely, denying passage of the amendment 
would allow for future legislation to legalize same-sex marriage, which could force churches to 
honor such unions. It was feared that churches would no longer have the freedom to exercise 
discretion when sanctifying marriages. Passing the amendment on the other hand, would protect 
churches' freedom to worship as they so choose: 
 Right now there is a court case in Hennepin County to change the definition of  
 marriage through the courts.  It's the same type of case that happened in Iowa  
 before marriage was redefined there. Politicians have said that they will try to  
 redefine marriage at their earliest opportunity, even next year, if the marriage  
 amendment doesn't pass.216  
Turning to Iowa as an example, the ad warned against giving an inch to progressive political 
action. The warning was given even more weight with the reminder that Hennepin County court 
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in Minnesota was already hearing a case about the expansion of same-sex marriage. Including 
same-sex unions within the institution of marriage was framed as an intrusion from the 
government into one’s religious expression and concomitantly a threat to Christians.  
Vote Yes benefitted from appeals to tradition as status quo defenders.217 Turning almost 
exclusively to negative arguments that focused on the negative consequences of any proposed 
alternative to the status quo, Vote Yes attempted to inoculate voters against any counter 
argument to what they viewed as natural marriage and religious freedom.218 Doing so provided 
what Kahneman and Tversky originally coined as the “status quo advantage,” with which status 
quo defenders “need not explicitly engage in outlining the virtues of the status quo policy. 
Rather, it is sufficient (and not too terribly difficult) to suggest that certain costs and negative 
consequences might result from a policy option being proposed.”219 In one “man on the street” 
campaign spot one Minnesotan said, “I'm glad that we have this marriage amendment on the 
ballot because I don't want a politician or a judge determining the definition of marriage. I think 
every Minnesotan deserves a vote on the issue.”220 Another Minnesotan agreed: “I believe it 
strengthens democracy and allows the people of Minnesota the opportunity to protect marriage 
before it is redefined by judges and politicians.”221 Fixating on the potential that politicians and 
judges might corrupt the existent tradition of “natural marriage,” the campaign framed 
Amendment One as a bulwark against the danger of governmental intrusion that could come 
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about from a change in policy. Similar rallying cries such as: “Marriage is such a foundational 
institution and we need to protect the family,”222 “It's been proven that children grow up best in a 
house that has a father and a mother that are married to each other,”223 and “Marriage is the basis 
of the family and the family is the fundamental building block of society,”224 also framed the 
campaign for marriage equality as a direct attack on Minnesota's children and the family. From 
this platform, Vote Yes forged a connection between protecting the “natural” model of a nuclear 
family to protecting the integrity of society as a whole, without giving much regard to proving 
the inherent advantages of current policy (campaign ads relied on tacit agreement from viewers 
rather than external evidence to support claims).  
Despite the relative advantages of occupying the role of status quo defender, Vote Yes 
enabled the rhetorical opportunity for Vote NO to assert the material existence of families 
headed by same-sex couples as justification for a change in policy. In making the presence of 
same-sex partnerships and families more proximal, Vote NO could argue that such families 
marked an extension of marriage. Specifically, Vote NO developed multiple points of 
identification between same- and opposite-sex couples based in fundamentally similar familial 
experiences, if not sexual attraction to their respective partner. By moving between abstract and 
concrete values, Vote NO renegotiated the relative hierarchical position of sexual attraction and 
familial bonds as they relate to both marriage and family. Running counter to Minnesota for 
Marriage, the Vote NO campaign headed by Minnesotans United for All Families defied the 
assumption that marriage was an institution fundamentally defined by the sex/gender/orientation 
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of the committed partners.225 Ultimately, positioning marriage and family as concrete values 
common to both same- and opposite-sex couples enabled Vote NO to appeal to voters on a 
personal, affective level and assert the abstract values of love and commitment as the 
foundational values that define and uphold the family.  
Diversifying the American Family: An Invitation to Vote NO 
As has been previously discussed, abstract values are general and transcend specific 
circumstances, which make them particularly useful for those “wishing to change the established 
order.”226 Because abstract values like love and commitment are not inherently connected to any 
one instance or experience, it is possible to build connections to concrete values, such as one’s 
family. Such associations can substantiate the argument to reframe the meaning of either value. 
Once the connection is made, a particular value may be reframed to suit more universal contexts, 
and universal values can be made more specific.227 The Vote Yes campaign relied solely on 
concrete values like Christian tradition and religious freedom to substantiate its argument about 
family. Vote NO on the other hand facilitated the renegotiation of value hierarchies in this 
discourse by moving between abstract and concrete values. This reordering of value orientations 
and hierarchies enabled Vote NO to appropriate family as a central value, and also to reframe 
family as a concrete value superior to Christian belief.  
Vote NO brought to the fore love and commitment as points of identification shared by 
same- and opposite-sex couples. Campaign spots used personal disclosure from same- and 
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opposite-sex couples as tools of proximity to build points of identification based in lived 
experiences. In other words, the rhetorical embodiment of same-sex couples within the narrative 
of family life functioned as a strategy to build proximity with voters. Minnesotans who followed 
their “gut check” and felt that the passage of the amendment would constitute a denial of dignity 
to gay and lesbian couples also developed the bridge between same- and opposite-sex couples. 
Vote NO emphasized appeals to the mundane, performed ritual, and inherited kindness as loci of 
proximity. This strategy analogized the day-to-day experiences of families headed by same-sex 
couples to those of opposite-sex couples, not on the basis of sexual orientation, but parallel 
familial relationships. By amplifying the threat against Minnesota families through loci of 
proximity, advocates demonstrated that the negative outcomes resulting from Amendment One 
would “hit close to home” by impacting those closest to them. Loci of proximity amplified the 
affective resonance of individual personal experiences and testimonies as identifiable and 
important markers of sameness. 
Appeals to the Mundane 
Vote NO reached out to persuadable voters with appeals to mundane day-to-day activities 
that characterize family life. In one campaign video, Minnesotans Paul and James explained why 
it was important to them that Minnesota recognize same-sex marriages and “demonstrate 
equality at the highest level from our state government, down to families.”228  
 We're the parents of twin boys who are going to be turning four next month and  
we're very proud of them. We have them going to church with us, we have them in 
preschool. They know what love is, they know what commitment is, and they know what 
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equality is and fairness and we want to demonstrate that for them.229  
In this video, Paul and James’ shared experiences as parents positioned their family as reflective 
of a broadly identifiable image of a family, and one that is religiously pious. The men discussed 
anecdotes such as going to church, dropping the children off at preschool, etc., as reflections of 
their spiritually enriched, familial life. Such activities were asserted as commonplace, something 
that many Minnesotan families at some point also experience. 
In another campaign spot, Kelly and Laura discussed their own family. The campaign 
video included video footage taken when the couple testified at a state legislative session in 
2009. The video concluded with Kelly's description of Laura's testimony.  
 We wanted to make sure the committee knew that there were families who look like  
 ours, children like ours all across Minnesota and they deserve the same rights and  
 protections as any other family. We get up in the morning and struggle to get our kids  
 out the door and struggle to get to work on time, just like every other family. We go  
 through every day, live our lives just like every other family and shouldn't we be  
 treated like every other family.230  
As was the case with Paul and James, Kelly and Laura invoked day-to-day experiences to 
establish an affective connection with others who share their experience. Like many 
Minnesotans, Laura and Kelly get up every morning and struggle to get their kids out the door 
and to work on time, “just like every other family.” The campaign videos asserted the mundane 
activities that make up daily life as integral experiences that characterize marriage and family. 
Through these appeals, the campaign invited viewers to recognize Kelly and Laura’s experience 
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as “ringing true,” and affirmed marital, familial life as an experience not limited to opposite-sex 
couples. Through rhetorical embodiment, these experiences were shown to exist within families 
headed by same- and opposite-sex couples alike.  
Performed Ritual 
The two couples mentioned above also developed proximal ties with their viewers 
through appeals to the performance of marriage and family, the ritualized public performance of 
life-long commitment. Building from their appeal to the mundane, Paul and James articulated a 
rhetorical link between their children’s moral upbringing and the values that they live out in their 
committed partnership to one another. The men argued that the continued refusal of the State to 
publicly recognize their family as a legitimate family could poison their son’s view of justice by 
demonstrating systemic discrimination. By accentuating their personal, lived experience (i.e., 
maintaining a loving commitment to one partner, describing the joys of parenting, and the 
importance of family), the men’s testimony first validated the dignity of their family before 
asserting the implications of being denied public recognition.  
It's very much, I think, a public recognition of the relationship, which is very important to 
us. Both of our parents are celebrating their forty-fourth wedding anniversary next  
 June. They've showed us what committed, loving couples have and what that means  
 and we want to show [our children] that we want to do the same thing as well.231  
For Paul and James, marriage is a public reflection of kinship, the family its product. Paul and 
James provided a justification for rejecting Amendment One that directly challenged what Vote 
Yes had attempted to establish: that legalizing same-sex marriage would change the institution of 
marriage. Paul and James’ testimony used the affective resonance of day-to-day experiences in 
                                                          
231 “Real Minnesotans United for Marriage: Paul & James.” Italics mine. 
109 
 
private life as support for the argument that a family that exists in private life should be 
recognized in public life. The public performance of commitment, signaled through the state’s 
recognition of a marriage, is necessary to bestow dignity upon the family that is formed through 
that union. Same-sex unions existed and were recognized in various ways before the state 
extended marriage equality. However, for Paul and James the state’s recognition of their 
partnership as a marriage would establish their family as a family. 
Throughout the campaign, the ritual nature of marriage helped to forge the link between 
private and public life. Marriage ceremonies are a public rite of passage that commemorates 
promises of love and commitment that had been made privately. Though a couple’s motivation 
to get married might be deeply personal or spiritual, the lived experience of getting married is 
anything but private. The process of getting married necessitates participation from the State and 
from witnesses; it is a public performance of commitment. Vote NO highlighted the importance 
of the public performance of marriage through the testimony of Laura and Kelly, who had 
already lived together in a committed relationship for several years and raised children before 
Amendment One was put on the ballot. 
 I think allowing marriage equality is important to us for a number of reasons.   
 The biggest personal reasons are the commitment we have to each other.   
 Kelly and I have pledged our lives together, we made a life-long commitment to  
each other we stood before our friends and family and promised. Promised to build a 
future together.232  
In their testimony, Laura and Kelly explained the ways in which their public pledge in front of 
friends and family to promise to build a future together should constitute not just a life-long 
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commitment, but also a marital union. As they described, they had already undergone the public 
declaration of life-long commitment; and yet their promise to build a life together, which 
mirrored the origin of so many marriages, had gone unrecognized by the state. In the clip filmed 
during a 2009 legislative session, Laura advocated in front of the state assembly on behalf of her 
relationship, and relationships like hers across Minnesota, in the hopes of achieving equal 
treatment from the state.   
 On August 15, 2009, Kelly and I stood before our friends and family and we  
 exchanged vows. We promised to love each other, to trust each other, to walk  
 through this life together. As I assume yours did, our wedding included laughter,  
 tears, good food, music, and a lot of love. What our wedding did not have, what  
 our marriage still does not have, is any recognition by the state we call home.233 
By describing their ceremony as a wedding, Laura minimized the perceived gap between same-
sex unions and state-sanctioned marriages. Laura referenced the “laughter, tears, good food, 
music and lots of love” that made their wedding comparable to any other wedding. Defined not 
by the sex/gender/orientation of the committed partners, but by the ritualized actions that were 
carried out in public, Laura and Kelly asserted their committed partnership as a marriage.  
Inherited Kindness 
The campaign used concrete values like family and the Golden Rule to renegotiate the 
meaning and relative importance of abstract values like love, commitment, kinship, and 
compassion. Vote NO was inclusive in its depiction of what family, love and commitment “look” 
and “feel” like and argued for the public recognition of same-sex couples and their families by 
asserting the inherently identifiable aspects of kinship. In so doing, Vote NO worked to 
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disentangle the construct of the family from heterosexual marriage, which was the only marital 
union recognized by law at that time. By way of troubling the assumption that heterosexual 
marriage was synonymous with family, Vote NO renegotiated family as a value that was 
threatened by Amendment One.  
Vote NO included testimony from straight allies who, upon recognizing the dangers that 
Amendment One posed for their friends and neighbors, bolstered Vote NO’s effort to make 
queer lifeways more proximal for voters. Along with same-sex couples like Paul and James and 
Kelly and Laura, John and Elizabeth provided testimonies that further supported the importance 
of publicly recognizing heterosexual and same-sex unions as legitimate marital unions and that 
of publicly enacting the values that undergird their own family. John and Elizabeth explained, 
“Our parents taught us the Golden Rule: not judging others and treating others the way we'd like 
to be treated and those are the values we're showing our children by voting no on the marriage 
amendment.”234 For John and Elizabeth, publicly enacting the Golden Rule (a biblical construct) 
was an important feature that defined their family. As a concrete reflection of an abstracted 
moral responsibility to model care and compassion to their children, the Golden Rule enabled 
John and Elizabeth to justify their choice to “vote no” through an identifiable Christian 
paradigm. Operating as a concrete value warrant within John’s and Elizabeth’s family, the 
Golden Rule provided an affective point of connection to viewers for whom Christian values 
would resonate. This argument deployed the Golden Rule as a concrete Christian value and as a 
fundamental feature of the family. Through their testimony, John and Elizabeth were a 
rhetorically embodied representation of the Golden Rule in action. As they put it, they “showed” 
their values to their children by voting no. The clip continues, 
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We thought long and hard about it and we know that someday, allowing everyone the 
freedom to marry won't change our kid's values because they get those values from us. 
We've been married, oh, it'll be almost twenty seven years. If I can get married, it just 
seems wrong to say that someone else can't get married.235  
John and Elizabeth avoided taking on the moral “rightness” or “wrongness” of same-sex 
partnership, but focused instead on the way they instill and revitalize Christian values within 
their own family. In this case, voting no was a direct public expression of their Christian identity 
because the Golden Rule was a fundamental characteristic of their family identity. By “not 
judging others and treating others the way [they’d] like to be treated,” John and Elizabeth 
invoked the Golden Rule as an affective representation of abstract values associated with 
marriage and family (i.e., love, commitment, and compassion), values shared between same- and 
opposite-sex couples alike. 
The campaign ads tapped into Vote Yes’s argument that the interests of children should 
be considered foremost when defining the stakes of Amendment One. For John and Elizabeth, 
the choice to vote no was a way to extend compassion and reserve judgment, values that could be 
best served in practice. John’s and Elizabeth’s choice to live out the Golden Rule in private and 
in public built an association between secular and non-secular value sets. Moving between 
abstract values (inclusivity and freedom) and concrete values (Golden Rule and children), the 
campaign created a road map for undecided voters to reconcile their religious identities with 
progressive policy. The interests of children and the values they might inherit were the primary 
vehicles for this argument.  
The campaign ads modeled kindness and inclusivity. Vote NO called undecided voters to 
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action, to vote no as an example for future generations. Former Minnesota Governor, Jesse 
Ventura, and his wife Terry illustrated the affective resonance of lived experience as exemplars 
of loving-kindness.  
 We've been married now, believe it or not, thirty-seven years. The happiness we've  
 had I would wish for everybody to have. Marriage is about when people fall in love  
 and decide to make a commitment in front of their friends and their family and it  
 means something. How in the world can two people professing how much they love  
 each other and care for each other and that they want to be with each other forever,  
 how can that be bad? No matter who you are.236  
The Venturas asserted a definition of marriage that enabled an affective connection with viewers. 
Proffering a positive image of marriage, the Venturas discussed falling in love and deciding to 
make a commitment in front of friends and family as the primary markers that make a marriage a 
marriage. Taken together, the examples above served two interrelated goals: 1) to forge an 
association between same-sex partnerships and marriage, and 2) to frame the family as a site 
wherein values held privately should be extended outward into the public realm. John and 
Elizabeth and Jesse and Terry asserted marriage as a partnership defined by shared values, rather 
than relative sex/gender identity. Tapping into viewers’ own experiences as spouses, parents, or 
children themselves, the testimonials in the video clips urged viewers to consider what their own 
families meant to them, how they defined their connection to those they love most. Moreover, 
the call to action issued in the campaign spots included a call to kindness and encouraged 
viewers to see the choice to vote no as a way of modeling a kindness that could be inherited by 
their children.  
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Making the private public, the campaign portrayed the family as a unit defined by love 
and life-long commitment, a private reflection of a public system of kinship that must be 
defended from Amendment One. The campaign was inclusive in its depiction of what family, 
love and commitment “look” and “feel” like and argued for the public recognition of same-sex 
unions and their families through loci of proximity. In essence, the use of personalized, 
experiential evidence countered the dominant framing of the discourse, which contributed to the 
shift in public opinion necessary to defeat the amendment. 
Renegotiating community boundaries through proximal dialectic 
Shared ideological commitments are important rhetorical features that work to constitute 
communities. However, communities are in need of constant revitalization and ritualized 
reconciling of differences. As countering viewpoints converge among members, the boundaries 
of the community are renegotiated. In these times when community ties are being renegotiated, 
the redefinition of experiences becomes possible. The proposition of Amendment One marked 
such a moment in LGBTQIA+ rights discourses. As had happened in thirty states before, the 
amendment forced a broader discussion of marriage and family in Minnesota’s communities, and 
with the decision to pass or deny passage of the amendment firmly in the hands of voters, 
advocacy from either camp necessitated deliberative action from ordinary citizens. As the Vote 
NO and Vote Yes campaigns deployed their respective arguments with regard to the amendment, 
Minnesotans were called upon to cast a vote that would endorse one of two visions of marriage 
and family. However, importantly, the two visions put forth were not mutually exclusive – while 
Vote Yes spoke to the primarily religious tropes that defined marriage and family, Vote NO 
rhetorically embodied the lived experiences shared by those who value familial relationships.  
As has been discussed in prior chapters, affect is a circulated entity that contributes to the 
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constitution of a collective through experience that is resonant in the body. Affect thereby 
materializes the foundations for the community that is called forth and sustained through shared 
experiences. Sara Ahmed notes emotions play a crucial role in creating individual and collective 
bodies and the very effect of togetherness and apartness between bodies, worlds, and the signs 
that represent them; emotions are the “corporeal limn that [guide] sensory perception.”237 Broad 
symbols represented in value warrants can evoke latent emotions that are felt by the persons who 
deploy that value in argument and by those for whom the value is a symbol of lived experience. 
Rather than appeal to viewers’ potential fear that religious freedom might be infringed, which 
would have been an understandable concern for either ideological camp, Vote NO welcomed 
discussion about what marriage and family means on a personal level. In one Vote NO video a 
married, heterosexual couple conceded that they had not always been in support of same-sex 
marriage. However, interactions with a same-sex couple changed their views: 
 We just had our thirteenth anniversary. Thirteen years and three kids. It's a  
 commitment to forever. Marriage is really important to me, I didn't really think a  
 lot about same-sex marriage. We had a gay couple live in our neighborhood.  
 They had adopted a little son and they were the most wonderful neighbors. […] We  
 did have some good discussions. In our daughter's world, her normal is so much  
 different than ours. It didn't phase her at all. It's ok to take a second look. And when  
 you do, vote no.”238  
During her testimony above, Kim first noted how important marriage was to her and how for her, 
the primary feature that defined her marriage was the “commitment to forever.” After “some 
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good discussions” with a gay couple and their son, and after viewing the issue through their 
daughter’s eyes, Kim and her husband John embraced the comparability between their family 
and that of their neighbors. Through the exchange, Kim and John widened their perspective of 
what a family could look like and which families “counted” in their community.  
Emotionally based, experiential evidence rhetorically represented in the example of Kim 
and John promoted dialogue with the expressed purpose of allowing a multiplicity of 
perspectives coexisting together. Kim and John, along with other couples and individuals who 
were featured in Vote NO campaign ads, engaged a dialectic with viewers. Dialectic as a 
rhetorical strategy is useful when attempting to forge connections between multiple symbolic 
reflections of lived experience. It is a terminological means of building bridges between 
individuals, of establishing consubstantiality between contrasting ideologies in order to 
renegotiate the boundaries of a community. As Kenneth Burke explains, dialectic is largely 
driven by ironic interaction, which “arises when one tries, by the interaction of terms upon one 
another, to produce a development which uses all the terms.”239 There is enough ambiguity to 
embrace multiple interpretations of the same phenomenon. Within the context of Vote NO, the 
video testimonies all described the lived experience of “family” and “marriage,” while also 
intimating that public deliberation of what those experiences signified was necessary to arrive at 
a more socially conscious, ultimately more Christian, understanding.  
The dialectic was a means to invite persuadable voters to work through their misgivings 
about the amendment, to consider the merits and consequences of a “yes” or “no” vote. The 
videos showed that speaking to other Minnesotans about love and commitment as universal, 
abstract values was an enjoyable experience that ultimately led to a deeper appreciation for 
                                                          
239 Burke, A Grammar of Motives, 512. 
117 
 
marriage and family. It allowed viewers to consider the amendment without approaching their 
gay and lesbian neighbors, coworkers and friends as adversaries. Dialectic enabled a widening of 
the community that did not inherently threaten the shared values of that community. As Burke 
notes, in a dialectic all contributions to the discourse are treated as meritorious in their own right, 
“none of the participating 'sub-perspectives' can be treated as either precisely right or precisely 
wrong. They are all voices, or personalities, or positions, integrally affecting one another,” 
needing each other, indebted to each other, and consubstantial with each other.240 As more 
individuals are welcomed to a conversation, perspectives that had previously been incongruous 
collide as individuals negotiate for the legitimacy of their experiences. Through dialectic, the 
boundaries that define and separate parties from each other are tested and re-tested, negotiated 
and reframed as the discourse develops. 
Vote NO engaged the public with the eventual goal of moving the needle, so to speak, on 
public opinion pertaining to same-sex marriage. Other examples of emotionally driven 
arguments in Vote NO also demonstrated a careful consideration of the issue and the benefits of 
keeping an open mind. In a Vote NO campaign spot, one elderly Minnesotan man, donning a 
cowboy hat, explained:  
 It used to be there wasn't even this discussion. Marriage was a man and a woman.   
 But times change and I've thought about it more. My marriage is the most important  
 thing in my life. Who am I to deny that to anybody, gay or straight. I'm not going to  
 limit a basic freedom just because I'm uncomfortable. And I'm not going to put it in  
 our state constitution. Our constitution should protect our freedoms, not take them  
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 away.241  
In this video, the man noted the discomfort he felt when considering same-sex partnerships. Yet 
his discomfort did not supersede the value he placed on his own marriage and the experience of 
marriage more broadly. After “[thinking] about it more,” the man reconsidered how marriage 
could be envisioned, which helped him bring into congruity competing experiences (i.e. that of 
his own marriage and the full range of partnerships he had encountered). “Gay or straight,” 
everyone who shared in a relationship similar to the one he experienced with his wife was 
deserving of public recognition from the state, regardless of the type of union. Moreover, the 
man in the clip tapped into Vote Yes rhetoric by saying “I’m not going to limit a basic freedom 
just because I’m uncomfortable.” Echoing appeals to religious freedom from the Vote Yes camp, 
the man was able to illustrate for viewers how to renegotiate the relative hierarchical position of 
“family” and “freedom” as concrete and abstract cultural values, respectively. By engaging 
dialectically, and turning to his experience as a married man, the man in the clip argued for a 
renegotiation of community ties. This strategy was a common feature throughout the campaign. 
Vote NO infused their messages with multiple perspectives, which moved between abstract and 
concrete values as each value was negotiated dialectically. This strategy may have been 
appealing for people belonging to the persuadable middle who were resistant to ideological 
polarization. 
 Within an ironic dialectic, negotiation continues without predetermined resolution, as the 
process of negotiation is more significant than the resolution. Vote NO invited viewers to 
recognize multiple points of identification, all related to the issue of marriage and family, and 
each designed to make more proximal the threats posed by Amendment One. The testimonies 
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cited above emphasized the paramount relevance of commitment, vibrant dialectic, and basic 
freedom, which challenged the “naturalness” of “natural marriage.” Vote Yes argued that God 
had ordained marriage as a union through which to procreate. However, Vote NO diversified the 
purpose of marriage beyond procreation by highlighting the many experiences that characterize a 
married lifestyle, which served to subsume the Vote Yes message under a more inclusive 
umbrella. For example, one campaign ad cited responsibility as one of the pillars of marriage.  
 Government isn't telling people who they can fall in love with, so governments  
 shouldn't be telling people who they can marry. We're supposed to be the home of  
 the brave, land of the free. If two people, gay, straight, commit to each other and  
 want to take responsibility for each other through marriage, there is no reason for the 
 government to get in the way of that. The constitution is supposed to protect our  
 freedom, not take it away. I'm votin' no.242  
Tapping again into Vote Yes's appeal to viewers on the basis of religious freedom, Vote NO 
asserted that the public recognition of same-sex partnerships would not intrude into religious 
freedom; rather the institution of marriage was characterized by two people taking responsibility 
for one another. The act of taking responsibility for one another is ungendered, and could be 
carried out by any two partners, regardless of their sex/gender/orientation. Importantly, in 
leaning on tropes like freedom from government intrusion, which was a key rhetorical strategy 
for Vote Yes, Vote NO didn’t simply counter hegemonic assumptions embedded within 
Amendment One, but engaged them in order to reorder their respective importance. Vote NO 
depicted the question as undecided, the picture of the family in flux. Renegotiating the purpose 
of marriage enabled Vote NO to envision the family as an inclusive social construct, one that 
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needed and deserved room to grow.  
The infusion of Vote Yes argumentative tropes served other ends as well. Leading up to 
the vote in Minnesota there was a pervasive fear among conservative voters that denying passage 
of the amendment would then pave the way for the state to intrude into their churches. This led 
to an underlying feeling of discomfort predicated on fear of the unknown. To dispel that 
discomfort, Vote NO engaged it, head-on. For example, Paul and James responded in their video 
testimony to Vote Yes's claim that legalizing same-sex marriage would result in churches being 
forced to sanctify all marriages. Paul and James explained, “What's wonderful about the state of 
Minnesota is that churches will continue to be able to have the right to marry who they want and 
who they don't want to. The churches get to decide who they can and cannot marry. Nobody will 
ever be forced to marry somebody else.”243 Directly naming the fear felt by many who supported 
the amendment was a political gamble, as it lent credibility to the claim. However, naming the 
fear also empowered Vote NO to assuage that fear.  
Vote NO discussed religious freedom in more diverse terms than Vote Yes, which may 
have made their case more persuasive to voters who were not affiliated with an evangelical 
Christian religion. Vote NO widened the conversation beyond that of protecting Christianity by 
pointing out the disparity of treatment that had existed for churches seeking to sanctify same-sex 
marriages. In one video clip, Katie and Gwen discussed their church’s policy regarding marriage 
and pointed out that while their marriage may be recognized within the walls of their church they 
did not enjoy recognition by the state, a privilege enjoyed unquestioned by heterosexual married 
couples. 
 Marriage is a civil institution and churches can choose to or not choose to marry  
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 whomever they want. But when it comes to the law of the land, that belongs to the  
 state. Our church, of which we're a member [recognizes marriage as] any consenting,  
 two adults who are in a loving, committed relationship, who choose to commit to one  
 another and share, hopefully, their entire lives together.244  
In the example above Katie and Gwen maintained emotional sensitivity and challenged the 
hegemonic assumptions that justified marriage as a union between one man and one woman, 
while also working dialectically to widen the boundaries of the family to encircle all unions that 
are lived out by two consenting adults who “are in a loving, committed relationship, who choose 
to commit to one another” in order to build a life together.245  
The choice to formulate the campaign as a dialectic may not have been voluntary, as TV 
spots for the Vote Yes campaign ran for several months before Minnesotans United began their 
TV campaign. A complete negation of Vote Yes would not have been practical. Nevertheless, 
dialectic enabled Minnesotans United to renegotiate key terms within the heated campaign 
season and purposefully invite the participation of voters in reinvigorating their community ties. 
Amendment One provided the crisis moment necessary to revitalize public deliberation on the 
definition of marriage and family in Minnesota. Engaging marriage and family as contested 
terms, Vote NO implicated what had previously been accepted as private spaces (i.e., marriage 
and family) as public, socially constructed spaces in need of re-evaluation. Above all, 
Minnesotans United seemed to understand the power of rhetorical embodiment in the process of 
building and revitalizing community. Amendments like Minnesota’s Amendment One may have 
provided the impetus for reconsidering what marriage and family means in America; Vote NO 
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provided the strategy.  
“Real Minnesotans” Vote No 
A critical investigation into the Vote NO campaign reveals that “emotionalism and 
rationality are not at opposite ends of a spectrum,” rather emotional rhetoric may serve as a 
means of reframing dominant discourse.246 By analyzing the personal testimonies of individual 
Minnesotans through the Vote NO campaign, this chapter has revealed the utility of rhetorical 
embodiment in renegotiating the meaning of and relationship between abstract and concrete 
values within argumentative loci of proximity. By appealing to the mundane, performed ritual, 
and inherited kindness, Minnesotans United invited viewers to see their own marriages and 
families reflected in the shared similar experiences of gay and lesbian couples as committed 
partners and parents. Vote NO renegotiated marriage and family as concrete values that underpin 
kinship. By making the private public, Vote NO argued for the imperative of gay and lesbian 
couples to demand recognition of their union from the state. Ultimately, the personal testimonies 
of same-sex and heterosexual couples helped Vote NO to assert love and commitment as more 
authoritative definitional characteristics of marriage than the respective sex/gender/orientation of 
the married partners. Renegotiating for a more inclusive model of the family, Vote NO also 
renegotiated the relative position of conservative and progressive values with respect to marriage 
equality.  
Perhaps the most powerful strategy at Vote NO’s disposal was that of constituting 
community. This analysis has shown that dialectic is an effective strategy for creating shared 
stakes among disparate collectives in order to co-create a community. Even when facing political 
polarization, affective economies, via rhetorical embodiment, reinvigorate individual investment 
                                                          
246 Patricia Roberts-Miller, Deliberate Conflict: Argument, Political Theory, and Composition 
Classes (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2004), 230. 
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in public issues and “align individuals with communities - or bodily space with social space - 
through the very intensity of their attachments.”247 By way of dialectic, Vote NO encouraged a 
co-creation of meaning between disparate parties, in this case marriage equality advocates and 
undecided voters. Vote NO offered a realistic, diverse and affective vision of committed love, 
partnership, and family and used experiential knowledge to argue that families come in all 
shapes and sizes. From there Vote NO relied on audiences to provide the inevitable inference 
that same-sex couples and their families, who within an alternative frame of reference, are no 
different from any other family in deserving equal recognition under the law. Vote NO reflected 
the lives of “real Minnesotans” and invited voters to participate in the deliberative practice of 
deciding what marriage and family could be. Voters got to “feel good” about inclusion, and 
ameliorate the face threat that might come from breaking with ideological or religious tradition. 
Vote NO's portrayal of everyday Minnesotans and their families allowed the audience to bypass 
Vote Yes's claim that heterosexual and same-sex unions were incontrovertibly different. Vote 
NO invited undecided voters to co-create their community as one that reflected shared 
experiences and values. 
 Vote Yes's demise might ultimately be attributed to their insistence on battling on rigid 
concrete values, rooted in ideological purity. Vote Yes’ argument that same-sex marriage posed 
a threat to both “natural marriage” and religious freedom was made less compelling when Vote 
NO made more proximal the humanity of those individuals and families who would be harmed 
by the passage of the amendment. Moreover, same-sex couples seeking public recognition of 
their families faced an easily definable threat in that passage of the amendment would make any 
marriage equality legislation impossible. Amendment One constituted a crisis moment for 
                                                          
247 Ahmed, “Affective Economies,” 118. 
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Minnesotans, and Vote NO built a strong case that the amendment itself constituted a threat to 
Minnesotan families. Vote NO didn’t seek to create rigid boundaries around marriage and 
family. As a dialectic, gaining total agreement from Minnesotans on a “new” definition of 
marriage and family wasn’t as important than the process of negotiating inclusion, of seeking a 
more authentic representation of what marriage and family could look and feel like. 
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Stability, Dignity, and a “happy, healthy home”:  
Adoption Rights for Same-Sex Couples and the Moral Imperative to Provide Care 
In the state of Mississippi, as in all of the United States, there is strong public interest to 
place children into stable, loving homes through the foster care system or through adoption. 
Though the federal government legislates nationwide requirements for legal guardianship and 
adoption, and states must comply with federal regulation, the states are given latitude to develop 
policies and regulations to facilitate the fostering and adoption of children. Several such statutes 
have been implemented in Mississippi to find foster or permanent homes for displaced children, 
including the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997248 and Mississippi Code Ann. 43-15-
13(8).249 Both these statutes emphasize the desirability of permanence and stability as outcomes 
for children, along with the maturity and holistic wellness of their guardians. Under Mississippi 
statute, single persons and married couples are eligible to foster and adopt children provided they 
are at least twenty-one years of age, have “income and insurance sufficient to meet the additional 
needs of an adopted child,” and “meet accepted emotional, intellectual and psychological 
standards to be good parents.”250 All of these qualifications and criteria are designed to ensure a 
foster or adoption placement is in the best interest of the child, which is not to say that couples 
and families are not enriched by the inclusion of a foster or adopted child. Nonetheless, the law 
prioritizes the interests of the child over the interests of the parents and guardians. Statutes that 
deny adoption rights to same-sex couples have necessarily established that such homes are 
                                                          
248 The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 was a policy that encouraged permanent 
adoptive homes for children in need of placement. 
249 Mississippi Code Ann. 43-15-13(8) advised that if a child currently in the foster system could 
not be reunified with one or both of their birth parents, then the eventual placement must 
constitute the best possible permanent living arrangement for the child. 
250 The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, “Public Adoptive Placements-
Requirements,” The ICPC State Pages, 2012, http://icpcstatepages.org/Mississippi/. 
129 
 
unsuitable placements for children. 
As has been discussed at length in prior chapters, the hierarchical arrangement of values 
and value-driven arguments relative to one another impact the trajectory of discourse. In 
Mississippi, the prioritization of the interest of the child over that of the adoptive or foster parent 
enabled those who would exploit anti-LGBTQIA+ public sentiment and policy to cast same-sex 
couples as unsuitable options for guardianship, regardless of biological parentage. Other legal 
precedents have worked alongside the inherent barriers resulting from “best interests” arguments, 
which, in this context are specifically grounded in anti-LGBTQIA+ advocacy. In 1999, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court issued a decision in the case of Weigand v. Houghton, which denied 
the petition for custody of a child to a gay guardian. The child in question was biologically the 
son of divorced couple, David Weigand and Machelle Weigand Houghton. During the 
proceedings, the court noted that David was a loving and affectionate father, provided a stable 
home and ensured that Paul (child) had all of the necessities and luxuries of life. Paul’s mother, 
on the other hand, worked two jobs, which meant that were she granted custody, Paul would be 
parented largely by Paul’s stepfather, a convicted felon, who had been physically abusive to 
Machelle, abused alcohol and would have provided a potentially psychologically and physically 
dangerous environment for Paul.251 Despite these potential dangers, the court awarded full 
custody to Machelle. David Weigand was denied custody of his biological son, Paul, on the 
grounds that his sexuality and romantic lifestyle made him unfit to parent.252  
Following suit and extending the court’s decision to petitioners not biologically related to 
their children, legislators in Mississippi drafted an amendment in the following year that codified 
                                                          
251 David John Weigand v. Machelle “Gil” Weigand Houghton, No. 97-CA-01246-SCT 
(Supreme Court of Mississippi February 4, 1999). 
252 Justice Banks, David John Weigand v. Machelle “Gil” Weigand Houghton Dissenting 
opinion, No. 730 So.2d 581 (Mississippi Supreme Court February 4, 1999). 
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the extent of the state’s jurisdiction with regard to adoption. A statement within the new 
language of the statute effectively prohibited same-sex couples from adopting, regardless of 
marital status or biological parentage of one of the petitioners. The statute unequivocally stated: 
“Adoption by couples of the same gender is prohibited.”253 As the legislature worked to secure 
passage of the adoption ban, vested parties voiced support on the grounds that same-sex 
partnerships were morally wrong, and thus could not establish a suitable home for children. State 
Senator, Ron Farris, stated, “a homosexual relationship implies the exercise of illegal activities 
[…] and no child should be permitted to enter that type of setting.”254 Echoing Farris’ argument 
State Representatives Rita Martinson and Gary Chism stated, “there is no way you can convince 
me that ‘Joe has two mommies’ is a value that we need to extend to the next generation” and the 
state of Mississippi “shouldn’t place [children] in a lifestyle that’s unnatural,” respectively.255 
Taken together, testimony from the state assembly that supported the ban reflected the 
assumption that gay and lesbian couples were incapable of providing a suitable home for 
children in need of placement because they lacked the moral fitness to be parents.  
In the effort to overturn foster care and adoption statutes in Mississippi that excluded 
same-sex couples from eligibility, the Campaign for Southern Equality (CSE), along with the 
Family Equality Counsel (FEC) and several same-sex couples, filed a lawsuit against the state of 
Mississippi. CSE and their allies capitalized on the State’s emphasis on the interests of the child 
as a primary pillar of their argument, shifting the field of argument in favor of a progressive 
vision of the home. The case documents include detailed discussion of the “Albright factors,” 
                                                          
253 “Mississippi Code,” 93-17-3 § (2000), sec. 5, http://codes.findlaw.com/ms/title-93-domestic-
relations/ms-code-sect-93-17-3.html. 
254 Gina Holland, “State Bans Adoption by Gay Couples, ACLU: Decision Likely to Bring 
Lawsuits,” Sun Herald, April 20, 2000, sec. A4. 
255 Emily Wagster, “Bill to Ban Adoptions by Same-Sex Couples Advances,” Clarion-Ledger, 
February 23, 2000, sec. 5B. 
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often used by Mississippi courts when determining the best interests of the child in a petition to 
adopt.256 Included in those factors are the age, health and sex of the child, continuity of care, 
parenting skill and a willingness to provide primary childcare, the moral physical, mental fitness 
and age of the parents, employment of the parents, stability of the home, and preferences of the 
child. Relying on the rhetorical options made available by the Albright factors, plaintiffs in 
Campaign brought credence to the primary, if not sole focus on the child’s wellbeing in 
determining the suitability of placements before extending through their argument the realm of 
suitability to include same-sex couples and their homes.257  
CSE challenged the assumption that a stable home was in any way defined by the 
sexuality of the parents. Arguing against the second-class status to which the adoption ban had 
relegated gay and lesbian couples, the plaintiffs reframed the legal problem itself by magnifying 
the significant harms brought about by the ban as they effect children already in custody of 
same-sex parents and those still in need of placement. CSE countered the assumption that same-
sex parents were morally unfit to parent children by shifting the field of argument away from the 
moral rightness or wrongness of homosexuality and toward the right of children placed or 
currently living in same-sex households to “understand the integrity and closeness of their own 
family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.”258 As was 
argued, the ban created two entwined problems simultaneously: it wrongfully deprived gay and 
lesbian couples of their constitutional rights and caused “their children to suffer irreparable harm. 
                                                          
256  Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1983), is a case filed in Mississippi that lists 
thirteen factors that the Court must consider when making an initial custody decisions. The facts 
of the case are considered relative to each factor. The Court makes a determination as to which 
factor favors which parent and decides how to weigh each factor.  
257 Campaign for Southern Equality et al., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, No. 
3:15cv578DPJ-FKB (n.d.). 
258 Ibid., 21. 
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It also harm[ed] the significant number of children in Mississippi waiting to be adopted.”259  
In their case against Mississippi CSE renegotiated the value cluster associated with “the 
home” by emphasizing the affective experiences of stability, love, nurturance, as well as 
physical, mental, and emotional health. This reordering of priorities and value hierarchies 
enabled the plaintiffs to make concrete the threat of displacement for children in need of foster 
and adoptive parents. More specifically, the plaintiffs’ argument highlighted the severity of harm 
brought about by the ban in order to advocate that same-sex couples were a superior option for 
children in need of placement. In so doing, the plaintiffs accomplished several things. First, 
plaintiffs in Campaign made present the ways in which same-sex couples created homes more 
suitable for children than displacement and decreased the presence of arguments that challenged 
the moral fitness of same-sex couples as parents. Perhaps more importantly, they also assuaged 
the material and psychological impacts on children who had been deprived of legal parentage by 
the state by asserting the moral imperative to provide care where care is needed. Guided by an 
ethic of care, same-sex couples meet the moral imperative to provide stability and dignity to 
children most in need. 
The following first provides a contextual backdrop for the suit, with specific attention to 
the plaintiffs and defendants. I then dissect the three loci of severity deployed by CSE: crises of 
stability, financial cost and loss of dignity for children awaiting legal guardianship. Transmitted 
with affective resonance, these three loci enabled CSE to make present and compelling the 
problems associated with the ban. I then explore the ways in which loci of severity enabled a 
shift in the field of argument and a reordering of abstract and concrete values associated with 
“the home” and the moral imperative to give care, which ultimately created the rhetorical space 
                                                          
259 Ibid., 20.  
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for progressive models of the family. By amplifying lived experience as superior to abstracted 
claims, CSE de-emphasized questions of morality in a discussion of what makes a home suitable 
for children. Echoing arguments from Lawrence, the case ultimately establishes that 
heteronormative visions of the home are outmoded and too exclusionary to reflect the myriad 
joys, responsibilities, and challenges of parenting.  
Background on the Plaintiffs & Defendants 
The Campaign for Southern Equality (CSE) was established in 2011 to “advocate for the 
full equality of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) people in American life and to 
increase public support for their rights.”260 Based out of Asheville, North Carolina, the coalition 
provides support and resources throughout the south. Their services are varied, ranging from free 
legal clinics, litigation, and local organizational support and training for grassroots LGBT 
leaders. CSE was recognized as a proper institutional plaintiff soon before the adoption case in 
Mississippi, focusing much of their efforts on achieving marriage equality. After the Obergefell 
decision however, CSE turned their attention toward adoption litigation for same-sex couples. 
Joining CSE in the suit was the Family Equality Council (FEC), the only national organization 
“exclusively dedicated to securing justice and equality for LGBTQ parents and their children by 
advancing legal and social justice for all families.”261 Founded in 1979, the FEC extends its 
reach beyond the informal boundaries of the south, across the nation. However, the FEC remains 
invested in service to LGBTQ parents in Mississippi, sponsoring legal service clinics, seminars 
and other community-building events in order to increase awareness of family-building legal 
options.262 
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Along with CSE and the FEC, several same-sex couples added their names to the suit. 
Each of the couples that participated in the suit spans the gamut of family building. For Donna 
Phillips and Jan Smith, legal adoption will make Jan a full and legal parent to the daughter that 
Donna gave birth to but both women parent. Kathryn Garner and Susan Hrostowski face similar 
circumstances, wherein Kathryn gave birth to their son and Susan is seeking legal adoption 
rights. Jessica Harbuck and Brittany Rowell were engaged to be married at the time of the 
lawsuit and had hoped to jointly adopt children through Mississippi’s foster care system, 
something it was noted they were both emotionally and financially able to manage. Similarly, 
Tinora (Tina) Sweeten-Lunsford and Kari Lunsford hoped to foster and adopt children with 
special needs, which was something the couple was uniquely equipped to do given Tina’s 
professional experience working with children with disabilities. As was cited in the case brief, 
children with special needs are in desperate need of foster placement and eventual adoption and 
many couples are ill equipped to care for these children, which means many children cannot be 
placed. It was argued during the proceedings that for their employment security and marital 
status, each of the four couples would have otherwise been able to obtain legal adoption of their 
current and future children had they not been same-sex couples in Mississippi. Notably, each of 
the plaintiffs in the case are women. Functioning not only as caregivers but also as mothers, the 
women reify the underpinnings of an ethic of care through their gender. More importantly in this 
case, these same-sex couples not only answered the call to provide care to children in need, but 
they banned together as women in a way that challenged heteronormative notions of what it 
means to provide care as parents within a home.  
On the other side of the aisle, representatives from three institutions were under fire in the 
CSE’s lawsuit. For his capacity as the Executive Director of the Mississippi Department of 
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Human Services, Richard “Rickey” Berry, was implicated in the suit. In addition, Phil Bryant 
was implicated for his capacity as the Governor of the state of Mississippi, as was Jim Hood for 
his capacity as the Attorney General of the state of Mississippi. Each of the men in their official 
roles represented the majority sentiments put forth by the state assembly, which insisted that 
children would be better off as wards of the state than in the temporary or permanent custody of 
same-sex couples. The question of moral fitness was paramount to any professional or personal 
experiences same-sex couples might have that position them to provide stable, permanent homes. 
The defendants posed abstract value arguments about what moral fitness entailed, and what a 
moral home would look like, as superior to physical or financial arguments that might have 
justified same-sex couples as fit parents in light of the Albright factors. In so doing, the 
defendants not only asserted the moral unfitness of same-sex couples as reason to deny them 
eligibility to foster or adopt children, but also exalted the superiority of moral arguments 
altogether within the discourse.  
The plaintiffs, however, challenged such arguments with a two-pronged attack. Initially, 
they shifted the field of argument such that arguments regarding sexual orientation and identity 
as moral issues were hierarchically subordinated to other argumentative storehouses. Second, 
they asserted the fitness of same-sex parents through an ethic of care, which engaged the moral 
objection. CSE made present the severity of the problem of displacement in order to argue for 
the superiority of placement in homes headed by same-sex couples. Abstract values from both 
sides coalesced around the concrete value of “the home;” both parties asserted the importance of 
a stable, loving home for the development of healthy children. Yet each side proffered different 
models for what that home might look or feel like. Arguments made on behalf of the plaintiffs 
emphasized love, nurturance and dignity as synonymous with the home. These affective appeals 
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worked to uncouple sexual orientation from the moral component of a safe, stable, permanent 
and loving home. Importantly, anecdotal evidence served progressive arguments that highlighted 
the uniquely severe problem of child displacement and the ways in which same-sex couples are 
uniquely suited to address that problem. The following section illustrates how the plaintiffs 
reordered the hierarchical relationship between moral arguments against same-sex couples as 
parents and arguments based on stability, financial fitness, and dignity. 
A Crisis of Stability, Financial Cost and Loss of Dignity for Children 
Each party on both sides in Campaign contended that displaced children constituted a 
particularly vulnerable community. As individuals in need of stability and guidance, children in 
the foster and adoption system must be placed in suitable homes in order to thrive. CSE 
amplified the problem of child displacement, with specific regard to the ways in which the 
adoption ban exacerbated the severity of the problem. Loci of severity make present a problem 
by showing that “those affected by the problem have suffered great hardship or have had their 
lives disrupted in an extreme way.”263 Inherently, then, the lived experience of great hardship or 
extreme disruption is central to loci of severity. Individuality of experience calls for a flexible 
sense-making paradigm wherein arguments can be viewed dynamically, so that there may be 
varied uses for a single notion. When a notion is viewed dynamically, “in terms of its uses of the 
notion in argumentation, [the] field of application of the notion varies according to these uses 
and that the plasticity of notions is related to them. The ‘emotive meaning’ is an integral part of 
the notion’s meaning, not just an adventitious addition that does not belong to the symbolic 
character of language.”264 In other words, argumentative loci of severity are imbued with 
affective resonance, which facilitates an emotional response that can be persuasive. CSE turned 
                                                          
263 Jasinski, Sourcebook on Rhetoric: Key Concepts in Contemporary Rhetorical Study, 4:457. 
264 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, 140. 
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to affectively charged arguments that emphasized the problem of adoption and foster bans on 
same-sex couples on three topical levels, stability, financial fitness and dignity. 
A Crisis of Stability and Financial Cost 
Initially, the plaintiffs argued that denying same-sex couples the right to foster or adopt 
children created a crisis of stability, one that was unique in its severity. As a function of 
presence, developing a crisis of stability in affective terms made the problem more concrete and 
the threat posed by the ban more evident. By denying same-sex couples the right to adopt, 
children in need of foster and adoptive placement are inevitably left out in the cold, so to speak. 
At the time the lawsuit was filed, the Mississippi Department of Human Services (MDHS) had 
approximately four hundred children who were in need of adoptive homes, one hundred of 
whom were placed in temporary foster care. As was cited in the court documents, many of the 
children in the system experience serious medical, emotional, or psychological setbacks while 
awaiting permanent placement stemming from “backgrounds of adversity, loss, and instability, 
such as parental abuse and neglect, removal from their homes, and subsequent (sometimes 
multiple) temporary placements.”265 CSE included in their documents personal information and 
anecdotes about children who were available for adoption at the time of the lawsuit. Included 
were descriptions of Aeron, “a sweet, out-going 8-year-old boy’ who ‘loves eating soul food’ 
and Joyce, a 17-year-old 10th grader, who is a ‘good student’ and ‘likes to climb trees.’”266 These 
personal stories about the children left displaced under the adoption ban illustrated the problem 
of displacement. When left in abstract terms, child displacement could easily be seen as a severe 
                                                          
265 Campaign for Southern Equality et al., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 23. 
266 Ibid., 22. The case documents site the Mississippi Department of Child Protective Services 
website, specifically the Mississippi Heart Gallery page where profiles can be found of children 
available for adoption. Some children who were mentioned in the case document, Aeron, for 
example, are still available for adoption. 
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problem. However, the specific stories of these particular children who had been displaced made 
the crisis of stability more concrete, which amplified the hardship and extreme disruption felt by 
those affected.  
With stability as an abstract value that characterized the interests of both legal parties in 
this lawsuit, CSE attempted to shift the concrete value associated with stability. This enabled 
them to challenge the assertion that homes headed by same-sex couples were inherently less 
stable. The plaintiffs argued that the severity of the problem of child displacement was further 
amplified because gay and lesbian couples tend to be more motivated to adopt than heterosexual 
couples. 
Prohibiting gay and lesbian married couples from adopting – couples that tend to be more 
motivated to adopt – means that many of the children waiting to be adopted will have to 
wait longer, and some will age out of foster care without ever having a permanent, stable 
family of their own.267 
Citing the motivation of same-sex couples to provide care, CSE argued that the problem at hand 
was child displacement, not the question of moral fitness, and same-sex couples were ready and 
willing to answer the call. Waiting longer to be placed in a foster or adoptive home was equated 
with an increased instability. As such, the problem of displacement under the adoption ban 
created hardship and extreme disruption for the children involved. Without the stability of a 
long-term or permanent home, the children would continue as wards of the state, some until they 
reach adulthood.  
Having described actual children like Aeron and Joyce as potential casualties of the ban, 
the case documents made the issue of child displacement affectively resonant. CSE and their 
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allies developed argumentative connections between the material interests of actual children, the 
strong display of character in being motivated to provide care where it was needed, and the 
stability of a loving home, which the CSE argued same-sex couples were willing and able to 
provide. The plaintiffs used material referents to make present the severe outcomes of having a 
lack of stability, in order to diminish the persuasive impact of arguments against same-sex 
couples’ moral fitness to raise children. The severity of the problems associated with 
displacement were positioned as a superior concern to the moral fitness of same-sex parents, and 
more aptly supported with concrete examples. Because reliability and longevity of care was 
linked with the abstract notion of stability, placement in homes headed by same-sex couples was 
promoted as a fitting solution to that problem. 
Relatedly, the plaintiffs turned to loci of severity when arguing the enormous material 
and financial costs to denying same-sex couples the right to adopt. A study from the Williams 
Institute, cited in the case documents, established that a national ban on gay and lesbian foster 
care could cost anywhere from eighty-seven million dollars to one hundred-thirty million dollars 
in foster care system expenditures each year. Costs to individual states would soar up to twenty-
seven million dollars.268 As was cited, “preventing qualified gay parents from adopting leaves 
more children in foster care for longer periods of time and this, in turn, costs the state more 
money.”269 Running counter to paradigms of parenting that embrace a village mentality, the 
Adoption Ban in Mississippi was presented as an obstruction to residents’ collective 
responsibility to care for and rear children. In this way, the notion of stability was extended 
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outward to the interests of society at large. Preventing same-sex couples from adopting not only 
cost the children in need of loving and stable homes, but also the state’s economic stability.  
A Crisis of Loss of Dignity 
Renegotiating the concrete value to the abstract value of stability enabled CSE to make 
present the severity of the threat posed by the ban, not only for the children left displaced, but 
also for the state. In addition, the plaintiffs turned to loci of severity in arguing that the adoption 
ban damages the dignity of children waiting to be legally adopted, some of whom have been 
parented by same-sex couples their whole life. Similar to the way stability functioned as an 
abstract representation of the material stakes of displacement, dignity served as an abstract 
representation of home, or perhaps more specifically, feeling at home. The plaintiffs argued that 
denying recognition as parents under federal law to married gay and lesbian couples would 
humiliate tens of thousands of children being raised by same-sex couples and would make it 
“even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own 
family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.”270 In other 
words, the argument was based in the truth that homes headed by same-sex couples exist, 
children already live in those homes, and the adoption ban degraded the stability of those homes 
by preventing the state from recognizing a legitimate family unit. Hearkening to the shared 
experience of daily life in a community, CSE positioned the discriminatory aspects of the 
adoption ban as something that would be felt and lived out by the children in those homes. The 
argument extended an invitation to consider what it would be like for these children as they ride 
bikes with neighborhood friends or attend church and Sunday school.  
Somewhat different from the arguments regarding stability or financial cost, which 
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focused on displaced children waiting for foster or adoptive guardians as wards of the State, 
arguments about dignity emphasized the severity of the problems associated with the adoption 
ban for children already living in homes headed by same-sex couples. In such cases, when 
adoption rights are denied to gay parents, “the equal dignity of hundreds of families and 
thousands of children in Mississippi is disrespected and the significant and concrete rights, 
benefits, and duties that come with legal parentage are denied.”271 Turning again to the concrete, 
material experiences that characterize life within a loving home, CSE developed a connection 
between dignity as an abstract value that represents the material existence in a home. Denying 
the dignity of such an existence would potentially place a badge of inferiority on children, 
something the Court had determined inappropriate in cases like Brown vs. Board of Education.272 
Also leaning on Obergefell and Windsor as precedent, CSE argued that beyond the undeniable 
harm done to parents who are unable to seek legal adoption of their children, “such 
discrimination against children because their parents happen to be gay is blatantly 
unconstitutional.”273 Therefore, denying adoption rights to same-sex couples infringes on the 
children’s constitutional right to equal dignity within their home.  
Further amplifying the severity of the problem, the plaintiffs also highlighted the ways in 
which “the absence of a legal relationship between parent and child often becomes critical in 
situations that are already stressful or traumatic for families, including medical emergencies and 
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the death of a parent.”274 Each of these arguments emphasized the double-pronged infringement 
of liberties, for the guardians and children involved, but also for society. By evoking affective 
qualities that illustrate these harms and magnify the potential negative outcome of denying legal 
adoption rights to same-sex parents, CSE reoriented how the home could be constituted as a 
place of refuge that was simultaneously strong and fragile. A loving home was strong enough to 
sustain families through hardship yet fragile enough that the State’s interference by way of the 
adoption ban threatened its characteristic stability. In the same portion that discussed the 
potential trauma that parents and children can experience during medical emergencies and 
unexpected deaths in the family, the case documents cited Kathy’s and Susan’s shared fear that 
being denied legal adoption would potentially fracture their already grief-stricken family should 
Kathy (H.M.G.’s biological mother) pass away.275 Donna and Jan cited similar concerns, given 
that Donna (H.M.S.P.’s biological mother) was often out on military deployments. CSE argued 
that Donna’s routine deployment away from home compounded understandable concerns and 
anxiety that a tragic incident could jeopardize their family unit:  
Donna and Jan understandably share similar concerns and anxiety, which they feel 
particularly acutely when Donna is deployed away from home. During deployments, Jan 
and H.M.S.P. worry not only for Donna’s safety, as does the family of every service 
member on duty away from home, but they also have the added distress that, if something 
were to happen to Donna, they could lose each other as well.276 
Evident in this passage are allusions to fears and anxieties, commonly experienced by military 
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families and identifiable to civilians as well. The love shared by Donna, Jan, and their daughter 
made their family strong, and the family leaned on one another to endure the hardships that 
accompany Donna’s routine deployments. However, these hardships and the worry that a loved 
one might not return from deployment was amplified by the fear that should something happen 
to Donna, Jan and H.M.S.P. would also lose one another as the state would be legally obligated 
to dissolve their family status. 
Loci of severity enabled CSE to develop a double-pronged argument that asserted the 
simultaneous strength and stability of the home as well as its preciousness and fragility. Taken 
together, arguments that established a crisis of instability, financial cost and loss of dignity, each 
of which is a locus of severity, facilitated a hierarchical reordering of values within the 
discourse. Appropriating abstract values shared between the two legal parties, such as stability 
and dignity, CSE shifted the concrete values represented by those abstractions. Whereas the 
defendants of the case sought to situate moral arguments as superior to other Albright factors, the 
plaintiffs made present the severity of the problem of child displacement brought about by the 
adoption ban, and the loss of dignity for those children living with same-sex parents. Thereby 
CSE diminished previously asserted arguments against the moral fitness of same-sex parents as 
hierarchically inferior, in both relative importance and veracity with regard to the case. 
Moving “Home” from the Abstract to the Concrete 
By making present the severity of the adoption ban, CSE shifted the field of argument 
toward an argument of what constitutes a home. The argument put forth by the plaintiffs 
benefited from two major sources of evidence. First, the narrative representation of existing 
homes headed by same-sex couples, and the material existence of children flourishing in such 
homes, were asserted as primary markers of good and authentic parentage. A significant amount 
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of page space in the case documents was devoted to the exposition of the plaintiffs’ backgrounds, 
employment information, children’s hobbies and interests, among other details about everyday 
life in the household. In Donna and Jan’s case, the brief cited that the couple had been together 
since 1995, were legally married in Maryland on August 1, 2013, and that they lived in 
Mississippi their entire lives. In addition, the case brief cited Donna’s service with distinction in 
various positions in the military, “including as a company commander of a unit in the Mississippi 
Army National Guard responsible for the immediate response to Hurricane Katrina.”277 Both 
women’s Master’s Degrees are listed, and their daughter (born to Donna) is described as “happy, 
bright, and well-adjusted.”278 The women are described as being actively involved in their 
daughter’s life, and the eight year old is described as loving both women as parents very much 
and wanting to be legally adopted by Jan. The case documents include similar detail about Kathy 
and Susan. Their son (born to Kathy) is described as “thriving in every measure. He earned 
straight A’s in his freshman year of high school, was the starting quarterback for his high school 
football team, and spent part of [his] summer as a counselor at a camp for children with 
intellectual disabilities.”279 Such descriptions served as concrete evidence to support not only the 
existence of households headed by same-sex parents, but also a home.  
Including mundane details such as getting straight A’s, being quarterback of the football 
team, or being bright and well-adjusted echoes common experiences that are affectively resonant 
to the reader and illustrate the significance of the Albright factors. Rather than list a full 
employment history, the case documents narrativized Donna’s military service and illuminated 
what it was like to be a military family. In so doing, CSE deployed the material existence of 
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same-sex households as homes to their argumentative advantage. That these families exist 
provided tangible, concrete evidence, which was then asserted as a material referent for the 
concrete value of a good home. The narrative representations of the plaintiffs’ material existence, 
recorded in the case documents, created an affectively compelling narrative in which the onus to 
ensure care was shifted. As was illustrated, same-sex couples had lived up to their moral duty to 
provide care where care was needed – and were pleading to give more. It was up to the State to 
uphold its moral covenant to honor that ethic by fully recognizing the guardianship that was 
already taking place.  
Along with the material existence of same-sex families (illustrated through narrative), the 
second source of evidence that the plaintiffs benefited from was the statistical substantiation of 
their assertion that same-sex couples were willing and able to provide care where care is needed. 
CSE used official numbers from the Census to illustrate the material existence of homes headed 
by same-sex couples and the number of children currently living in those homes. The 2010 
Census captured a telling snapshot of the present-day American family that countered hegemonic 
models that depict a father, mother, two kids and a dog. In 2010, twenty-six percent of the 
approximately 3,500 gay couples living in Mississippi were raising children (under the age of 
18) in their homes. As of 2014, however, that picture had shifted even further away from 
hegemonic notions of the family, with twenty-nine percent of gay couples in Mississippi, or 
approximately one thousand households, raising nearly 1,500 children in their homes. 280 The 
plaintiffs used these numbers to assert a progressive vision of the family, or at the very least to 
establish that an updated vision is necessary.  
Narrative and statistical evidence, along with loci of severity, amalgamated to form a 
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cohesive argument strategy with which to reposition the adoption ban and the primary problem at 
hand, that actively worked against the State’s interest to secure safety and stability to its most 
vulnerable residents. Moreover, the arguments highlighted an ethic of care as the primary marker 
of a healthy home that satisfies the Albright factors while disregarding antiquated questions of 
morality with regard to sexuality. As a state behind the times, “Mississippi is the last state that 
explicitly bans gay couples from adopting without regard for their qualifications as parents or the 
best interests of the child,” regardless of the actual reality that many Americans experience as 
authentic family life.281 References to “actual reality” and “authentic family life” brought 
abstracted representations of family and the home closer in line with the lived experiences that 
mark a family’s daily life. In other words, shifting the field of argument in this case also 
facilitated a renegotiation of the abstract values associated with “the home.”  
Importantly, this process reoriented the frame of reference away from the abstract and 
toward the concrete via affective appeals toward embodied, lived experience. The case 
documents cited the diversity of families, noting:  
They differ in size, cultural heritage, religion, and economic means. Some are headed by 
parents who planned, were prepared for, and wanted children – others are not. Some 
children, regardless of their parents’ sexual orientation, come from single-parent, 
divorced, or blended families. And some children now have married lesbian and gay 
parents who live in committed and loving relationships in Mississippi.”282  
Key in the passage above is the means through which the concept of family is defined by 
individual experience. While hegemonic models of the family are characterized through the 
sex/gender/orientation of the parents (i.e., one mother and one father), the case documents 
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argued that a family can also be recognized by the presence of children. When two parents are 
involved, sex/gender/orientation is diminished as less important than the commitment and loving 
relationship they share. In other words, affective experience is the key defining feature. The 
presence of children, love, and commitment are brought to the fore of the hearer’s consciousness. 
These appeals countered the persuasive impact of claims that challenge the moral fitness of 
same-sex parents because they center attention on the hearer’s lived experience, occupying the 
“foreground of the hearer’s consciousness.”283 This strategy is useful not only in  
argumentation aiming at immediate action, but also in that which aspires to give the mind 
a certain orientation, to make certain schemes of interpretation prevail, to insert the 
elements of agreement into a framework that will give them significance and confer upon 
them the rank they deserve.284  
In other words, the argumentative processes that made CSE’s arguments compelling asserted that 
it was not enough to debate the merits of same-sex couples as parents – one must instead 
consider the moral imperative that all parents or guardians share, including those in same-sex 
partnerships. The abstract notion of morality became associated with the call to provide care, to 
live out the responsibilities of being a family.  
Several years after signing the Adoption Ban into law, former governor of Mississippi 
Ronnie Musgrove expressed regret at having made it illegal for gay and lesbian couples to adopt 
children. He explained, “There are far too many children in America in need of a loving home, 
who are shuttled between temporary homes and group shelters that fail to provide the stable, 
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nurturing environment all children deserve.”285 Reliant on outmoded tropes of morality that 
diminished the moral imperative to provide care, the adoption ban could not respond adequately 
to the accelerating need for permanent, legal guardianship for displaced children and those living 
in same-sex households. Opponents of the ban brought to the fore a kaleidoscopic view of the 
family, families that occupied a home with greater plasticity and dynamism than the outdated 
Mississippi statute could contain. 
The broader point of this strategy is to shift the definition of what makes a family a 
family and what qualities define a strong and nurturing home. In this case, the relative success of 
children in same-sex households was a common trope used to demonstrate the positive 
consequences, as illustrated in the lives of the children, of growing up in such a home. The case 
documents told the story of Jan and Donna, one of the couples to file against the state in 
Campaign.  
Jan and Donna have a happy, bright, and well-adjusted eight-year-old daughter whom 
they both love very much. Jan and Donna are exemplary parents who have mutually 
provided H.M.S.P. with a childhood full of love and support. Both are actively involved 
in their daughter’s life and are dedicated participants in the Parent Teacher Organization 
at H.M.S.P.’s school.286 
Having provided their daughter with a “childhood full of love and support,” Jan and Donna’s 
mutual parenting has produced a “happy, bright, and well-adjusted” child. Specifically, the 
passage cites Jan and Donna’s active daily involvement in their daughter’s life as evidence of 
exemplary parenting skills. Their daughter’s positive qualities are a direct result of the home they 
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have provided. Similarly, Kathy and Susan not only provided their son with a stable home, but 
also enabled him to thrive, achieving academic and athletic success and giving back to his 
community. Though not reflective of heteronormative models of the family, Kathy and Susan 
reflect a progressive vision of what the family actually looks like for many Mississippians. In 
showing the lived experiences that comprise each of the families whose heads of household filed 
the suit, the plaintiffs decoupled parents’ sex/gender/orientation from the definitional qualities of 
heads of households in order to emphasize that a home is not a home without the presence of 
children, made to thrive through the stability of constant love and nurturance. The primary 
definitional quality of the home is that it be a place where children are supported and reared 
lovingly. In this way, the plaintiffs reordered the value hierarchies associated with the case and 
shifted the field of argument toward the importance of stability and nurturance within the home 
and the moral imperative to give care. 
What Damages One, Injures the Other: Equal Dignity and the Interests of the Child 
Taking place in a courtroom, advocacy in this discourse necessarily had to respond to the 
issue of legal precedent. CSE took advantage of prior proceedings that challenged direct 
infringement on Constitutional liberties, like Equal Protection and Due Process. Importantly, the 
arguments in this case linked the infringement of parental liberties with that of the children 
involved. As part of a family, parent and child would share a stake of the threat. Stating outright 
the claim of infringement for the foster and adoptive parents, the case documents submitted by 
CSE contend  
the Mississippi Adoption Ban at issue denies to persons within Mississippi the equal 
protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States. By allowing straight coupes to adopt, while refusing to allow gay 
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couples to do the same, the State of Mississippi impermissibly distinguishes among 
similarly situated people by discriminating solely on the basis of sexual orientation.”287 
Concomitantly, the case documents stated that the adoption ban “prohibits gay couples from 
adopting without any regard for their qualifications as parents or whether the adoption would be 
in the best interests of the child.”288 This succession of arguments paired concerns for the equal 
protection of the parents with the best interests of the child in question, which intimated that 
what is good for one party is good for the other. Similarly, that which is damaging to one party 
injures the other as well. Barring same-sex couples from adopting “demeans gay families and 
deprives them of equal dignity. [The law] also demeans children who are actually being raised 
by two gay married parents in Mississippi, but who only have one legal parent.” 289 Depicting the 
adoption ban as reflective of an injurious “regime,” the case documents positioned the ban “at 
odds with creating and maintaining a stable relationship within which children may flourish.” 290  
The issue of personhood, which is cornerstone to arguments regarding Equal Protection 
under the Constitution, supports affective arguments against the adoption ban. Families, 
comprised of individual persons unified through their daily commitment to love and nurture each 
other within a stable home, were of central importance. As was argued in the case documents, 
the ban  
conveys the message that gay families are inherently less valuable than all other families 
and should not be afforded the same dignity under the law. It is a public, government-
sponsored rejection of one of the most important relationships in the lives of gay 
Mississippians, and it unconstitutionally relegates them and their families to second-class 
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citizenship.”291 
Though many of the arguments, illustrated by the passage above, focused specifically on families 
wherein children were already being parented by same-sex couples, some arguments broadened 
the scope to include children waiting for placement in foster or adoptive care. A decision issued 
in Campaign for Southern Equality v. Bryant III by Justice Carlton W. Reeves, which was cited 
in the case documents, explained that the state of Mississippi, like many states,  
suffers when heterosexual parents have unprotected sex, bear children, and cannot take 
care of them. A number of those children end up in the foster care system, the juvenile 
justice system, and the children’s mental health system. These children need homes and 
caretakers that love them. Same-sex couples can help.”292 
Put simply, foster children were positioned as a vulnerable population in need of a stable, loving 
home above all else. Same-sex couples do offer a sensible solution in that they can provide 
stability and care to children left displaced by supposedly irresponsible birth parents. Building 
upon this argument, and the premise that heterosexual birth parents of displaced children were 
irresponsible, CSE proffered that same-sex couples were, in many ways, uniquely suited to 
provide stability to the children who are awaiting placement because they were properly 
responding to the call to provide care. Having been born to parents unfit or unready to raise 
them, these children suffer mental and psychological harm as they await placement. Yet 
“research demonstrates that gay and lesbian couples have an understanding of how it feels to be 
different and may have overcome oppression and discrimination in their own lives.”293 Thus, the 
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personal struggles faced by children in the system mirror some of the same struggles that same-
sex couples have had to overcome. In this way, it was argued that same-sex couples would be 
more naturally equipped to relate to these children. The case documents cited several sources 
that supported their claim that same-sex couples would be more likely (and better equipped) to 
parent children who are members of racial or ethnic minorities or who are otherwise seen as 
“other” in society. In preventing these couples from filling the role for which they are uniquely 
suited, CSE argued that “the State does not encourage the stability or well-being of the family or 
community in which they live, it only undermines it.”294 
All is Queer on the Home Front 
Turning to the personal testimonies of Mississippians, the plaintiffs built a case for the 
ways in which same-sex couples could assuage many of the fears and threats that occur when 
children are displaced or left in the foster system indefinitely. By channeling the abstract value of 
the home through queered concrete values, CSE renegotiated morality as an abstract value 
associated not with sex/gender/orientation, but with an ethic of care. As was illustrated through 
the proceedings, same-sex couples’ unique suitability to parent children with special needs and 
those from marginalized communities often resulted in a very normal upbringing for the child in 
question. In the end, it was illustrated that these couples could provide foster and adopted 
children with the quintessential American home built upon stability, nurturance and parents who 
meet the moral imperative to provide care. One such testimony came from Will Miller, a 28-
year-old Mississippian. Parented by mothers who had been together for 23 years, Miller said that 
he never understood “what all the fuss was about. They loved me and that was all that mattered. 
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It’s all that should matter. Indeed, my childhood as the son of lesbian parents was extraordinary 
in that it was simply ordinary.”295 Certainly, stories like Miller’s are not uncommon as “the 
positive experiences that children of gay parents have are consistent with decades of social 
science findings: children of same-sex parents and children of different-sex parents fare equally 
well academically, psychologically, and socially.”296  
The case against Mississippi’s Adoption Ban echoes the plaintiffs’ case in Lawrence in 
their assertion of Equal Protection and Due Process as relevant statutes through which to 
challenge the defendants in the case. The Equal Protection clause directs that “all persons 
similarly situated should be treated alike” and that “a law cannot be sustained where the 
proffered reasons for the law are simply irrational.”297 Similar to the argumentative choices made 
on behalf of Lawrence and Garner, the case documents filed by the CSE cited a slew of prior 
court cases that had directed a higher level of scrutiny to laws that discriminate particular groups 
of people. In particular, such scrutiny was applied in cases where the following factors are 
relevant: a group that has been historically discriminated against, a group that differs from others 
in a way that impacts their ability to contribute to society, a group that is defined by “obvious, 
immutable or distinguishing characteristics,” a group that lacks political power because 
“prejudice against the group tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon.”298 Same-sex couples fit the bill for several of these factors and it 
was upon which these premises that the CSE built their case. 
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Citing the Due Process clause, which contends that no State shall deprive citizens of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of the law, the CSE also linked personal freedoms 
guaranteed through the Constitution with the desire to establish a home. They claimed that 
protected liberties within the Due Process Clause include personal choices “central to individual 
dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”299 
Speaking specifically to that clause, the CSE highlighted “the freedom to have and raise children 
is one of the most basic civil rights,” which was supported the Obergefell decision.300 Ultimately, 
Mississippi’s adoption ban was an “outdated relic” reflective “of a time when courts and 
legislatures believed that it was somehow okay to discriminate against gay people simply 
because they are gay.”301 As was demonstrated through the affectively charged arguments in the 
case documents, the adoption ban, which prevented children from being adopted by “otherwise 
qualified married gay couples, [did] not improve or in any way affect the stability of families 
with opposite-sex parents.” 302 Rather, such discrimination “circumvents the regulatory system 
that otherwise ensures that adoptions proceed in the best interests of the child.”303 Denying 
adoption rights to same-sex couples not only supports a stigma against gay couples seeking to 
raise children, but also extends that stigma to the children themselves. As the plaintiff’s 
contended, families headed by same-sex couples already exist; households headed by same-sex 
couples already included children. The adoption ban did not create or erase families; it 
preempted the formation of a stable home and deprived families of the dignity and stature 
“afforded to straight, married couples through governmental recognition of one of their most 
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cherished relationships.”304  
In his statement of regret about passing the Adoption Ban, Governor Musgrove stated:  
If you are fortunate in life, age and knowledge breed compassion. And as I have gotten 
older, I came to understand that a person’s sexual orientation has absolutely nothing to 
do with their ability to be a good parent. In every decision I made as Governor, I always 
tried hard to view the profound personal and individual impact of the laws I signed and 
policies I enacted on every Mississippian. Had I vetoed the law denying LGBT adoption, 
the Legislature had more than enough votes to override my veto. Nonetheless, this 
decision that all of us made together has made it harder for an untold number of children 
to grow up in happy, healthy homes in Mississippi—and that breaks my heart.”305 
In the end, the CSE and others who advocated against the adoption ban contended that all things 
being equal, the key for children’s success centers on the notion of the home. In shifting the field 
of argument away from the moral fitness of same-sex couples as parents and toward the moral 
imperative to provide care, the CSE engaged directly the values and characteristics that define a 
home. So much more than four walls and a roof, the home is where loved ones dwell and where 
sanctuary can be found. The case documents, and the resultant decision to strike down the ban, 
reflect a hierarchy of values wherein stability and nurturance supersede outmoded assumptions 
regarding morality and homosexuality. By amplifying personal testimonies and shared 
experiences, the plaintiffs made present the problems associated with a backlog of children 
waiting to be placed in safe, loving and permanent homes, thereby overwhelming counter-
arguments through affectively charged loci of severity. As was stated in the case brief, “the 
question before the Court is not what kind of family is best. That is not a question for this or any 
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court to decide.”306 The question is now, and perhaps was inevitably about the degree to which 
members of a partnership, family, community, or country, should care for one another. 
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Queer Legal Worldmaking:  
An Answer to Stagnation and LGBTQIA+-Exclusive Policy 
Queer legal worldmaking is a complex and interactive process through which judges, 
lawyers, voters, plaintiffs and defendants negotiate a tangled web of co-constituted rhetorics via 
formal and informal channels of power brokerage. The role of culture, language, and human 
relationships has been integral to the development of queer social movements, and subsequently, 
queer worldmaking in legal and public contexts. This dissertation has dissected the 
argumentative processes through which progressive advocates arguing for the expansion of queer 
rights have created rhetorical space for queer perspectives in legal and public deliberation.  
Public and legal deliberation tends to be conservative and resist change, but my analysis 
has proven that social movements can engage these seemingly stagnate sites of influence with 
argument loci that constitute communities around fulcrums of shared experiences. Through 
argumentative loci of presence, advocates in the three aforementioned case studies deployed 
affect to accentuate and make relevant the threat posed to LGBTQIA+ individuals and broader 
communities by heteronormative policy. The magnitude, proximity and severity of anti-queer 
policy make such laws as intolerable as they are discriminatory for vested stakeholders. The key 
then is to renegotiate how vested parties are delineated and to widen the scope of stakeholders by 
reinvigorating communities around shared values.  
Fundamental to advocates in Lawrence, Vote NO, and Campaign were definitional 
questions about the meanings of intimacy, privacy, partnership, marriage, and family. These 
questions have been pervasive in post-homophile era social movements, but only relatively 
recently have they been appropriated in legal reasoning and political decision-making. In part, 
the Obergefell decision was an answer to those questions. Obergefell asserted enduring love, 
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deep respect and fulfillment as common markers of Americans’ pursuit for happiness, 
irrespective of one’s sex/gender/orientation. Post-Obergefell legal logic contends a marital 
partnership is no more defined by the sex/gender/orientation of the partners than sexual intimacy 
is defined by genitalia, than a family is defined as the traditional nuclear model. Obergefell 
crystalized a fundamental obstacle for LGBTQIA+ rights advocates: status quo politics 
misrepresents intimate partnerships, marriage and family and the value clusters that had come to 
be associated with those performances of private life in public domain.  
Lawrence and Garner v. Texas, the Vote NO campaign, and Campaign for Southern 
Equality v. Mississippi encapsulate primary contexts wherein deliberation about queer rights 
policy take place. As exemplars of LGBTQIA+ advocacy, within and without the state and 
federal courtroom, these case studies reveal how vernacular, social movement rhetorics can be 
appropriated in legal argument to challenge legal precedent regarding queer rights. The three 
case studies I have examined develop a prescriptive vision for queer legal worldmaking. Ranging 
from the U.S. Supreme Court (Lawrence), to the Mississippi statewide Supreme Court 
(Campaign), to the TVs and billboards of Minnesota (Vote NO), advocates involved with the 
case studies constituted policy-making communities in legal and extra-legal contexts. These case 
studies demonstrate the dialectic relationship between social movements and the law as 
advocates attempt to make queer partnerships and families more present in political discourse. 
In this chapter, I summarize the key arguments I have advanced in this dissertation and 
contextualize the contributions I have made to several theoretical areas including, intersections 
of social movement and legal discourses, the role of affect in creating presence, and the function 
of abstract and concrete values in community formation. This dissertation has affirmed that 
affecting change in legal and public deliberative discourses is often met with firm resistance and 
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is fraught with identitarian political conflict. Nevertheless, legal traditions and the social 
constructions that bolster them can be impacted through argument. Argument strategies for 
bringing about change, like those discussed in the prior case studies, take advantage of moments 
wherein values are renegotiated and reasserted in particular ways for particular parties. Moments 
of dissonance enable a reshuffling of who can be counted as a vested member of the community 
at stake and what values define the community. With this in mind, I conclude the chapter by 
discussing practical pathways forward for scholars and advocates hoping to engender continued 
resistance to laws and movements that would obfuscate or delegitimize queer lifeways. 
Affect as a Tool for Creating Presence 
 A way of addressing the difficulty of bringing about change in legal deliberative contexts, 
affect as a feature of loci of presence bring problems associated with anti-LGBTQIA+ policy to 
the fore and to renegotiate community ties. In Lawrence Lambda Legal turned to loci of 
magnitude to make discursively present the material harms of anti-sodomy legislation for vested 
parties beyond homosexual individuals. Texas’ Homosexual Conduct Law outlawed homosexual 
sodomy only, which meant that the person was being policed, not the action itself. For that 
reason, Lambda highlighted the affective resonance of government’s “prying eyes” and the 
notion that all U.S. citizens value privacy and self-determination. Prior to Lawrence, same-sex 
couples who had been arrested for homosexual conduct violations in states like Texas who 
upheld and enforced statutes condemning such behavior, gays and lesbians could be designated 
as criminals, relegated to a status of delinquency in the community. The Lawrence decision, 
however, codified that the threat against private intimacy was a matter of public concern for 
same- and opposite-sex couples alike. From an affective standpoint, Lambda’s argument 
deemphasized the emotional justification for designating homosexuality (and by extension, 
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homosexual sodomy) as immoral and diminished the negative affective resonance that had for so 
long been associated with homosexual sodomy. Lambda brought to the fore the unpleasantness 
of an altogether different scenario: that of “prying government eyes” watching the most intimate 
moments that take place in the bedroom.  
 The Vote NO campaign turned to loci of proximity to argue that amendments defining 
marriage as a union between one man and one woman would have unintended negative 
consequences for those closest to voters. Similar to Lawrence, advocates involved with the Vote 
NO campaign built community bonds between same- and opposite-sex couples. These appeals 
worked to create a community of vested individuals who valued love and commitment as the 
primary pillars of marriage and family. Specifically, the campaign redrew community lines 
around the shared experiences that marked day-to-day life as a family. Campaign spots cited the 
daily battle to get kids off to school and get to work on time, the importance of bringing up 
children to understand the dignity of their family, and the public performance of kinship. The 
campaign spoke directly to undecided voters, who may not have otherwise realized they had skin 
in the game, so to speak. By dialectically negotiating what marriage and family could look like, 
Vote NO highlighted for voters the threat posed to already existing families who would have 
been deemed “second-class” were the amendment to pass. In this case study, perhaps more so 
than hearings in the courtroom, the influence of affect on public opinion and the dialectic process 
of public argument was integral to success.  
Advocates for Campaign argued from loci of severity to emphasize the problems with 
Mississippi’s adoption law that kept same-sex couples from legally adopting. The plaintiffs in 
the case turned to the affective elements of child displacement to reveal a problem more dire than 
the idea of placing children in homes where they would be fostered or raised by same-sex 
163 
 
couples. By amplifying the experiences of families headed by same-sex couples, or same-sex 
couples seeking to adopt, CSE highlighted two entwined problems simultaneously. The first was 
that the ban wrongfully deprived gay and lesbian couples of their constitutional rights. The 
second was that the ban also posed problems for children with same-sex parents, the dignity of 
whose family was stripped, and a significant number of children in Mississippi in need of 
placement. CSE emphasized the affective resonance of “the home” to create rhetorical space for 
progressive models of the American family to dwell.  
In each of the case studies, politically conservative arguments aimed toward preserving 
the status quo assumed that the majority of Americans considered homosexual partnerships 
immoral and deviant. Yet the rhetorical embodiment of lived experiences created the possibility 
for progressive arguments as intelligible and suasory on multiple legal and cultural levels. 
Counting on the affective function of values in argument, advocates in each case renegotiated 
community ties through loci of presence.  
Reshaping Abstract and Concrete Values through Presence and Affect 
Affect and presence make it possible to renegotiate the field of argument in legal 
reasoning and reorder the hierarchical relationship between values that come to bear on legal 
debates over the expansion of queer rights. Namely, advocates in each case study grounded their 
arguments in concrete values like sexual partnership, marriage, family and the home and 
established associations between abstract values like privacy, love, commitment, stability and 
safety. In so doing, advocates created the opportunity to lessen the argumentative impact of 
moral arguments regarding sex/sexual orientation. The rhetorical process of associating and 
dissociating concrete and abstract values from one another is useful when resolving value-driven 
arguments. Abstract values are general, transcend specific circumstances, and are not inherently 
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connected to any one instance or experience. However when abstract values are paired with a 
concrete value that is attached to “a living being, a specific group, or a particular object,” the 
meaning of either value can be reframed. 307 Through its connection to an abstract value, a 
concrete value may be reframed to suit more universal contexts, and universal values can be 
made more specific.308 Manipulating the relationship between abstract and concrete values is 
particularly useful in legal and political contexts. Individuals may claim allegiance to any 
number of concrete values but it is difficult to reconcile abstract values without the 
argumentative process of establishing similarities through particulars. 309 As such, arguing from 
the abstract to the concrete, and vice versa, was useful for advocates in these case studies who 
sought to minimize the cognitive dissonance that for some, issued from embracing morality and 
love and commitment within the context of queer partnerships and families.  
The process of moving from between abstract and concrete values manifested slightly 
differently in each case study. When arguing on behalf of Lawrence and Garner, Lambda Legal 
decoupled values associated with moral rightness from questions of homosexual sodomy by 
building fresh associations between morality and privacy. Shifting the imperative for moral 
rightness, Lambda argued that privacy was an apt particular within which morality was reflected. 
By establishing privacy as a concrete value representative of abstract notions of moral rightness, 
Lambda could then assert the moral implications of defending same-sex partnerships, which 
were as deserving of privacy as intimate partnerships between opposite-sex couples, from the 
prying eyes of government. Through loci of magnitude, Lambda renegotiated the hierarchical 
relationship between morality and privacy as values reflective of everyday American 
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experiences. Community lines were redrawn; parties impacted by anti-sodomy laws were 
constituted as Americans concerned with equal dignity and individual liberty, not their 
sex/gender/orientation. In moving from the abstract to the concrete, Lambda asserted that every 
American, gay or straight, should expect that they would be free to live their lives without the 
government’s intrusion into their homes, into their bedrooms.  
Vote NO, on the other hand, moved from the concrete value of marriage and family 
toward abstract values of love and commitment in order to establish that same- and opposite-sex 
unions are more similar than they are different. Through loci of proximity, Minnesotans United 
countered arguments that defined marriage by the type of union (i.e., the relative 
sex/gender/desire of the partners). Rather, marriage was defined by the depth and strength of a 
loving, intimate relationship. Similar to the strategy used by Lambda, Vote NO shifted the moral 
implication for voters. While Vote Yes asserted the moral imperative to defend religious 
freedom, Vote NO asserted that voters had the moral obligation to defend their friends and 
neighbors from the threat posed by Amendment One. Leaning heavily on the affective aspects of 
the Golden Rule, Minnesotans United encouraged voters to reconsider the ways in which 
families were counted. As key players in the dialectic, Minnesotans renegotiated the value 
associations that define marriage and family such that those closest to them could seek public 
recognition as members of a unified community. In so doing, the debate over Amendment One 
could be shifted away from a discussion of religious freedom and moral superiority toward a 
defense of marriage and family as a lived experience, shared by those who value love, 
commitment and the Golden Rule. 
Finally, CSE established a crisis of instability, financial cost, and loss of dignity, all of 
which are grounded in loci of severity, to facilitate a hierarchical reordering of values within the 
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discourse. Whereas the defendants of the case sought to situate the moral fitness of the parents or 
guardians as superior to other Albright factors, the progressive party diminished arguments 
related to the moral fitness of gay parents as hierarchically inferior, both in relative importance 
and veracity with regard to the plaintiff’s case. References to “actual reality” and “authentic 
family life” brought abstract values associated with family closer in line with the lived 
experiences that represent “the home.” In other words, reorienting the frame of reference away 
from the abstract and toward the concrete via affective appeals exalted the material needs of 
children above the ideological commitments of lawmakers. CSE amplified the problem of child 
displacement by contending that displaced children were particularly vulnerable and in need of 
stability, dignity and suitable homes. Doing so made it possible to shift the field of argument 
away from the moral fitness of same-sex couples as parents and toward a discussion of what 
constitutes a safe and loving home. The adoption ban was positioned as outmoded and overly 
rigid, incapable of adequately responding to the accelerating need for permanent, legal 
guardianship for displaced children and those living in same-sex households. Similar to the logic 
used in Lawrence and Vote NO, CSE emphasized the affective resonance of concrete values in 
order to forge fresh associations to abstract progressive values. In shifting the field of argument 
away from purely abstract value warrants pertaining to Christian ideology and morality, 
progressive advocates enabled a more inclusive argument imbued with greater plasticity and 
dynamism than outdated legal precedents could contain. 
Renegotiating Value Hierarchies in Legal reasoning 
This renegotiation of abstract and concrete values in relation to one another makes two 
main outcomes possible in political contexts. First, by shifting the field of argument, advocates 
can make queer perspectives legally relevant and the values associated with such perspectives as 
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superior to others. Values and value arguments can become relevant in queer legal worldmaking 
when they achieve “stickiness” across both legal and social movement discourses. Renegotiating 
the relationship between abstract and concrete values in legal debate empowers progressive 
advocates to read queer perspectives in the values that people hold most dear. In other words, 
values and value warrants can empower a person to argue not only for a particular action, as a 
reflection of a certain point of view, but also to assert the superiority of arguing from that point 
of view. The valuation of queer perspectives in legal reasoning assigns importance to those 
perspectives and invites the audience to assume a similar point of view. In the case studies, 
values and appeals based on values were powerful argumentative supplements that created a 
queer-inclusive worldview, justified by its relevance and affective resonance. 
Second, shifting the field of argument through affective channels can make concrete 
values superior to abstract values. In selecting certain elements over others as evidence in an 
argument, the relative importance and pertinence of those elements is elevated as well.310 
Concrete values are particularly useful when the hierarchical relationship among values are 
actively negotiated. Concrete values operate as touchstones that make abstract values re-
interpretable. When values are in dispute, “a person may disqualify it, subordinate it to others, or 
interpret it but may not reject all values as a whole.”311 Same-sex partnerships and families, 
when represented discursively can gain legitimacy as concrete, representations of value 
arguments that had already been made legally relevant. Arguments that spoke to the importance 
of preserving the nation’s moral history, honoring a faith-filled lifeway, and bringing up children 
in stable, loving homes created rhetorical space in which Lambda Legal, Minnesotans United, 
and CSE could ultimately realign abstract and concrete values with queered material referents. 
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Though conservative and progressive parties contend morality as important, in dispute were the 
concrete values that reflect it. In Lawrence, Lambda built associations between morality and a 
defense of privacy through the imagery of a bedroom, the physical representation of sexual 
intimacy. Vote NO linked morality with the Golden Rule in order to motivate voters to defend 
their friends and neighbors from the negative consequences of Amendment One. When arguing 
Campaign, CSE linked morality with the dignity of the home and an ethic of care. In each case, 
the simultaneous coupling and uncoupling of abstract and concrete values made it possible to 
assert affective arguments as convincing and superior to other modes of argument. The process 
of creating and sustaining value hierarchies with respect to ideological formations necessitates 
that a person acknowledge and dispense with those in opposition. As Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca argue, “In this respect, values are comparable to facts: for, when one of the interlocutors 
puts forward a value, one must argue to get rid of it, under pain of refusing the discussion; and in 
general, the argument will imply that other values are accepted.”312 As the relationships between 
abstract and concrete values are renegotiated, the acceptable parameters of argument may also 
shift. As such, value hierarchies enable the negotiation of values across social contexts and are 
integral to the process of creating and interpreting legal precedent. Values and value hierarchies 
are useful constructs in argument, particularly when challenging the status quo. The success of 
such arguments depends largely on the perceived relevance for vested audiences. As such, 
deliberative moments wherein values are renegotiated, or reasserted as hierarchically superior or 
inferior relative to one another, constitute a kairotic moment in which communities may be 
reconstituted, bound by shared affiliation to those values.  
Theoretical Implications 
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This dissertation contributes to several theoretical conversations. First, the three case 
studies provide a more complete picture about how legal change happens. More specifically, this 
dissertation discusses the ways in which social movement and legal rhetorics both contribute to 
the formation of policy and queer legal worldmaking. Language is integral to the creation of 
meaning in legal discourse and how values come to represent dearly held community ties. The 
law is reflective of cultural and social activities, all of which are dependent on language.313 As a 
social and cultural function, the law is  
something we do with our minds, with language, and with each other. This is a way of 
looking at the law not as a set of rules or institutions or structures (as it is usually 
envisaged), nor as a part of our bureaucracy or government (to be thought of in terms of 
political science or sociology or economics), but as a kind of rhetorical […] activity.314 
If laws constrain behavior, then argument creates and constrains the possibilities for the 
formation of law. The law is far from static. It can be translated and reappropriated for and by 
particular audiences in order to achieve socio-legal rights. Importantly then, judges, lawyers, 
voters, plaintiffs, defendants, and laypersons all may be constituted as a community of 
stakeholders in policy. The law is at its core a constitutive force and through argument, can 
impact how communities are created and transformed. Not merely a “system of rules (or rules 
and principles), nor reducible to policy choices or class interests,” the law is a cultural context 
within which one party seeks to persuade another toward a particular position.315 The law’s 
greatest and most basic power is “in the coercive aspect of its rhetoric – in the way it structures 
sensibility and vision.”316 The law is created through the collaboration between existent policy 
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and vernacular, grassroots and even extra-legal discourses that are rooted in the assertion of lived 
experience as legitimate resources in argument. Yet communities must be constituted and 
actively revitalized through argument. Understanding the ways in which social movements 
intersect with legal discourse is key to understanding how the law is created. As these case 
studies have shown, law is not only a product of the technical sphere, but of the public sphere.317  
Second, as a function of technical and public sphere discourses, the negotiation between 
abstract and concrete values is a primary vehicle for queer legal worldmaking. Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca note the movement between abstract and concrete values can serve a key 
function in resolving value-driven arguments. As a value that is associated to specific ideas, 
persons, or objects, concrete values are an entry point for affective arguments.318 Abstract values, 
when associated with the concrete, transcend specific circumstances and can facilitate the 
process of reframing the meaning of either value. Once the connection is made, a particular value 
may be reframed to suit more universal contexts, and universal values can be made more 
specific.319 In the three cases studies, advocates deployed abstract values as tools for revolution 
and concrete values as tools for community building. In turning to abstract values such as 
privacy, love and commitment, and the ethic of care, concrete values like family and the home 
could be made more inclusive. Similarly, by deploying the affective resonance of concrete 
values, and by building associations to the abstract, advocates could impact the relative 
importance of abstract values. The renegotiation of the hierarchical position of abstract and 
concrete values facilitated progressive argument in each respective political context. While 
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politically conservative arguments relied heavily on the moral deviance of same-sex couples and 
parents, progressive arguments shifted the meaning of morality altogether, while simultaneously 
heightening the relative importance of other abstract values. What these cases ultimately 
illustrate is that both a hierarchical reordering of values and an assertion of concrete values as 
reflective of their more universally accepted, abstract counterparts is useful in progressive 
political argument. When contradictions arise between abstract values like morality, love or care, 
it is difficult to reconcile the contradictions without establishing similarities through particulars. 
As such, arguing from the abstract to the particular, and vice versa, is a practical method for 
reconciling contradicting value arguments and redrawing community lines around shared values 
in legal and public deliberative contexts.  
Third, this dissertation more fully explores the function of affect in loci of presence. Each 
of the three loci of presence that were illustrated in this dissertation provide insight into how 
representations of queer partnerships and families gain visibility and legitimacy in the legal 
sphere. Argumentative appeals rooted in the magnitude, proximity and severity of problems 
associated with regulating sexual intimacy, marriage and family building could make the 
rhetorical embodiment of queer persons and lifeways “sticky” across both legal and social 
movement discourses. The discursive aspects of lived experience were vital resources for 
arguing from the loci of magnitude, proximity, and severity. Arguing through affect facilitates a 
“discursive effect” that makes a “phenomenon, idea, concept, process, or person [more] vivid, 
tangible, and /or proximate to an audience.”320 This “verbal magic” both focuses the audience’s 
attention while altering its perceptions and perspectives, and motivates an audience toward an 
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action or judgment.321 As an instrumental technique of argumentation, which often elicits 
emotional responses geared toward initiating a change in audience’s attitudes or behavior, 
presence is persuasive and speaks to experiential existence.322 
The process of making values more present is an inherently affective process. Presence 
“acts directly on our sensibility”323 and has “an indisputable effect on those who recognize the 
symbolic connection, but none at all on others.”324 Illustrations that amplify or analogize 
experiences and values contribute to the affective impact of presence. Illustrations that made 
vivid and specific that which as abstract were useful for advocates in the Vote NO campaign and 
for the CSE. Amplifying the existence and legitimacy of queer partnerships and lifeways as 
fundamentally similar to those of heterosexual couples facilitated the transposition of queer 
perspectives in policy-making. No longer should queer partnerships and families be obfuscated 
within the law. No longer should queer partnerships and families be abstract reflections of some 
immoral lifeway. Loci of presence, and the affective impact of amplification, created rhetorical 
space for queer persons and the values they hold dear within the policies that govern their lives.  
Moreover, affective arguments can make the process of political negotiation more 
pleasurable. Rather than adopt a confrontationalist perspective wherein winners triumph over 
losers on an ideological battleground, dialectic negotiation predicated on affective commonality 
broadens communities of protest to include non-marginalized individuals as vested parties. What 
these case studies illustrate is that arguing alongside comrades can be a more comfortable 
process than arguing against an enemy.  As a direct living out of the Golden Rule, the emotional 
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resonance of amplification facilitates the presence of queer perspectives in common values, 
which are essential resources in legal argumentation and the constitution of communities of 
protest.325 
Finally, these case studies show how amplifying queer experiences by moving from 
abstract to concrete value arguments takes advantage of the plasticity of concepts and better 
enables progressive advocates to respond to the exigencies they face and to make more strategic 
considerations of their audience. Each successive case study appealed to a broader audience than 
the last by relating the problems associated with each respective contested policy to a wider 
circumference of vested individuals. When advocating on behalf of Lawrence and Garner, 
Lambda Legal’s primary task was to supplant outmoded legal precedent regarding sexual activity 
between two people. The outcome of the case not only challenged moral judgments that 
relegated homosexual relationships to a criminal status, but also overturned outmoded legal 
precedent that designated privacy and sexual intimacy beyond the scope of legal protection. By 
turning to loci of magnitude, Lambda set the stage for legal debates to follow in two key ways. 
Initially, Lambda developed the moral imperative for the state to protect the privacy of its 
citizens. Secondly, by amplifying the magnitude of the harms brought about by Texas’ 
Homosexual Conduct Law Lambda illustrated how morality as an abstract value could have 
stronger ties to the virtue of private, intimate partnership than to sexual desire or orientation. 
Before the Lawrence decision, homosexual individuals were still represented as a social 
“infection,” capable of spreading the disease of deviance within an otherwise virtuous populous. 
A post-Lawrence legalscape however, exonerated gay couples from their criminal status and co-
created a cultural narrative that cast Bowers-era legal logic as the infectious disease in need of 
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eradication. Lambda’s argument created rhetorical space wherein protecting citizens’ privacy 
was the state’s moral imperative, superior to outdated models of American morality. The case 
called into question the assumed moral deviance associated with homosexuality while also 
making legal debates about privacy and intimate relationships of greater concern to a greater 
number of people. 
When arguing against Amendment One Minnesotans United built from the successes 
Lambda achieved in Lawrence by making more proximal the threats not only to intimate 
partnerships but also to families. The Vote NO campaign invited the voting public to weigh in on 
what makes a family a family with the expressed goal of widening the scope of who would be 
counted. The dialectic negotiation and affective arguments facilitated the constitution of 
persuadable voters as a community bound by abstract values like commitment and love and 
decoupled traditional family values from traditionally upheld definitions of marriage. By framing 
the family as a concrete value irrespective of the sex/gender/orientation of the married partners, 
Vote NO created rhetorical space for gay and lesbian heads of households that already materially 
existed. Importantly, Vote NO shifted the issue of marriage equality toward a debate about 
family equality. Amendment One in Minnesota predated Obergefell, which meant that the 
definitional stasis of marriage remained unsettled in legal discourse. Vote NO broadened the 
stakes of marriage equality to encompass the importance of the family. What Vote NO ultimately 
accomplished was to translate legal debate into a context wherein public opinion could stand in 
for legal precedent and wherein voters would have a direct hand in creating policy. In this case, 
more than the others, vernacular discourses intersected with legal rhetorics in order to further 
widen the public’s purview in creating law. In so doing, the community of vested individuals not 
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only widened to include individuals from non-marginalized communities, but also enabled those 
members to see their gay and lesbian friends and neighbors’ interests as proximal to their own.   
Finally, Campaign for Southern Equality v. Mississippi extended the successes of 
Lawrence, Vote NO and Obergefell by asserting the moral imperative of providing care as a 
social responsibility, one that takes precedence over antiquated moral objections to same-sex 
couples as parents. CSE made present the severity of the problem of child displacement in order 
to argue for the superiority of placement in homes headed by same-sex couples. While morality 
was a relevant abstract value for the plaintiffs and defendants, the plaintiffs shifted the meaning 
of morality through its association to the concrete value of “the home.” Whereas Lawrence 
subordinated morality as an abstract value less important than privacy, CSE returned to a 
conversation of morality, albeit from a different field of argument. The affective resonance of 
anecdotal evidence served progressive arguments that highlighted the uniquely severe problem 
of child displacement. In a post-Obergefell legalscape, married couples (gay or straight) are 
charged with an ethic of care, a moral imperative to take responsibility for children through 
foster care, adoption, or by supporting others’ choice to provide such care. Campaign worked to 
widen the community of vested individuals beyond intimate partners and families to encompass 
societal interest. Mississippi’s Adoption Ban characterized households by the 
sex/gender/orientation of the figureheads. What the case ultimately illustrates however is that 
sex/gender/orientation is not inherently nor incontrovertibly coupled with marriage and family. 
Linkages between moral virtue and same-sex attraction are contestable and likely will continue 
to be outmoded through legal argument. Additionally, abstract values like love, stability, and 
care have strong affective connections to the home and the values that define it. Defined by the 
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“right to be left alone,” love and commitment, and an ethic of care, the home is an apt vector 
through which to sustain queer legal worldmaking.  
Queer Legal Worldmaking and Rhetorical Change 
 Legal and social change is slow and complex. The result of incremental collaboration 
among vested parties to determine shared futures, such change requires continual, often 
uncomfortable negotiation to determine who can be counted as a vested party and what 
constitutes a shared future. Social movement rhetorics are important features of community 
building and social progress, and it is imperative that these rhetorics are understood. It is also 
vitally important to understand how social movements and legal rhetorics intersect and reach out 
to a persuadable audience in order to create lasting and meaningful change. This dissertation has 
established that affect as a tool of presence can reach persuadable audiences to both widen 
community boundaries and make LGBTQIA+ families and lifeways more present in legal 
discourse. Specifically, queer perspectives that are already evident in social movement contexts 
are amplified within legal contexts through loci of presence. As a process of “competing 
examples,” legal reasoning produces decisions that arise out of a process in which “parties as 
well as the court participate in the law making.”326 Litigants, judges, plaintiffs, defendants and 
the public all have a stake in the laws that are created as well as laws that exist. On some level, 
each vested individual has played some role in making law.  
 A primary rhetorical problem that this dissertation has illuminated and, in part, addressed 
is that of creating an argument that is “sticky” for persuadable audiences. This is a problem that 
continues to hamper deliberation about the expansion of rights for queer persons. The Obergefell 
decision assuaged the problem somewhat, specifically in deliberation about same-sex marriage. 
                                                          
326 Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 504. 
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Obergefell made any remaining statewide prohibitions on same-sex marriage unenforceable. 
However, marriage is not the only socio-economic issue around which legal and public debate 
remains heated for LGBTQIA+ advocates. Since 1977, eleven states have passed some form of 
prohibition on adoption rights for same-sex couples.327 Ranging from a resistance to the 
institution of gender-neutral terms for parentage, disallowing gay partners to adopt the biological 
children of their partners, to all-encompassing prohibition that prevent same-sex couples from 
fostering or adopting children altogether, these laws relegate same-sex couples to a second class 
status and bring about significant harm to the children caught in the crosshairs of the continued 
political firestorm.  
Beyond the scope of marriage and adoption rights, queer and trans persons have also 
been targeted by exclusionary policies with regard to access to bathrooms and service in the 
armed forces. On August 25, 2017, President Trump signed a directive to reinstate a ban on 
transgender individuals from serving in the military. Caveats to the ban have continued to 
emerge from the Administration, namely through President Trump’s deference to the pentagon in 
implementing the ban as well as the reservations that have been articulated by Secretary of 
Defense, James Mattis. Nevertheless, the ban echoes deliberative premises that facilitated the 
passage and eventual overturning of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Despite the gains that have been 
made through legal triumphs like Obergefell, discrimination against LGBTQIA+ individuals in 
workplaces, the military, and even rented properties is a persistent obstacle to those fighting for 
full rights and recognition of personhood within these communities. The attempt by communities 
hostile to LGBTQIA+ rights advancement to preserve the status quo and resist the installation of 
progressive policy makes the battle for persuadable audiences of even greater importance. 
                                                          
327 Those states include Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, and Wisconsin. 
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In large part, affect is a component in legal and public argument that reiterates the 
material consequences of policy for those the policy impacts. Of key utility in affective strategies 
is the function of empathy as an abstract value capable of associating with myriad concrete 
values. Advocates have deployed the constitutive power of empathy, through affect, to gain 
access to communities and public platforms wherein they can bring about change, not only 
within the case studies included in this dissertation and the realm of queer rights, but also civil 
rights as a whole. Empathy as an abstract value drove the activist agenda headed by Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr. who argued that empathy and justice were inextricably linked. As King wrote in 
the Letter from Birmingham Jail,  
injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable 
network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly 
affects all indirectly. Never again can we afford to live with the narrow, provincial 
‘outside agitator’ idea. Anyone who lives inside the United States can never be 
considered an outsider”328  
Through King’s paradigm, the application of justice through the law is contestable. We whom 
the law governs have vested interest in ensuring that the law is just. Through argument, 
communities bound by collective stake in moral justice, who fought on behalf of the “plight of 
the negro” in the 60s, advocate now for the interests of queer brethren in the present day. An 
affectively resonant argument, King’s appeal to empathy reveals two interrelated truths that 
maintain their relevance across legal and extra-legal contexts: 1) Americanness cannot be 
characterized by one singular archetype, and 2) all American citizens are implicated in the 
perpetuation of injustice through the law for their continued allegiance to the United States. As 
                                                          
328 Martin Luther King Jr., “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” August 1963, para. 4. 
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has been illustrated in prior pages, there are deep injustices embedded into the notion of “law and 
order” in this country. Laws that violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution by 
privileging a certain way of living at the expense of other alternatives perpetuate an injustice 
rooted in the extra-legal rhetorics that along with legal rhetorics, formulate public opinion. 
Drawing concrete connections between the notion of empathy and the material interests of 
marginalized communities is an affective process that can bring to the light injustices otherwise 
left obfuscated. For lasting and meaningful change to take place such injustices must not only 
revealed but experienced by those who are part of the impacted community. Rhetorical 
embodiment is a powerful tool for accomplishing this task. Following the rule of law is not 
enough in the pursuit of higher justice, and the rule of law cannot alone illuminate the shared 
stakes of public life. Rather, the interaction between social movement and legal rhetorics provide 
the tools needed to ensure that the law is just. 
Affect is a means through which advocates can renegotiate the values and value 
hierarchies that become relevant in legal debate. The reordering and re-coupling of abstract 
values and the concrete values and the shifting of the field of argument away from points of 
division toward points of unification, enable advocates to come to fight for the interests of their 
fellow citizens, rather than against the interests of the status quo. Individual legal cases serve as 
prominent and fertile grounds on which to apply such political strategy. Individual lawsuits put 
into stark relief the material, lived experience of injustice – and enable legal practitioners to 
tackle isolated premises as opposed to entire social platforms. Lambda Legal argued through 
Lawrence that no one would be less free to live their life authentically if intimate partnerships 
between gay men were decriminalized. Rather, all Americans would be more free to live their 
lives openly. Minnesotans United argued through the Vote NO campaign that marriage would 
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not be trivialized or in any way marred should same-sex marriages be recognized by the State. 
Rather, families already in existence would be more free to share in community life. CSE argued 
through Campaign that children would be no more harmed in the legal custody of gay, lesbian, 
and queer guardians. Rather, children in need of stability could gain access to safe and loving 
homes. Advocates in each case study in this dissertation deployed the strategic benefits of 
presence and affect to illustrate that fabric of our nation is made stronger by the addition of more 
threads, more voices that represent the shared qualities that unite all of us under a common 
banner. In creating seats for queer perspectives and lifeways at the proverbial table, affect lessens 
the inevitable tension experienced by those loyal to the status quo. Welcoming queer 
perspectives into legal paradigms does not take space away from one to give to the next. There 
are more than enough possibilities, more than enough seats when we build a bigger table.   
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